LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 

SiLelf....K-5.; 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



THE POWER AND AUTHORITY ] 

1 
OF j 

SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS 1 



IN THE MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNMENT OF 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND OVER PUPILS OUT OF SCHOOL 

AS DETERMINED BY THE 

COURTS OF THE SEVERAL STATES 



A MEMBER OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAR ] 




NEW YORK 
HARPER & BROTHERS, FRANKLIN SQUARE 

1885 



i%. V. 






Copyright, 1885, by Harper & Brothers. 



All righU reserved. 



PREFACE. 



This collection of decisions, bearing upon the 
powers and authority of school officers and teach- 
ers in the management and government of public 
schools, is the result of a careful examination of re- 
ported cases in the several states. The work was 
first undertaken to enable me, as a school officer, 
to answer, with some show of authority, the ques- 
tions constantly presented. Its publication has 
been advised and urged by many directly interested 
in school work, and by a large number of teachers 
eminent in their profession. The need of such a 
book has been long felt and acknowledged. With- 
out commenting upon the form or substance of 
other publications relating to the law of schools, it 
is sufficient to say that this book, in plan and scope, 
is unlike all others, and certainly embodies more 
recent law than any other. 

My plan has been to fully state the facts upon 
which each case arose and was determined, and the 
opinion of the court, not the substance of the deci- 
sion. The cases relating to the same subject matter 



IV PREFACE. 

have been grouped, and reported An tlie order of 
date, with cross references and annotations. 

In a number of states the decision of all ques- 
tions arising in the administration of schools is left 
to the school oflScers, with provisions for appeal 
from town or subordinate officials to those of the 
county, and thence to the highest school officials of 
the state. In some states the final decisions are 
published. In making up this collection of cases I 
have not resorted to the decisions thus made, but 
have taken those rendered by courts. In the re- 
ports of cases decided by school officials the state- 
ment of facts and the decision are usually very mea- 
gre and unsatisfactory, while the opinion of a court 
defines the principles governing the case. Again, 
the tribunals thus created within the school system 
follow and depend, in a large measure, upon the 
law as announced by courts. 

I have added at the close of the book, in appendi- 
ces, abstracts of the laws of the states relating to the 
supervision of schools, and the suspension, expulsion, 
and punishment of pupils, and other matters. 

The Compiler. 



CONTENTS. 



General Powers of School Officers Page 2 

What is a Eeasonable Rule ? 2 

Rule as to Tardiness and Absence 3 

Bendick Y. Bahcock^ I ^1 T ■ 'SC^ 3 
Chandler v. Bahcock^ ) ' 

Thompson v. Beaver, 63 111. 356.... , 8 

Russell V. Lynnfield, 116 Mass. 366. 9 

Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444 , 10 

King V. Jefferson City School Board, 11 Mo. 628 .. . 20 

Churchill v. Fewkes, 13 Brad. Rep. 520 22 

Rules Concerning Studies 24 

Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 24 

Guernsey v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 226 33 

Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 34 

Rulison V. Post, 79 111. 567 41 

Sewell V. Board of Fducation, 29 0. St. 89 44 

Trustees v. People, 87 111. 303 46 

State V. Mizner, 50 Iowa, 152 * 50 

Kidder v. Chellis, 59 K H. 473 52 

Note 56 

Rules in Other Cases 68 

Spiller V. Woburn, 12 All. 127 68 

Perkins v. Board of Directors, 56 Iowa, 479 72 

Suspension and Expulsion 74 

Hodgkins v. Rockport, 105 Mass. 475 76 



VI CONTENTS. 

Suspension and Expulsion — Continued: 

Scott V. School 'District, 46 Vt. 452 .Page 11 

State V. Burtoyi, 45 Wis. 150 78 

Parker v. School District, 5 Lea, 525 80 

Davis V. City of Boston, 133 Mass. 103 83 

Hughes v. Goodell, 3 Pitts. R. 264 86 

Peck V. Smith, 41 Conn. 442 88 

Rights and Powers oyer Pupils for Acts Committed 

Out op School. , . , 91 

Sherman v. Charlestown, 8 Cush. 160 91 

Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 96 

Murphy v. Board of Directors, 30 Iowa, 429 99 

Dritt V. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286 102 

Corporal Punishment 105 

State V. Pendergrass, 2 Dev. & Batt. 365 105 

Hathaioay v. Rice, 19 Vt. 102 109 

Stevens v. Fassett, 21 Me. 266 110 

Cooper V. McJunMn, 4 Ind. 291 113 

Gardner v. State, 4 lud. 633 115 

Commonwealth v. Randall, 4 Gray, 36 116 

Anderson v. State, 3 Head, 455 119 

Lander v. Seaver, 82 Vt. 114 121 

State V. Mizner, 50 Iowa, 152 122 

Dannenhoffer v. State, 69 Ind. 295 124 

Commonwealth v. Seed, 5 Pa. L. J. R. 78 126 

Note 129 

Rules Need not be Recorded, and Rules Made by 

Teachers and Ratified by Board are Binding 130 

Pupils Over Age Subject to Rules 133 

Teachers Acting in Good Faith not Personally Liable 1 34 

Authority op Teacher in Charge op School, without 

Holding Certificate op Appointment 138 

State V. Williams, 21 Yt 156 140 



CONTENTS. Vll 

APPENDIX A. Page 

Statk Laws in Relation to Powers of School Officers,. 143 

APPENDIX B. 

State Laws in Relation to Suspension and Expulsion.. 159 

APPENDIX C. 

State Laws in Relation to Powers of Teachers 167 

APPENDIX D. 

State Laws in Relation to Insults to Teachers 169 

INDEX Ill 



POWER AND AUTHORITY 

OF 

SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 



In defining herein the rights and powers of teach- 
ers and school ofiicers in the management of schools, 
as determined by the courts of last resort of the 
several states of the Union, we assume, at the out- 
set, that the school officers — committee, visitors, 
trustees, directors, or however designated by statute 
— have been legally chosen ; that the teachers have 
been found worthy and well qualified, and have re- 
ceived certificates of approval and election from the 
proper source;* that the school taxes have been 
legally assessed ; that the person having such duty 
has employed a boy to open and sweep the school- 
room and build the fire ; that the scholars have 
arrived, and the teacher is ready to call them to 
order. 

* For authority of teacher having no certificate, see p. 138. 



2 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

By starting from tliis point we /know better where 
we are, and escape a great number of conflicting de- 
cisions which arose in the judicial interpretation of 
statutes enacted in the early days of school legisla- 
tion. 

GENERAL POWERS OF SCHOOL OFFICERS. 

A general power of charge and supervision of 
schools includes the power to make- all reasona- 
ble rules and regulations for the discipline, govern- 
ment, and management of the schools. (5 Gush. 
[Mass.] 198; 8 Gush. [Mass.] 160; 12 All. [Mass.] 
127; 105 Mass. 476; 63 111. 353.) 

(For power as given by law in different states, 
see Appendix A.) 

WHAT IS -A REASONABLE RULE 

is a question of law to be determined by the courts, 
or by officers designated by law to pass upon ques- 
tions arising in the administration of the school 
laws. (63 111. 353 ; 48 Yt. 476, 477.) The Iowa 
Supreme Gourt makes a general definition as fol- 
lows; "Any rule of the school, not subversive of 
the rights of the children or parents, or in conflict 
with humanity and the precepts of divine law, which 
tends to advance the object of the law in establish- 
ing public schools, must be considered reasonable 
and proper." (31 Iowa, 565.) 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 



RULE AS TO TARDINESS AND ABSENCE. 

Iowa, ISVl. — Bendick v. Bahcock^ ) 

Chandler v. Babcock, \ ^^ ^^^''^' ^^2- 

The board of directors and teachers in a district 
in Iowa adopted the following rules, among others: 
" Any pupil who is absent six half days in any con- 
secutive four weeks, and two times tardy, shall be 
counted as one absence, unless detained by sickness 
or other unavoidable cause, and shall be suspended 
from the schools until the end of the terra, or until 
reinstated by the superintendent or board." " Teach- 
ers may require absence and tardiness to be certified 
to by parent or guardian in writing, or personally, 
or by special messenger. All lessons lost on account 
of absence may be made up at the discretion of the 
teacher." 

Two cases arising under this rule were passed 
upon by the Supreme Court in 1871. In the first, 
a boy was absent and tardy, and was suspended. 
The teacher notified the boy's father, and informed 
him that his boy could return if proper excuse were 
rendered, and assurance given that the acts would 
not be repeated. The father replied that he kept 
the boy at home to work, and for that reason he 
was absent and tardy ; that he could give no assur- 
ance as to the future, and claimed the right to keep 
his boy at home at any time for the above purpose, 
and, notwithstanding the above rule, to send him to 
school. 



4 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

In the second case a girl was siispended for being 
absent. Her parents represented that she was kept 
from school to be taken upon a visit with them ; 
that they were poor, and unable to leave their chil- 
dren at home when they went visiting, and had to 
take her with them. 

The suspended pupils brought suit against the di- 
rectors and superintendent for damages, and asked 
the court to restrain the directors from enforcing 
the rule. It was claimed that the rule first quoted 
was unreasonable, oppressive, and unjust. The court 
held otherwise, and decided it to be reasonable and 
proper, and in the course of the opinion say : 

"The object of public schools, as established by 
our laws, is to secure education to the children of 
the state. The intention of the law is, not that the 
children shall, at certain times or on certain days, 
be simply gathered together, but that, when assem- 
bled, they shall be instructed. Their progress in 
learning is the grand object of the law. ... It re-^ 
quires but little experience in the instruction of 
children and youth to convince any one that the 
only means which will assure progress in their stud- 
ies is to secure their attendance ; the application of 
the powers of their minds to the studies in which 
they are instructed. . . . But this cannot be done 
if they are at school one day and at home the next; 
if a recitation is omitted or a lesson left unlearned 
at the whim or convenience of parents. . . . The 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 5 

rule requiring prompt and constant attendance is 
for the good of the pupil, and to secure the very 
objects the law had in view in establishing public 
schools. It is, therefore, reasonable and proper. . . . 

" Tardiness-^that is, arriving late — is a direct in- 
jury to the whole school. The confusion of hurry- 
ing to seats, gathering together of books, etc., by 
tardy ones, at a time when all should be at study, 
cannot fail. to greatly impede the progress of those 
who are regular and prompt in attendance. The 
rule requiring prompt and regular attendance is de- 
manded for the good of the whole school. While 
it may be admitted that absence and tardiness are 
acts committed out of school hours, yet, as their 
effects and consequences operate upon the school— 
the pupils when assembled for instruction— they 
are therefore subject to control by rules for the gov- 
ernment of the schools. . . . The rule in question, as 
we have shown, operates directly upon the order of 
the school ; upon the pupils when assembled for in- 
struction. It promotes efficiency to the school, and 
secures the progress of the pupils in their studies. 
It is therefore a rule for the government of the school, 
and must be regarded as proper and reasonable, and 
wuthin the authority of the school officers to pre- 
scribe and enforce. 

"It is argued that the rule interferes with pa- 
rental authority, inasmuch as it deprives the parent 
of his right to the services and society of the child 



6 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

at times "when Ije may require 'them. ... If he 
would have him make proper advances in school, he 
must not distract his attention and slacken his in- 
terest by interruptions for a day or two in a week, 
or an hour or so in a day, for the little advantage 
that he may derive from his labor during such 
times. Neither has the parent the right to interfere 
with the order of the school, or the progress of the 
pupils, by sending his own child at times and in a 
condition that will, as we have seen, prove an an- 
noyance and hinderance to others. ... 

"Again, it is said that the rule visits upon the 
child punishment for the parent's offence. That is, 
the child is kept from school through the fault of 
the parent, and is punished for the act of the par- 
ent in detaining him. If the good of the children 
were to be considered only, there would be force in 
this argument ; but it is completely answered by the 
consideration that the parent's act is an injury to 
the whole school. He makes the child, in the ex- 
ercise of his authority, a source of annoyance and 
absolute injury to all the other pupils of the school. 
This he cannot do. The child, through no fault of 
his own or of his parents, may be afflicted with a 
contagious disease ; yet, as the good of other pupils 
demanded it, he may be for that reason forbidden 
attendance at the school (Spear v. Cummings, 23 
Pick. 225). So, if, by the exercise of parental au- 
thority, the child is made to act in such a manner 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 7 

as to interfere with the progress of his fellow-pu- 
pils, it is the duty of those having charge of the 
school to remove the evil by dismissing the pupil 
causing it. The good of the whole school cannot 
be sacrificed for the advantage of one pupil who has 
an unreasonable father. 

" It is urged as an objection to the rules in ques- 
tion that poor parents who require at certain times 
of the day, as the morning hours, or during the 
whole of school-days, the services of their children 
to aid in earning their support, will be prohibited 
sending them to the public schools. But this appli- 
cation of the rules is foreign to their spirit, and it 
cannot be presumed that they will be unjustly and 
wantonly enforced in cases not in their spirit. The 
tenth rule provides that absence and tardiness, un- 
less from sickness or other unavoidable causes, shall 
be punished by suspension ; and the eleventh rule 
provides that the parents may be required to certify 
the cause of absence and tardiness. Now we cannot 
believe that a school board or school teacher within 
our state will not accept as an unavoidable cause of 
absence or delay in reaching school the fact that the 
child's services, at such times, were demanded for 
its own support or that of its parent. In such cases 
the school boards and teachers will be bound to per- 
mit inconveniences and annoyances to other pupils, 
which we have above pointed out, for the sake of 
such unfortunate ones, upon whom want has en- 



8 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

forced the necessity of labor daring school hours* 
No such case as this is made by the records before us. 

"In the first case the son was detained from 
school to do some work in preparing * shrubbery for 
winter,' and his tardiness resulted from the fact that 
he had ' two cows to take care of/ and was required 
* to do the marketing for the family.' These facts 
do not indicate a condition in life that requires the 
labor of a lad either for his own support or for that 
of his parents. 

"In the other case the daughter was kept from 
school to visit with her parents. A family that can 
afford to visit may well keep their children at 
school, and if this can only be done by the parents 
depriving themselves of the pleasures of visiting, it 
is not too great a sacrifice to secure the great bene- 
fits of education to their offspring." 

The foregoing views, it is believed, are sus- 
tained by the following cases: Sherman v. Charles- 
towrij 8 Cush. 160; Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 
379; Landers v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114; Guernsey v. 
Pitkin, 32 Vt. 224; Spiller v. Wohurn, 12 All. 
127.* 

Illinois, \%l2.— niompson\. Beaver, 63 111. 356. 

Directors of a district in Illinois made a rule that 
the school -house doors should be barred against 
tardy children. In an action to determine certain 
* See p. 10. (48 Vt. 444.) 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 9 

powers of township trustees, the power of school 
directors was considered, as bearing upon this rule. 

The Supreme Court said: 

"The directors undoubtedly have the power to 
make and cause to be enforced all reasonable rules 
and regulations for the government of schools in 
their respective districts. What are reasonable rules 
is a question of law, and we do not hesitate to de- 
clare that a rule that would bar the doors of the 
school-house against little children who had come 
from so great a distance (a mile and a half) in the 
cold winter, for no other reason than that they were 
a few minutes tardy, is unreasonable, and therefore 
unlawful. In its practical operation it amounts to 
little less than wanton cruelty." 

Massachusetts, 1874. — Rixssell v. Lynnjield, 116 Mass. 366. 

One member of the school committee of Lynn- 
field, Mass., made a rule that if a pupil was tardy 
twice the teacher should send the pupil to him. 
This rule was subsequently assented to by the other 
members of the board. A girl was tardy the sec- 
ond time, and the teacher told her to go to the 
above member of the committee. She left the 
schoolroom, but, instead of obeying the command 
of the teacher, went directly home. For this diso- 
bedience the teacher suspended her from school un- 
til she should conform to the rule. 

The girl brought suit, but the Supreme Court de- 



10 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

cided in favor of the rule. Th6 justice delivering 
the opinion of the court says : " For the disobedi- 
ence of a regulation established to prevent tardiness, 
the plaintiff was suspended from a public school un- 
til she should conform to the rule. . . . Upon the 
case here presented we cannot see that there was 
not a reasonable exercise on the part of the teacher 
of the power necessary to punish disobedience and 
promote the proper government and discipline of 
the school." 

Yermont, 1876. — Ferriter v. Tyler^ 48 Yt. 444. 

An important case was decided by the Supreme 
Court of Vermont in 1876. The decision was to 
the effect that the committee of a school district 
had authority to exclude children from school for 
absence contrary to the rules thereof, although such 
absence was in obedience to the command of Cath- 
olic parents and their priest, and for the purpose of 
atttending religious services. 

The priest of a Catholic church in Brattleboro, on 
the morning of June 4th, 1874, sent to the commit- 
tee of Brattleboro this note : 

" You will confer a favor on us Catholics by ex- 
empting the Catholic children from attending school 
on all holy days. I should have called and explained 
our reasons, but have not had opportunity as yet." 

The committee replied as follows : 

" Your note is just received. To comply with 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 11 

your request involves closing two of our schools, 
and greatly interrupting several others. This we 
never have done, and cannot do. "We have great 
pride in our schools, in which the Catholic children 
are as well treated as any." 

The 4th day of June, 1874, was called " holy 
Corpus Christi day ;" and considered and set apart 
by the Catholic Church as a holy day. Catholic 
parents were directed by their spiritual adviser, their 
priest, to attend services on that day, and have their 
children do so. On the day before, the Catholic 
children informed their teachers that they should 
not attend school on the next day, that it was a 
holy day, and they had been directed by their priest 
to attend services at church on that day. The 
teachers replied that they could not be excused for 
that purpose. On the morning of the 4th of June 
five or six of such scholars called on the committee 
and said they had heard that the committee would 
not excuse them, if they were absent to attend 
church on that day ; to whom the committee replied 
that they had not been requested to excuse them, 
and that they could not have done so, if they had 
been requested. The children then went to their 
priest, and soon returned with the note from him 
above recited. 

Some sixty Catholic children, by direction and 
command of their parents, were kept from school 
to attend religious services. When they applied for 



12 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

admission to the schools they were' told by the com- 
mittee thatj as they had absented themselves without 
permission, and in violation of the rules of the 
school, which they well understood, they could not 
return without an assurance from their parents or 
their priest that in future they would comply with 
the rules of the schools. The committee assured the 
children, their parents, and also the priest, that if 
the schools would not again be interrupted in like 
manner they would gladly admit the children to 
them. The priest and parents refused to comply 
with this proposal, and claimed that on all days 
which they regard as holy, they could, as matter of 
right, take their children from the schools, without 
any regard to the rules thereof. 

For more than ten years there had been a rule, 
required by the committee, that those registered as 
scholars for a given term should be constant and 
regular in their attendance, and not be absent, ex- 
cept by permission of the teachers or the committee, 
on reasonable cause shown. The committee claimed 
the right, which they had exercised, to suspend from 
school during the remainder of the current term, 
scholars who violated the rule. 

The parents asked the Supreme Court to restrain 
the committee from excluding their children from 
school, and based their claims upon two grounds : 

First. " Their constitutional right to worship God 
accordino- to the dictates of their own consciences, 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 13 

without being abridged in the enjoyment of their 
civil rights." Second. Their " right to exercise par- 
ental authority and government over their children 
as regards their moral training and culture." 

The court held, at the outset, that the parents 
were not the proper parties to the suit, but, in view 
of the importance of the subject, they considered it 
on a broader ground, by supposing the children to 
have been substituted for the parents. 

The " rights of conscience " article in the Consti- 
tution of Vermont is : " That all men have a natu- 
ral and inalienable right to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates of their own consciences 
and understandings, as in their opinion shall be reg- 
ulated by the word of God ; and that no man ought 
to, or of right can, be compelled to attend any re- 
ligious worship, etc., contrary to the dictates of his 
conscience;, nor can any man be justly deprived or 
abridged of any civil right as a citizen on account 
of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of re- 
ligious worship ; and no authority can or ought to 
be vested in or assumed by any power whatever that 
shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner 
control, the rights of conscience in the free exercise 
of religious worship: nevertheless, every sect Or 
denomination of Christians ought to observe the 
Sabbath or Lord's day, and keep up some sort of 
religious worship, which to them shall seem most 
agreeable to the revealed will of God." 



14 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

The following ^^re extracts from the opinion ren- 
dered by the court : 

"... Art. III. (above recited) was not designed 
to subjugate the residue of the Constitution, and the 
important institutions and appliances of the gov- 
ernment provided by the enacted laws for serving 
the highest interests of the public as involved in 
personal condition and social relations,' to the pe- 
culiar faith, personal judgment, individual will or 
wish of any one in respect to religion, however his 
conscience might demand or protest. In that re- 
spect it is implied that while the individual may 
hold the utmost of his religious faith, and all his 
ideas, notions, and preferences as to religious worship 
and practice, he holds them in reasonable subservi- 
ency to the equal rights of others, and to the para- 
mount interests of the public as depending on, and 
to be served by, general laws and uniform adminis- 
tration. . . . 

" Let it be granted that parents and others may, 
npon their own respective reasons, control the at- 
tendance of the scholars, as against the oflScial right 
of the committee in that behalf, and practically the 
ground of system and order and improvement has 
no existence. ... If a Catholic citizen should be 
serving on a jury in the midst of a trial when divine 
service in his church on holy Corpus Christi should 
be in progress, would it be a violation of his rights 
under said Art. III. to compel him to keep his seat 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 15 

and serve tlirougli the trial? The same may be 
asked of the Jew or the seventh-day Baptist, who 
should be required to do like service on Saturday. 
The same may be asked of a devout Methodist, when 
a camp-meeting or a love-feast should be in progress 
in his vicinage. If either, or all, should refuse to 
serve, would their rights of conscience under Art. 
III. be a valid defence in a prosecution for the pen- 
alty in suck case provided. . . . 

" Let it be repeated then, that that article in the 
Constitution was not designed to exempt any person 
or persons of any sect, on the score of conscience as 
to matters of religion, from the operation and obli- 
gatory force of the general laws of the state, author- 
ized by other portions of the same instrument, and 
designed to serve the purposes contemplated by such 
other portions ; it was not designed to exempt any 
persons from the same subjection that others are 
under to the laws and their administration, on the 
score that such subjection at times would interfere 
with the performance of religious rites, and the ob- 
servance of religious ordinances, which they would 
deem it their duty to perform and observe but for 
such subjection. ... 

" It remains now to be considered whether the bill 
can be maintained on the other ground, namely, the 
prerogative of parents to control their children as 
scholars, as against the prerogative of the commit- 
tee to make and enforce the rule in question. This 



16 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

does not involve ^ny right or question of conscience 
under the Constitution, but only the matter of legal 
right under the statutes as to public schools. . . . 
By our statutes the committee are charged with the 
duty of * adopting all requisite measures,' etc., as 
before recited.* The graded school in Brattleboro 
is organized and acts in pursuance of the statutes 
in that behalf. The committee are chosen and 
charged with their duties under the same statutes. 
They adopted rules for the regulation of the schools, 
and for the improvement of the scholars in learn- 
ing. The rule in question is for the purpose of 
inducing and enforcing constancy in attendance. 
That such constancy is essential to such improve- 
ment is not debatable. That such attendance is 
requisite as matter of regulation in order to the 
necessary classification of the scholars in reference 
to age, capacity, studies, and proficiency is not de- 
batable. Those who attend constantly cannot be 
required to linger, in order that the inconstant may 
keep along with them ; nor can such inconstant 
scholars keep equal pace with those who attend 
constantly. The rule, then, is such as is contem- 
plated by the statute, so far as the purpose of it is 
concerned. That purpose is indispensable to the 
attainment of the object and end proposed by the 

* " Adopting all requisite measures for the inspection, ex- 
amination, and regulation of the schools, and the improve- 
ment of the scholars in learning." (Gen. Sts, c. 22, § 39.) 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 17 

statutes, both as to the individual scholar and as to 
all others who may be affected by his attendance 
and absence. The answer states, as before recited, 
that the rule had been in operation for more than 
ten years. The children of the orators were sub- 
jected to its operation in the present instance. Was 
that unlawful ? 

" If the. orators had the right to control the at- 
tendance of their children as against that rule, then 
the committee had not the right to maintain and 
enforce such rule. We are not prepared to sanc- 
tion a view of the subject that would subordinate 
the authority of the committee, in the matter of the 
attendance of the registered scholars, to the will of 
parents. On the other hand, we do not hesitate to 
hold and declare as matter of law that, in this re- 
spect, the citizen is in subordination to the lawful 
rules for the regulation of schools, and the improve- 
ment of scholars in learning ; and this is for the 
same fundamental reason that he is in subordina- 
tion to the statutes themselves, on that or any other 
subject ; and it is no more his right to defy or dis- 
regard those rules than it is to defy and disregard 
any statute that affects him as a citizen in respect 
to schools, or any other subject involving the com- 
mon weal, as it is to be provided for under the Con- 
stitution by the legislation of the state. . . . 

" Recurring now to what is stated in the answer as 
to the manner in which the rule has been administered, 
2 



18 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

it is proper to remark, that the lawfulness and pro- 
priety of the rule are not to be tested or adjudged 
upon the presumption that the penal part of it will 
be unjustly or unwarrantably enforced. The pre- 
sumption is the other way, to wit, that it will be 
administered justly, and upon, and with reference 
to, warrantable occasion. If a case should arise in 
which it should appear that the penalty had been 
inflicted outside of or beyond the fair scope and 
reason of the rule, it would be both the province 
and the duty of the courts to accord proper reme- 
dy. But, as before demonstrated, this is not such a 
case. And this leads to the further remark, that the 
remedy is not sought in this case as against the re- 
fusal of leave to be absent on the 4th of June ; but 
as against the imposing, as the condition of remit- 
ting the penalty, a promise that absence for a simi- 
lar cause should not be repeated that term. Such 
promise being refused, the penalty of exclusion was 
not remitted, and the children did not return to the 
schools; and hence the position assumed by the 
orators — the same as already stated — that the com- 
mittee had not the lawful right to exclude scholars 
who should be absent by the direction of their 
parents, contrary to the established rule of the 
school. 

" As before intimated, this position takes no ac- 
count of any diJfference of occasion or reason for 
such direction of parents, whether it be religious 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 19 

service or secular employment or amusement, but is 
on the ground only of the right of the parent as 
ao-ainst the rule of the school. In reference to that 
position, in explicit statement, as the result of the 
discussion, it is held that the scholars of a school 
are amenable to the school authorities as to their 
conduct as scholars affectijig the school, notwith- 
standing the prerogative of their parents in respect 
to them.* . . . The rule in question in this case, and 
the enforcement of it, are subject to the judgment 
of the courts as between the parties to the suit. It 
is easy to suppose cases in which such enforcement 
would be beyond the lawful right of the committee. 
The rule itself, in terms and intent, contemplates 
exclusions as a penalty only where permission to be 
absent is withheld for want of reasonable cause 
shown. In case of casual sickness of the scholar ; 
of sickness or death in the family of the scholar ; 
of some impediment, like fire or flood ; in case of 
various incidents of current life, giving occasion for 
temporary absence, the enforcement of the penalty 
of exclusion would, under such circumstances, be 
adjuTlged to be unauthorized under the statutes and 
law by which the subject is governed." 

* See as to this point, p. 3. (31 Iowa, 562.) 



20 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 



Missouri, 1880. — King v. Jefferson City School Board, '71 Mo. 
628. 

The following is from an opinion rendered by the 
Supreme Court of Missouri in 1880, in an action 
against the School Board of Jefferson City for the 
suspension of a boy under the rule stated. 

"The rule is as follows: *Any pupil absent six 
half days in four consecutive weeks, without satis- 
factory excuse, shall be suspended from school.' The 
statute provides (R. S. 1879, § 7045) that *the 
board shall have the power to make all needful rules 
and regulations for the organization, grading, and 
government of the schools in their district.' It is 
clear that the legislature have intrusted to this school 
board the duty of making regulations, touching the 
government of the school, of the necessity and pro- 
priety of which they are primarily the judges. They 
are elected by the people of the district, and must 
be presumed to be conversant with the subject, and 
have no motive to make any rules except such as, 
in their best judgment, are necessary and proper 
to promote the objects of our common-school sys- 
tem. ... 

" It is said that occasional absences from school 
on the part of the pupil, or truancy as it is familiar- 
ly termed, is of no importance to any one except 
the pupil or his parents, and its indulgence is, there- 
fore, not to be attended with such punishment as 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 21 

suspension or expulsion from the school entirely ; 
that every child has a right to go to the public 
school, and that right cannot be taken away by a 
rule of the board ; that such rule is subversive of 
the object of our system of common schools, which 
was designed to throw open and leave open the 
doors of the school to all children of the proper 
age, and give them an opportunity of acquiring such 
education as will fit them for the after-duties of life. 
This is true, but this right of attending school nec- 
essarily requires, when the school is joined, and 
while such attendance continues, a submission to 
the regulations of the school. 

" Suppose Rule 11 to be inverted, and instead of 
reading as it now stands, should read thus ; ' Any 
pupil is at liberty to go a-fishing during school 
hours and be absent a half day or a whole day, and 
as many days as he pleases, provided he conducts 
himself decently when in attendance on school.' 
And this is the point to which the argument of the 
plaintiff tends. The pupil, it is urged, is at liberty 
to be absent when he pleases, and such absence is a 
matter solely between him and his parents. But 
the studies in our public schools are, I presume, 
classified according to the ages and advancement of 
the scholars ; and the continued or repeated ab- 
sences of one of a class not only is injurious to the 
absentee, but if allowed beyond a certain point is 
calculated to demoralize those who attend, and de- 



22 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

range the orderly, instructions of the teacher. Taxes 
are not collected to pay teachers to sit in front of 
empty benches, or to hunt up truant boys. Such 
absences, when without excuse, are the fault of the 
parents, whose business it is to see that the attend- 
ance of their child is regular, unless prevented by 
causes which will, of course, be an excuse under the 
rule now in question. My opinion is, that the rule 
in question was clearly within the power of the 
board of directors, and that it is not our business to 
supervise its expediency, even if we might differ 
with the board on that point, but all the judges are 
of opinion that the rule was a reasonable and proper 



Illinois, ISSZ.—ChurcJdll v. Fewkes, 18 Brad. Kep. 520. 

This action was by pupil against school directors 
and teachers for expulsion from school. The direc- 
tors had made the following rules: 

" Any pupil who shall be absent six one half days, 
without a valid excuse, shall be liable to suspension 
from study, and no pupil thus suspended shall be 
restored without permission from the board." 

" All pupils will be required to bring written ex- 
cuses from their parents to teachers for absence, 
and such excuses must be satisfactory and reason- 
able, otherwise it will not be granted." 

The pupil suspended was absent from school 
about two weeks, in violation of these rules. When 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 23 

she returned she declined to give any reason what- 
ever for her absence. The teacher called her atten- 
tion to the rules, and informed her that it would be 
necessary for her to bring a written excuse from her 
mother. The parents refused to give a written ex- 
cuse showing why she had been absent, although 
she was absent with their knowledge and consent. 
After several days the principal of the school and 
assistant teacher each wrote a letter, couched in polite 
terms, to the mother (believing her to be the only 
parent), calling her attention to the rules of the 
school as prepared and adopted by the board of di- 
rectors, and their duty in the premises, and respect- 
fully asking that she would furnish her daughter 
with a reasonable excuse for her absence from school. 
No reply was made to these letters, and after the 
lapse of some four or five days, no excuse having 
been received from the parents, the child was sus- 
pended from further recitations. 

The suit was then brought. 

The court decided that an action would not lie 
against a public officer acting in good faith, af- 
firming the law as laid down in McCormick v. Burt 
(p. 134), and thus commented upon the rule : 

'' The rule in question is not a hard or harsh one. 
It does not of itself indicate any sinister or malevo- 
lent purpose, or wicked force, on the part of the 
directors. It does not trench upon the rights or 
dignity of any one. We instantly and properly re- 



24 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

pel any encroachment upon our rights as citizens. 
We have a proper pride and ambition in maintaining 
those rights under any and all circumstances. But 
I am utterly unable to understand how this simple 
rule or regulation, requiring the pupil in certain 
cases to bring a written excuse from its parents 
to the teacher, is an attack upon, or an abridgment 
of, our inalienable rights as citizens of this free 
country." 

RULES CONCERNING STUDIES. 
Maine, 1854.— DonaJioe v. BlcJiards, 38 Me. 379. 

The school committee of Ellsworth, Me., required 
the use of the Bible in their schools ; and that all 
of sufficient capacity should read therein, and di- 
rected the use of the common, or Protestant, version. 
A Catholic girl was expelled for not complying with 
this rule, and she began suit for this expulsion. 
Both the girl and her father considered the reading 
of this version to be sinful, and had been so in- 
structed by the Church. The case was decided by 
the Supreme Court in 1854, and in favor of the 
committee. 

The following extracts are made from the opinion 
of the court : 

" The present suit is by the minor, for her alleged 
wrongful exclusion from school in consequence of 
her refusal to read in one of the books directed by 
the defendants, who are the superintending school 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 25 

committee of the town of Ellsworth, to be used in 
the school of which she was a member. . . . 

"By the act of 1850, c. 193, art. 5, § 1, the pow- 
ers and duties of superintending school committees 
are defined and established, and the authority is 
given them ' to expel from any school any obsti- 
nately disobedient and disorderly scholar, after a 
proper investigation of his behavior, if found neces- 
sary for the peace and usefulness of the school ; also, 
to restore him to the school on satisfactory evidence 
of his repentance and amendment.' . . . 

"By the act before referred to, under art. 5, § 1, 
among various powers and duties conferred upon the 
superintending school committee, they are empow- 
ered, 'fourthly, to direct the general course of in- 
struction, and what books shall be used in the re- 
spective schools.' 

" The right to prescribe the general course of in- 
struction and to direct what books shall be used 
must exist somewhere. The legislature have seen 
fit to repose the authority to determine this in the 
several superintending school committees. They 
may therefore rightfully exercise it. 

" The power thus conferred is in the most literal 
and explicit terms. The power of establishing by- 
laws is given to the several city governments of the 
state. This court is authorized to establish rules 
for the regulation of business in court. The only 
restriction in either case is that the by-laws and rules, 



26 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

thus established, shall not conflict' with the statutes 
and Constitution of the state. Within these limits 
they have all the force and vigor of legislative en- 
actments. So, in this case, the same general and 
extensive power over the subject-matter is granted ; 
and the course of studies, and the books prescribed 
by the superintending school committee are to be 
regarded as if established and prescribed by the act 
of the legislature. 

" The power of selection is general and unlimited. 
It is vested in the committee of each town. . . . 
The manner of its exercise must depend upon the 
judgment, discretion, and intelligence of the different 
committees. The actual selection at any given time 
and place depends upon the views and opinions of 
those upon whom the law devolves this duty. The 
power of ultimate decision must rest somewhere. 
No right of appeal is granted. No power of revis- 
ion is conferred upon any other tribunal. Because 
the right of selection may be injudiciously or un- 
wisely exercised, it by no means follows that it does 
not exist. This court cannot make an aflarmative 
rule as to what books shall be selected, nor a nega- 
tive rule prescribing what shall not be used, if the 
right to selection be exercised in conformity with ex- 
isting statutes and the Constitution. The power of 
selection includes that of making injudicious and ill- 
advised selections, but, there being no right of ap- 
peal, the selection is binding and conclusive. . . . 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 27 

" If the right to direct the course of instruction and 
the books to be used is given, the right to enforce 
obedience to the determining power must manifest- 
ly exist or the determination will be ineffectual. It 
would be worse than idle to grant this power to 
direct, if any one can set at naught the action of the 
committee. 

" The committee may enforce obedience to all reg- 
ulations within the scope of their authority. If they 
may select a book, they may require the use of the 
book selected. If the plaintiff may refuse reading 
in one book, she may in another, unless, for some 
cause, she is exempted from the duty of obedience. 
If she may decline to obey one requirement, right- 
fully made, then she may another, and the disci- 
pline of the school is at an end. It is for the 
committee to determine what misconduct requires 
expulsion. That is expressly left to their determina- 
tion. . . . 

" The plaintiff seeks to avoid these conclusions by 
denying that the book selected was one in which she 
could be constitutionally compelled to read upon 
pain of expulsion, in case of her refusal to obey. 
She claims exemption from the general duty of obe- 
dience from the particular character of the book in 
whicb she was required to read. The question, there- 
fore, is whether, if the legislature should by statute 
direct any version of the Bible to be read in schools, 
and should impose the penalty of expulsion, in the 



28 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

case of refusal, such statute would be a violation of 
the Constitution. The use of the Bible as a reading- 
book is not prohibited by any express language of 
the Constitution. 

" Is its use for that purpose in opposition to the 
spirit and intention of that instrument ? If it be 
not, if it be a book which may be directed, within 
the spirit and meaning of the Constitution, to be 
used in schools, it is obvious that its use may be re- 
quired by all ; for a regulation which any scholar 
may violate with impunity would cease to have the 
force and effect of a rule. . . . 

" But the instruction here given is not in fact, and 
is not alleged to have been, in articles of faith. No 
theological doctrines were taught. The creed of no 
sect was affirmed or denied. The truth or falsehood 
of the book in which the scholars were required to 
read was not asserted. No interference by way of 
instruction, with the views of the scholars, whether 
derived from parental or sacerdotal authority, is 
shown. . . . 

"... The plaintiff, indeed, makes no objection to 
the Bible as a book which she may not rightfully be 
required to read in schools, but only to a particular 
translation. Indeed, the report finds that she was 
willing to read from the Douay version. It is ap- 
parent that it is highly desirable that in the same 
class there should be a uniformity of books to be 
used. But if the book is proper, if consonant to the 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 29 

soundest principles of morality, then is there any 
translation which can be justly deemed adverse to 
those principles? Does the version in which the 
plaintiff was willing to read contravene sound moral- 
ity, even in the judgment of the defendants ? Does 
the version which the defendants required to be read 
conflict, even in the opinion of the plaintiff, with 
pure morality? If not, then the book itself, alike 
in the judgment of the plaintiff and defendants, is 
one whicb may be read without reasonable grounds 
of objection in schools. ... 

" Such being the case, all that is shown by the se- 
lection of one version is simply a preference of one 
over another when there must, from necessity, be a 
difference of opinion. But in case of numerous 
translations of a work, in itself unobjectionable, a 
preference may be expressed and acted upon with- 
out infringing upon the just rights of others. 

" All that is done is, that a committee for the time 
being prefer one to another. Both, undoubtedly, 
may be used in schools, or both may be excluded 
therefrom. ... 

But the claim of the plaintiff is much more liable 
to the exception that it is creating the subordination 
or preference of one sect or denomination over an- 
other. Her claim to be exempted from a general 
regulation of the school rests entirely on her relig- 
ious belief, and is to the extent that the choice of 
reading-books shall be in entire subordination to her 



30 POWER AND AUTHORITY OP 

faith^ and because it is her faith. The preference 
is manifestly given, if, in the selection to be noade, 
the defendants were bound to defer to the doctrines 
and authority and teachings of the sect of which 
she is a member. The right of negation is, in its 
operation, equivalent to that of proposing and es- 
tablishing. The right of one sect to interdict or 
expurgate would place all schools in subordination 
to the sect interdicting or expurgating. 

" If the claim is that the sect of which the child 
is a member has the right of interdiction, and that 
any book is to be banished because under the ban 
of her Church, then the preference is practically giv- 
en to such Church, and the very mischief complained 
of is inflicted on others. ... 

" The case finds that the authorities of the sect of 
which the plaintiff is a member regard it sinful to 
read in the version directed by the defendants ; but 
if a book is to be excluded for that cause in one 
instance, it must be in all, and the use of books 
would be made to depend, not upon the judgment 
of those to whom the law intrusts their selection, 
but upon that of the authorities of a Church, so that 
each sect would have precedence as a sect and for 
that cause. 

"From the report, it appears that the plaintiff, from 
conscientious religious scruples, refused to read in 
the version designated by the defendants as the one 
to be used, and that she and her father both re- 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 31 

garded it as sinful so to do, both having been so 
taught by the authorities of the Church of which 
they are members. 

"As the suit is by the child, as her rights only 
are alleged to be violated, the conscientious religious 
views of the father are not involved in the deter- 
mination of this suit. He is no party to it, for the 
purpose of obtaining compensation, nor is it brought 
on account of any infraction of his rights. The 
real inquiry is, whether any book opposed to the 
real or asserted conscientious views of a scholar can 
be legally directed to be used as a school-book, in 
which such scholar can be required to read. The 
claim, on the part of the plaintiff, is that each and 
every scholar may set up its own conscience as over 
and above the law. It is a claim of an exemption 
from a general law because it may conflict with the 
particular conscience. 

*' The action being by the scholar, the invasion be- 
ing of its rights, it is apparent that if the fact of 
opposition to conscience on the part of a child af- 
fords a well-grounded reason for its exemption from 
the general rules of the school — that it may operate 
to the exclusion of books to an indefinite extent. 
As the existence of conscientious scruples as to the 
reading of a book can only he known from the as- 
sertion of the child, its mere assertion must suffice 
for the exclusion of any hook in the reading or in 
the hearing of Avhich it may allege 2^ wrong to be 



32 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

done to its religious conscience. The claim, so far 
as it may rest on conscience, is a claim to annul any 
regulation of the state made by its constituted au- 
thorities. As a right existing on the part of one 
child it is equally a right belonging to all. As it 
relates to one book, so it may apply to another — 
whether relating to conscience or to morals. Error 
may reach the understanding by the hearing equally 
as by the vision, by the ear as by the eye. As the 
child may object to reading any book, so it may 
equally object to hearing it read, for the same cause ; 
and thus the power of selection of books is with- 
drawn from those to whom the law intrusts it, and 
by the right of negation is transferred to the schol- 
ars. 

" The right, as claimed, undermines the power of 
the state. It is that the will of the majority shall 
bow to the conscience of the minority, or of one. 
If the several consciences of the scholars are per- 
mitted to contravene, obstruct, or annul the action 
of the state, then power ceases to reside in majori- 
ties, and is transferred to minorities. Nor is this 
all. While the laws are made and established by 
those of full age, the right of obstruction, of inter- 
diction, is given to any and all children, of how- 
ever so immature an age or judgment." 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 33 

Vermont, 1869.— 'Guernsey/ v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 226. 

A teacher of a district school in Vermont required 
that all scholars in grammar should write English 
composition, although not mentioned in the list of 
studies required by law to be taught. A boy named 
Guernsey declined to yield to this rule, and the 
teacher informed the committee. The committee 
visited the school, talked with the boy, and told the 
teacher he would see the boy's father, and if the fa- 
ther sent word that he did not wish his boy to write 
compositions, she could excuse him. The boy came 
to school the next day, but without an excuse. The 
teacher sent him to his father to see if he had not 
some word to send her on the subject. The parent 
returned answer that if she had any business with 
him she must call upon him. The committee then 
told the boy he must not attend the school unless 
he would obey the regulations, and instructed the 
teacher not to treat him as a scholar unless he 
obeyed her rule as above, or she received a request 
from his father to excuse him. The boy continued 
to attend the school for about three weeks, but the 
teacher would not hear him in recitation, or assist 
him in his lessons. He then left the school and 
sued the committee. 

The action of the committee was upheld by the 
courts. The lower court ruled that the requirement 
of the teacher in regard to compositions was reasou- 
3 



84 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

able and proper, and that by judicious means she 
endeavored to induce tlie pupil to comply therewith, 
and that there was no sufficient reason for his not 
complying with it. This ruling was sustained by 
the Supreme Court, from the opinion of which the 
following extracts are made : 

" But in regard to those branches which are re- 
quired to be taught in the public schools, the pru- 
dential committee and the teacher must, of necessity, 
have some discretion as to the order of teaching 
them, the pupils who shall be allowed to pursue 
them, and the mode in which they shall be taught. 
If this were not so it would be impossible to classi- 
fy the pupils, or for one teacher to attend to more 
than ten or twelve pupils. 

" With this concession to the teacher of fixing 
the mode of teaching these branches, it seems very 
obvious that English composition may fairly be re- 
garded as an allowable mode of teaching many of 
these branches." 

Wisconsin, 1874. — Morroio v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59. 

In 187-4 a case arose in Wisconsin the decision 
in which has been widely discussed and variously 
commented upon. A man named Wood sent his 
son, a boy about twelve years of age, to school. He 
wished him to study orthography, reading, and writ- 
ing, and also wished him to give particular attention 
to the study of arithmetic. In addition to these 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 35 

studies, the teacher, named Morrow, at once required 
the child to study geography. The father, on be- 
ing informed of this, told his boy not to study geog- 
raphy, but to attend to his other studies; and the 
teacher was promptly and fully advised of this wish 
of the parent, and also knew that the boy had been 
forbidden by his parent from taking that study at 
that time. But, claiming and insisting that she had 
the right to direct and control the boy in respect to 
his studies, even as against his father's orders, she 
commanded him to take his geography and get his 
lesson. And when the boy refused to obey her, 
and did as he was directed by his father, she resort- 
ed to force to compel obedience. The father insti- 
tuted a criminal action against her for the assault 
on his boy. She afterwards sued the father, com- 
plaining that the suit against her for the assault was 
malicious prosecution. The jury in the lower court 
was instructed that the order given by the father to 
his son not to study geography " did not annul or 
abridge the right of the teacher to control that mat- 
ter ;" " that under the circumstances, as proved, she, 
the plaintiff, had a right to require the scholar's 
obedience;" and that the infliction of the punish- 
ment was justifiable if " reasonable and commensu- 
rate with the boy's contumacy." The judgment in 
the lower court was in favor of the teacher, but in 
the Supreme Court this judgment was reversed, and 
the following decision made: 



36 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

" . . . And whether she had or had not the power 
to correct him is the question in the case ; for it is 
not pretended that the boy was otherwise disobe- 
dient, or was guilty of any misconduct, or violated 
any rule or regulation adopted for the government 
of the school. The circuit court, in considering 
the relative rights and duties of parent and teacher, 
among other things, told the jury that when a par- 
ent sent his child to a district school he surren- 
dered to the teacher such authority over his child 
as is necessary to the proper government of the 
school, the classification and instruction of the pu- 
pils, including what studies each scholar shall pur- 
sue, these studies being such as are required by law, 
or are allowed to be taught in public schools. And 
the court added, in this connection, that a prudent 
teacher will always pay proper respect to the wish- 
es of the parent in regard to what studies the child 
should take, but, where the difference of view was 
irreconcilable on the subject, the views of the par- 
ent in that particular must yield to those of the 
teacher, and that the parent, by the very act of send- 
ing his child to school, impliedly undertakes to sub- 
mit all questions in regard to study to the judgment 
of the teacher. In our opinion there is a great and 
fatal error in this part of the charge, particularly 
when applied to the facts in this case, in asserting 
or assuming the law to be that, upon an irreconcila- 
ble difference of views between the parent and teach- 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 37 

er as to what studies the child shall pursue, the au- 
thority of the teacher is paramount and controlling, 
and that she had the right to enforce obedience to 
her commands by corporal punishment. We do not 
think she had any such right or authority, and we 
can see no necessity for clothing the teacher with 
any such arbitrary power. We do not really un- 
derstand that there is any recognized principle of 
law, nor do we think there is any rule of morals or 
social usage, which gives the teacher an absolute 
right to prescribe and dictate what studies a child 
shall pursue, regardless of the wishes or views of 
the parent, and, as incident to this, gives the right 
to enforce obedience even as against the orders of 
the parent. From what source does the teacher de- 
rive this authority? From what maxim or rule of 
the law of the land? Ordinarily, it will be con- 
ceded, the law gives the parent the exclusive right 
to govern and control the conduct of his minor chil- 
dren, and he has the right to enforce obedience to 
his commands by moderate and reasonable chastise- 
ment. And, furthermore, it is one of the earliest 
and most sacred duties taught the child to honor 
and obey its parents. The situation Of the child is 
truly lamentable if the condition of the law is that 
he is liable to be punished by the parent for diso- 
beying his orders in regard to his studies, and the 
teacher may lawfully chastise him for not disobeying 
his parent in that particular. And yet this was the 



38 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

precise dilemma in which the defendant's boy was 
placed by the asserted authority on the part of the 
parent and the teacher. 

" Now we can see no reason whatever for denying 
to the father the right to direct what studies, in- 
cluded in the prescribed course, his child shall take. 
He is as likely to know the health, temperament, 
aptitude, and deficiencies of his child as the teacher, 
and how long he can send him to school. All these 
matters ought to be considered in determining the 
question what particular studies the child should 
pursue at a given term. And where the parent's 
wishes were reasonable, as they seem to have been 
in the present case, and the teacher, by regarding 
them, could in no way have been embarrassed, her 
conduct in not respecting the order given the boy 
was unjustifiable. If she had allowed the child to 
obey the commands of his father it could not pos- 
sibly have conflicted with the efiSciency or good or- 
der or well-being of the school. The parent did not 
propose to interfere with the gradation or classifica- 
tion of the school, or with any of its rules and reg- 
ulations, further than to assert his right to direct 
what studies his boy should pursue that winter. 
And it seems to us a most unreasonable claim on 
the part of the teacher to say that the parent has 
not that right, and, further, to insist that she was 
justified in punishing the child for obeying the or- 
der of his father rather than her own. Whence, 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 39 

we again inquire, did the teacher derive this exclu- 
sive and paramoutat authority over the child, and 
the right to direct his studies contrary to the wish 
of the father ? It seems to us it is idle to say the 
parent, by sending his child to school, impliedly 
clothes the teacher with that power in a case where 
the parent expressly reserves the right to himself, 
and refuses to submit to the judgment of the teach- 
er the question as to what studies his boy should 
pursue. We do not intend to lay down any rule 
which will interfere with any reasonable regulation 
adopted for the management and government of the 
public schools, or which will operate against their 
efficiency and usefulness. Certain studies are re- 
quired to be taught in the public schools by statute. 
The rights of one pupil must be so exercised, un- 
doubtedly, as not to prejudice the equal rights of 
others. But the parent has the right to make a 
reasonable selection from the prescribed studies for 
his child to pursue, and this cannot possibly conflict 
with the equal rights of other pupils. In the pres- 
ent case the defendant did not insist that his child 
should take any study outside of the prescribed 
course. But, considering that the study of geogra- 
phy was less necessary for his boy at that time than 
some other branches, he desired him to devote all 
his time to orthography, reading, writing, and arith- 
metic. The father stated that he thought these 
studies were enough for the child to take; and he 



40 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

said he was anxious the boy should obtain a good 
knowledge of arithmetic in order' that he might as- 
sist in keeping accounts. 

"He wished to exercise some control over the 
education of his son, and it is impossible to say 
that the choice of studies which he made was un- 
reasonable or inconsistent with the welfare and best 
interest of his offspring. And how it will result 
disastrously to the proper discipline,' efficiency, 
and well-being of the common schools to concede 
this paramount right to tbe parent to make a rea- 
sonable choice from the studies in the prescribed 
course which his child shall pursue is a proposition 
we cannot understand. The counsel for the plain- 
tiff so insist in their argument, but, as we think, 
without warrant for the position. It is unreason- 
able to suppose any scholar who attends school 
can or will study all the branches taught in them. 
From the nature of the case some choice must be 
made, and some discretion be exercised as to the 
studies which the different pupils shall pursue. The 
parent is quite as likely to make a wise and judi- 
cious selection as the teacher. At all events, in case 
of a difference of opinion between the parent and 
the teacher upon the subject, we see no reason for 
holding that the views of the teacher must prevail, 
and that she has the right to compel obedience to 
her orders b}!' inflicting corporal punishment upon 
the pupil. The statute gives the school board pow- 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 41 

er to make all needful rules and regulations for 
the organization, gradation, and government of the 
school, and power to suspend any pupil from the 
privileges of the school for noncompliance with the 
rules established by them, or by the teacher with 
their consent ; and it is not proposed to throw any 
obstacle in the way of the performance of these du- 
ties. But these powers and duties can be well ful- 
filled without denying to the parent all right to con- 
trol the education of his children. 

" These views are decisive of this case. Under 
the circumstances the plaintiff had no right to pun- 
ish the boy for obedience to the commands of his 
father in respect to the study of geography. She 
entirely exceeded any authority which the law gave 
her, and the assault upon the child was unjustifia- 
ble." 

Illinois, I8l6.—Iiulis07i v. Fost, 19 111. 56Y. 

One Frances S. Post attended a district school in 
Illinois, and was in a class which, by the course of 
study prescribed by the directors, was required to 
study book-keeping. She was requested by the 
principal of the school to procure books for the 
purpose, but declined, saying her father objected to 
her studying it. She was notified, as were also her 
parents, that unless she complied with the rule she 
would be expelled from the school. On going to 
the school without the book she was told her rights 
as a scholar had ceased, and she was requested to 



42 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

leave, but, declining, the teacher took hold of her 
and led or pushed her out of the building. She 
returned to the room and was again ejected. She 
instituted an action against the teacher and direc- 
tors for trespass, and the jury gave her a verdict, 
and assessed damages at $130. 

Book-keeping was not one of the studies enumer- 
ated in the law to be taught, but was prescribed un- 
der a provision of the law which allowed' the teach- 
ing of other branches than those enumerated. The 
Supreme Court sustained the above verdict. The 
reasons given therefor are contained in the follow- 
ing extracts from the opinion : 

" The school law [reciting it] under which these 
directors derived their powers and were then acting 
provides that the school directors ' may direct what 
branches of study shall be taught, and what text- 
books shall be. used in their respective schools, and 
may suspend or expel pupils for disobedient, refrac- 
tory, or incorrigibly bad conduct.' * The next sec- 
tion provides that no teacher shall be authorized to 
teach a school under that act who is not qualified 
to teach orthography, reading in English, penman- 
ship, arithmetic, English grammar, modern geogra- 
phy, and the history of the United States ; and the 
same section requires that such teacher shall be ex- 
amined by the county superintendent of schools, and 

* For the law at present see Appendices B and C. 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 43 

if found to be qualified shall be given a certificate 
of that fact. The same section contains this pro- 
viso, * that nothing herein contained shall prevent 
the teaching in the common schools of other and 
higher branches than those enumerated in this sec- 
tion.' From these enactments it is manifest that it 
was the design of the lawmakers that all of the 
children of the state should be afforded an oppor- 
tunity to acquire, free of charge, a knowledge of 
the enumerated branches required to be taught. . . . 

"In the performance of their duty in carrying 
the law into effect the directors may prescribe prop- 
er rules and regulations for the government of the 
schools of their district, and enforce them. They 
may, no doubt, classify the scholars, regulate their 
studies and their deportment, the hours to be taught, 
besides the performance of other duties necessary to 
promote the success and secure the well-being of 
such schools. But all such rules and regulations 
must be reasonable and calculated to promote the 
objects of the law — the conferring of such an edu- 
cation upon all, free of charge, ... 

" The law, for the purpose of preserving the school 
and promoting its usefulness, has empowered the 
directors to suspend or expel scholars, but only for 
disobedient, refractory, or incorrigibly bad conduct. 
It is by the commission of one of these acts alone 
that the pupil can forfeit his right to the privileges 
of the school ; and this forfeiture can only be en- 



44 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

forced, and the right lost, after all other reasonable 
means have failed; ... 

" As to the means the directors may employ for the 
purpose of imparting knowledge in the enumerated 
branches, and the extent of their power to compel 
the pupils to study all of them, or whether that is 
optional with the parent or guardian, we do not 
pretend to decide in this case. That question is 
not presented by this record, nor has it been dis- 
cussed by counsel ; we therefore pass it over until it 
is properly presented. The question here presented 
is whether the power has been granted the direc- 
tors to compel scholars to study other and higher 
branches than those enumerated in the law. . . . 

" They may undeniably require the teacher to im- 
part instruction in other and higher branches than 
those enumerated, but that is discretionary, and, be- 
ing discretionary, they cannot be compelled to mate 
the requirement ; it is only permissive to the direc- 
tors, and is optional with parents, guardians, or pu- 
pils whether the scholars shall study such branches, 
and, being optional, pupils cannot be compelled to 
pursue such studies without the assent of the parent 
or guardian, or their own consent." 

Ohio, ISIG.—Sewell v. Board of Ed., 29 0. St. Kep. 89. 

The School Board of Defiance, Ohio, prescribed 
the study of rhetoric, and one of the rules adopted 
by the board for the government of the schools 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 45 

provided tliat if any pupil should fail to be pre- 
pared in this study he or she should, unless ex- 
cused on account of sickness or other good cause, 
be suspended. A boy named Andrew Sewell re- 
fused to comply with the rule or offer an excuse, 
and the teacher, with the consent of the board, sus- 
pended him until he should comply with the rule or 
offer excuse. The boy's father brought suit against 
the board. The Supreme Court decided that the 
rule was a reasonable one. 

From opinion : " The act under which the com- 
mon schools of Defiance were organized gives to 
the board of education of the town the entire con- 
trol and management thereof; authorizes the board 
to make and enforce all necessary rules and regula- 
tions for the government of teachers and pupils 
therein, and to determine 'the various studies and 
parts of study' in which instruction shall be given in 
the several departments thereof. 

"The act does not direct how, or in what man- 
ner, the rules and regulations which the board may 
adopt for the government of the schools under its 
care and management shall be enforced, but leaves 
the whole subject of the making of such rules and 
their enforcement to the judgment and sound dis- 
cretion of the board. The rule in question, for the 
enforcement of which, in the manner stated, dam- 
ages are claimed by the plaintiff in this action, was, 
in our opinion, reasonable. 



46 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

" The pupil having failed to comply with the rule, 
the teacher, in excluding him from the school until 
he should comply with it, or offer a reasonable ex- 
cuse to the board for his non-compliance, acted un- 
der the authority of and with the consent of the 
board, and the action of the defendants in the prem- 
ises having been, as they aver in their answer, in 
their judgment, for the best interests and welfare of 
the school, they are not liable in damages to the 
plaintiff therefor." 

Illinois, 1811.— Trustees v. 77ie People, 87 111. 303. 

Frank Van Allen was examined for admission to 
the free high -school of Lake View, Illinois. He 
passed examination, and was sufficiently proficient 
in all branches of study except that of grammar to 
entitle him, under the regulations, to admission. 
He was denied admission solely because of his ina- 
bility to pass satisfactory examination in grammar. 
His father had forbidden him to study grammar, 
and desired that he should pursue no study which 
necessitated a previous knowledge of grammar, and 
asked that he be admitted to pursue only those stud- 
ies in which he was sufficiently proficient to entitle 
him to admission. The school trustees refused his 
request. He then resorted to the courts, which de- 
cided the rule unreasonable, and ordered the trus- 
tees to admit the boy. 

From opinion : " The powers and duties of the 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 47 

trustees being, with respect to the high-school, the 
same as those of directors with respect to the dis- 
trict school, it becomes necessary to ascertain what 
are the powers and duties of directors with respect 
to district schools. So far as they affect the ques- 
tion before us, they are, to adopt and enforce all 
necessary rules and regulations for the management 
and government of the schools; to direct what 
branches of study shall be taught, and what text- 
books and apparatus shall be used, and to enforce 
uniformity of text -books." (Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 
962-3, §48.) 

" Here, then, is power to decide what branches of 
study shall be taught in the high-school, what text- 
books shall be used, and to prescribe necessary rules 
and regulations for the management and govern- 
ment of the school ; but not to decide what particu- 
lar branches of study, of those decided to be taught, 
shall be pursued by each pupil. Under the power 
to prescribe necessary rules and regulations for the 
management and government of the school, they 
may, undoubtedly, require classification of the pupils 
with respect to the branches of study they are respec- 
tively pursuing, and with respect to proficiency or de- 
gree of advancement in the same branches; that there 
shall be prompt attendance, diligence in study, and 
proper deportment. All regulations or rules to these 
ends are for the benefit of all, and presumptively pro- 
motive of the interests of all. No parent has the right 



48 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

to demand that the interests of the children of others 
shall be sacriticed for the interestsr of his child, and 
he cannot, consequently, insist that his child shall be 
placed or kept in particular classes, when by so do- 
ing others will be retarded in the advancement they 
would otherwise make; or that his child shall be 
taught studies not in the prescribed course of the 
school, or be allowed to use a text-book different 
from that decided to be used in the school, or that 
he shall be allowed to adopt methods of study that 
interfere with others in their studies. The rights 
of each are to be enjoyed and exercised only with 
reference to the equal rights of all others. 

" But no attempt has hitherto been made in this 
state to deny, by law, all control by the parent over 
the education of his child. Upon the contrary, the 
policy of our law has ever been to recognize the 
right of the parent to determine to what extent his 
child shall be educated, during minority, presuming 
that his natural affections and superior opportunities 
of knowing the physical and mental capabilities and 
future prospects of his child will insure the adop- 
tion of that course which will most effectually pro- 
mote the child's welfare. The policy of the school 
law is only to withdraw from the parent the right 
to select the branches to be studied by the child, to 
the extent that the exercise of that right would in- 
terfere with the system of instruction prescribed for 
the school, and its efficiency in imparting education 
to all entitled to share in its benefits. . . . 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 49 

" If the relator's son had possessed the required 
knowledge of grammar, but would not have been 
compelled to further pursue that branch of study 
or to pursue any other branch of study to which a 
knowledge of grammar was essential, it is impossi- 
ble to perceive how his position in the high-school, 
so far as it might affect teacher and pupils, would 
be different from that he now occupies. He is 
qualified to pursue, as a pupil, every branch of study 
that the relator desires that he shall pursue in the 
high-school. If he is qualified to go on with the 
studies selected by the relator, of what consequence 
is it that he is ignorant of some branch of study 
in no manner connected with those branches ? This 
may, possibly, be a misfortune to Frank Yan Allen 
— it surely cannot affect the government .of the 
school or incommode the other students or the 
teachers. Whether fortunate or unfortunate to 
him, however, it is for the parent, not the trustees, 
to direct the branches of education he shall pursue, 
so far as they are taught, and he is, by necessary 
preliminary education, qualified to pursue them in 
the high-school. 

" It is possible that a father may have very satis- 
factory reasons for having his son perfected in cer- 
tain branches of education to the entire exclusion 
of others ; and so long as, in exercising his parental 
authority in making the selection of the branches ho 
shall pursue, none others are affected, it can be of 
4 



60 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

no practical concern to those having the public 
schools in charge. ' 

" We think the exclusion of the relator's son 
from the high-school, upon the ground alleged, by 
the respondents, unauthorized by the statute. The 
regulation requiring it is arbitrary and unreason- 
able, and cannot be enforced, but must be disre- 
garded. 

" In Bulison et al v. Post, 79 111. 56Y,* views were 
expressed in harmony with what has been here said, 
although the question there decided was materially 
different from that presented here. 

*' Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59,f presents the ques- 
tion of the right of a teacher to punish a pupil for 
refusing, under parental objection, to pursue the 
study of geography, and the ruling was against the 
right. The opinion is able and instructive, and 
demonstrates to our satisfaction the correctness of 
the conclusion." 

Iowa, 1878. — Stater. Mizner, 50 Iowa, 152. 

Ada Buemer, a pupil in a public school in Iowa, 
carried the following notes from her father to the 
teacher : " Please excuse Ada afternoons, as her 
health will not permit her to attend all the time," 
and " Please excuse Ada from the algebra class, she 
having more lessons than she can well attend to." 

♦Ante, p. 41. f Ante, p. 34. 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 51 

The teacher did not excuse her, and, from her re- 
fusal to recite, a very spirited conversation was 
carried on between her and the teacher; and ho 
called in a hickory stick to determine the argument. 
He was tried and convicted of an assault and bat- 
tery. There was a conflict of testimony and opin- 
ion as to whether the punishment was for tho fail- 
ure to recite or for her " insolent and contemptuous 
conduct." All views of the case were evidently passed 
upon. The value of the case for this collection of 
decisions is found in the following extract from the 
opinion of the Supreme Court : 

" If, therefore, the rules adopted by the teacher 
•required that the prosecutrix should study algebra, 
and be in attendance during afternoons, and that 
proper discipline and the good of the school, as 
a whole, required an enforcement of the rules, we 
are constrained to think the mode adopted was 
not the proper one. Compulsory education is not 
yet the rule in this state, and instead of whipping 
the prosecutrix for failure to attend or study alge- 
bra, when both she and her father desired she 
should be excused, we think the defendant should 
have plainly said to both the prosecutrix and her 
father that she could not attend the school unless 
she was prepared to obey the rules in this respect. 
If a pupil attends school it must be presumed he 
submits himself to the rules ; but that is not this 
case. Until compulsory education is established 



62 POWER AND AUTHORITY OP 

we are unwilling to sanction the rule that a teacher 
may punish a pupil, as ill this case, for not doing 
something the parent has requested the pupil to be 
excused from doing. The remedy in such case is 
not corporal punishment, but expulsion." 

New Hampshire, 1819.— Kidder v. Chellis, 59 N. H. 473. 

Chellis, the defendant, a teacher, was engaged by 
the prudential committee to teach a certain school, 
and presented himself to the school committee for 
examination. The committee-man asked him a few 
questions; told him he did not have time to ex- 
amine him then but told him to commence the 
school and he would send him a certificate in a few 
days. The defendant commenced school Jan. 22d, 
1879. He divided the largest scholars into two 
divisions for declaiming and writing, and fixed Jan. 
31st as the time for the first division to declaim. 
The plaintiff, sixteen or eighteen years of age, was 
to be ready to speak on the 31st. At the appointed 
time he was not prepared to speak, and declined to 
do so then, or at any future time. The teacher 
gave him until Feb. 3d to consider the matter, and if 
he then complied with the requirement, very well. 
But if he did not he must leave school until he could. 
On Feb. 3d he came to school in the morning, but 
refused to speak, and the teacher sent him home to 
stay until he would. In the afternoon he returned, 
but persisted in his refusal to conform with the reg- 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 53 

ulation. The teaclier then told him he must leave, 
took hold of him and put him out of the school- 
house. The effort was sharp and vigorous, but was 
no more than reasonably necessary to overcome the 
resistance of the plaintiff. 

The school committee, on the evening of Feb. 3d, 
after the affray, examined the defendant, and gave 
him a certificate, and he kept the school through ac- 
cording to his engagement. 

The scholar on the morning and in the evening 
of Feb. 3d notified the teaclier that, in his refusal 
to speak, he was acting according to the directions 
of his parents. 

The regulation as to speaking was made by the 
teacher, and was oral, and no regulations were pre- 
scribed by the committee for the school. 

Opinion of the court : " The statute is peremptory 
that no person shall be employed or paid for services 
as teacher until he shall produce and deliver to the 
prudential committee a certificate of the school com- 
mittee of the town that he is qualified to instruct in 
the branches to be taught in the school which he is 
employed to teach. (G. L. c. 89, § 6.) This require- 
ment of the statute neither the district nor the pru- 
dential committee can waive. {Barr v. Deniston, 19 
N. H. 170.) It does not necessarily follow, however, 
that the plaintiff can recover by reason of what tran- 
spired at the time of the affray. The defendant was , 
keeping a school in the school-house of the district. 



54 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

He sustained to the other occupants of the house the 
relation of teacher,' and they to him that of scholars. 
The daily assemblage in the school-house for nearly 
two weeks prior to the alleged assault was not an 
unlawful meeting. The defendant was occupied in 
the useful and highly honorable employment of giv- 
ing instruction to the youth of the district. If the 
instruction must be held to have been given gratui- 
tously because the school committee of the town neg- 
lected to examine him as to his qualifications and 
give him the proper certificate when he presented 
himself for examination, the business in which he 
was engaged was none the less useful and honorable, 
nor was it made thereby illegal. He was in the oc- 
cupation of the school-house for the purpose of giv- 
ing instruction to the scholars of the district, with 
the unrevoked license of the district, and of its in- 
habitants. Although not a public teacher by legal ' 
appointment he was a teacher in fact, and his au- 
thority to govern the school could not be contested 
by those who sought to avail themselves of its ad- 
vantages. By placing their children under his in- 
struction, parents, for the time being, invested him 
with the prerogatives of school government, and con- 
ferred upon him the power to do what was reason- 
ably necessary to maintain order and render effective 
his instruction to the school, and the plaintiff's par- 
ents authorized him to require of the plaintiff obedi- 
ence to such reasonable rules as were necessary for- 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 55 

the government and instruction of the whole school. 
Their directions that they did not desire him in- 
structed in public declamation did not limit the 
defendant's authority as his teacher, because the ref- 
eree has found that the regulation was a reasonable 
and useful one to the school. (The case had been 
referred to a referee to .find the facts.) They could 
not require the defendant to receive their child un- 
der his instruction without conforming to his rea- 
sonable rules. The plaintiff was informed that he 
must submit to the rule in question by declaiming 
on Feb. 3d, or leave the school. By remaining, he 
tacitly consented to submit, and gave the defendant 
authority to compel obedience ; or he was a tres- 
passer, and the defendant had the right to expel 
him. If Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 (see p. 84), 
sustains this action, we are unable to follow the de- 
cision in that case. 

" Although the defendant was not, for all purposes, 
the teacher of a public school, he was a teacher of a 
public or private school for the purpose of govern- 
ing the school as against persons who chose to be 
members of the school ; and for any misgovern- 
raent, or maladministration in prescribing studies 
or requiring educational exercises the law provided 
ample remedies ; and a refusal to obey his reason- 
able regulations was not a legal remedy for any wrong 
of which the plaintiff complains. The defendant 
did not expel the plaintiff, but merely suspended 



66 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

him until he should comply with the regulations. 
Whether the educational assembly^ over which the 
defendant presided' was a school in fact, whatever 
legal qualities it might lack — whether it was a pub- 
lic or a private school — the power of each parent to 
decide the question what studies the scholars should 
pursue, or what exercises they should perform, 
would be a power of disorganizing the school, and 
practically rendering it substantially useless. How- 
ever judicious it may be to consult the wishes of 
parents, the disintegrating principle of parental au- 
thority to prevent all classification and destroy all 
system in any school, public or private, is unknown 
to the law. 

*' As no unnecessary force was used to remove the 
plaintiff from the house for non-compliance with a 
reasonable and useful regulation of the school, the 
plaintiff cannot recover, and the defendant is en- 
titled to judgment on the report." 

Note. — It seems plain from a careful study of the 
Wisconsin case {Morroic v. Wood, ante, p. 34) that the 
Supreme Court of that state, in the consideration of 
rights of parents in the matter of studies in the 
schools, have removed the bound which had seemed 
fixed, by common consent, if not by the courts, to de- 
termine the relative rights of parents, pupils, and 
school oflacers. 

It is a matter of some moment in the administra- 
tion of common-school systems, and has merited and 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 57 

received much discussion. It may be claimed from 
one standpoint that while the above proposition is 
admitted — that the decision makes a change of limits 
— yet the decision is not based upon law or sound 
reason. From another standpoint the effect or result 
of the decision is not only admitted, but assented to ; 
and the decision supported as sound in both law and 
reason. There is a third view which admits the law 
and reasoning of the court, but claims that noth- 
ing new is decided — that the decision does not af- 
fect the rights and powers of school officers in gen- 
eral to prescribe studies as against the wishes of 
parents. 

In support of the last view it is claimed that 
the decision turned upon the power of the teacher^ 
rather than the right of school officers or authorities; 
and upon the method of punishment employed by the 
teacher in that particular case. The Supreme Court 
of Vermont, in the case of Ferriter v. Tyler ^ ante, p. 
10, seems to take this position, and thus reviews the 
case : " We have carefully studied the Iowa " (should bo 
Wisconsin) " case of Morrow v. Wood^ before cited, and 
not only find nothing in conflict with the other cases 
decided, but that the ideas expressed by Judge Cole 
are in harmony with the other cases. In that case 
the teacher required a boy to study geography. His 
father, for good reasons, wanted him to devote him- 
self to other studies, requiring all his time and strength, 
without geography. The boy, in obedience to his 
father's direction, refused to study geography, and 
the teacher whipped him. Hence the suit. It ap- 
pears that geography was one of the studies required 



68 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

by law to be taught, but there was no law requiring 
any scholar, or any particular description of scholars, 
to study it. There was no rule of the school, beside 
the arbitrary requirement of the teacher, which would 
make it the duty of the boy to pursue that study. 
Judge Cole says, ' The statute gives the school board 
power to make all needfal rules and regulations for 
the organization, gradation, and government of the 
school, and power to suspend any pupil from the 
privileges of the school for non-compliance "with the 
rules established by them, or by the teacher with their 
consent.' It does not appear, nor is it inferrible, that 
the school board had made a rule requiring the boy 
to study geograpliy, or had given their consent to the 
requirement of the teacher. The question then was, 
whether the teacher had justifiable cause for whip- 
ping the boy. The court held that she had not, and, 
in the discussion, held, that on the facts in the case 
the father had the right to direct as to the study of 
geography by his son. We see no occasion for dififer- 
ing with the court in that case. In the course of the 
opinion it is said : ' It is not proposed to throw any ob- 
stacle in the way of the performance of their duties ' 
by the school board. Again, ' We do not propose to 
lay down any rule whicli will interfere with any rea- 
sonable regulation adopted for the management and 
government of the public schools, or Mdiich will oj)- 
erate against their efficiency and usefulness. Certain 
studies are required to be taught in the public schools 
by statute. The rights of one pupil must be so ex- 
ercised, undoubtedly, as not to prejudice the equal 
riglits of others. But the parent has the right to 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 59 

make a reasonable selection from the prescribed 
studies for his child to pursue, and this cannot possi- 
bly conflict with the equal rights of other pupils. In 
the present case the parent did not insist that his 
child should take any study outside of the prescribed 
course.' 'And how it can result disastrously to the 
proper discipline, efficiency, and well-being of tlie 
common schools, to concede the paramount right to 
make a reasonable choice from the studies in the pre- 
scribed course which his child shall pursue is a prop- 
osition we cannot understand.' And this, as well as 
all that was said by the judge, is to be taken as in a 
case where there was no rule as to the study of geog- 
raphy by the boy, except the personal arbitrary com- 
mand upon him of the teacher. How this court 
would decide in a case involving the question of su- 
periority between the parent and the school board, as 
to the pursuit of a study required by the established 
rule of that board, w^e have now no occasion to an- 
nounce or intimate. Nor had that court any such 
question before it." 

It seems here assumed that had the school board 
made a rule covering the point in issue, and the 
pupil, under the direction of his father, refused 
to obey the rule, and was punished by the teacher, 
the court of Wisconsin would have decided other- 
wise. 

Again, it is claimed that the decision only deter- 
mines that the teacher had no power to punish the 
boy by inflicting bodily pain for refusing to obey her 
command rather than the command of his father. 
That, instead of whipping, she should have suspended 



CO rOWEli AND AUTnORlTV OF 

him iVom the privilogos of the schooh This daim is 
supported by the reasoning of the court ^ the case of 
State V. MUner, ante, p. 50. 

But, turning to the whole opinion of Judge Cole in 
the AViseonsiu ease, the deeision is plainly based upon 
a broader ground than the making of a rule, or the 
method of punishment, namely: "The paramount 
right of the parent to make a reasonable choice from 
the studies in the prescribed course." True, the right 
of the parent is determined as against the teacher, but 
the argument goes beyond, making no distinction be- 
tNveen the teacher and the school authorities. Sup- 
pose the school board had made, recorded, and duly 
announced to teachers and pupils a rule requiring 
the study of geography; would the parent;:^ riglit 
to make a choice of studies be in any ^Yay atlected ? 
Would the rule operate against the parent with any 
more force or reason than the act of the legislature 
prescribing certain studies? Recurring to the opin- 
ion (ante, p. 30), after the matter last quoted by the 
Vermont court occurs this language : "' But, consider- 
ing that the study of geography was less necessary for 
his boy at that time than some other branches, he de- 
sired him to devote all his time to orthography, read- 
ing, writing, and arithmetic. The father stated that 
he thought these studies were enough for the child to 
take ; and he said he was anxious the boy should ob- 
tain a good knowledge of arithmetic, in order that he 
might assist in keeping accounts. He wished to ex- 
ercise some control over the education of his son, and 
it is impossible to say that the choice of studies which 
he made was unreasonable or inconsistent with the 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 61 

welfare and best interest of his offspring. And how 
it will result disastrously to the proper discipline, ef- 
ficiency, and well-being of the common schools to 
concede this paramount right to the parent to make a 
reasonable choice from the studies in the prescribed 
course which his child shall pursue is a proposition 
we cannot understand." 

Here the argument rests entirely upon the right of 
the parent to choose, and the reasonableness of his 
choice. And again, " It is unreasonable to suppose 
any scholar who attends school can or will study all 
the branches taught in them. From the nature of the 
case some choice must be made, and some discretion 
be exercised as to the studies which the different pu- 
pils shall pursue. The parent is quite as likely to 
make a wise and judicious selection as the teacher." 
What force has the word "teacher" here? Why is 
not the father, from his knowledge of "the health, 
temperament, aptitude, and deficiencies of his child " 
(ante, p. 38) as likely to make a wise and judicious 
selection as the school board ? The words of Judge 
Cole first quoted by the Vermont court, and the sen- 
tence next quoted, " It is not proposed to throw any 
obstacle in the way of the performance of these du- 
ties," are to be read in connection with the qualifying 
proposition immediately following, commencing with 
a very large and expressive " But.'''' " But these powers 
and duties can be well fulfilled without denying to 
the parent all right to control the education of his 
children " (ante, p. 41). And it must be noticed, further, 
that in the remarks cited by the Vermont court as 
demonstrating the wish of the Wisconsin court to 



62 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

avoid all conflict with the rules of the lyoard^ occurs a 
qualifying statement equally broad and distinct as the 
above, and introduced with the equally expressive 
'•^Buty ''But the parent has the right to make a 
reasonable selection from the prescribed studies for 
his child to pursue, and this cannot possibly conflict 
with the rights of other pupils." And in this connec- 
tion it must be observed that it is only the "reason- 
able " regulation of the board with which the court 
will not interfere ; and this expression, couj^led with 
the assertion of the parent's right, is a broad intima- 
tion that any regulation afiecting that right would 
not be " reasonable." 

True, again, the case decides that the teacher had 
no right to whip the boy ; but if the act was in con- 
travention of a parental right, which right the de- 
cision aims to establish, what matters it whether the 
parental right is trespassed upon with a rattan or a 
note of suspension. 

That the Wisconsin court has made a decision 
which announces the right of a parent to select the 
studies the child shall pursue is fully recognized and 
approved by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case 
of Trustees v. The People, ante, p. 46. There the reg- 
ulation was made by the school officers, and they 
were the defendants in the suit; furthermore, the 
method adopted with the pupil was not castigation, 
but exclusion from school. The school officers were 
authorized by law, "to adopt and enforce all neces- 
sary rules and regulations for tlie management and 
government of the schools ; to direct what branches 
of study shall be taught." The court declares, with- 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 63 

out any equivocation, that the school board has no 
power "to decide what particular branches of study, 
of those decided to be taught, shall be pursued by 
each pupil," that "no particular branch of study is 
compulsory upon those who attend school, but schools 
are simply provided by the public in which prescribed 
branches are taught, which are free to all within the 
district between certain ages," and "it is for the 
parent, not the trustees, to direct the branches of edu- 
cation" the child shall pursue. This seems to be 
just the case supposed by the Vermont court, involv- 
ing the questions which it said were not raised in the 
Wisconsin case. It was decided three years after the 
review of the subject by the Vermont justices, though 
a year before the case of State v. Mizner. 

It remains to take ground in support of, or against, 
the decisions of Wisconsin and Illinois which an- 
nounce the right of the parent to make a selection 
from the list of studies prescribed by law, as against 
school officers and teachers. The language of the 
statutes of the above states is no more plain and 
direct, and the powers and rights granted the school 
officers any less than in most of the states. The argu- 
ment against the assertion of the parental light, as 
made by the courts above named, rests upon the cen- 
tral, pivotal idea of public education — a system of 
common instruction, announced and cared for by the 
state, for the benefit of all the people, and therefore 
the state. The state recognizes the fact that its sta- 
bility and perpetuity are dependent upon the virtue 
and intelligence of its citizens ; that individual, and 
hence general, virtue is increased by tlic increase of 



64 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

individual and general intelligence. To this end the 
state desires to secure for each child the rudiments 
of education. It does not take from the parent the 
right, or release him from the duty, to educate his 
child ; but it warrants a measure of education to the 
child as against the neglect or inability of the parent, 
and defines the duty of the parent. The state, jealous 
of its own interests, will not allow parents to permit 
their children to grow up in ignorance. Hence, by 
public statute, a course of jDublic education is pre- 
scribed supported by public taxation. It is to be 
presumed that the course of education defined, when 
one is defined, by the organic law or the legislature, 
is the best result of the wise deliberation of the rep- 
resentatives of the public having in view the best in- 
terests of the state and its citizens; and when a 
course is not defined, as is the case in a number of the 
states, but the choice is confided to certain officers or 
boards created by the law, the presumption is equally 
strong that the legislature has given to them its own 
powers of prescription, and that the interests of citi- 
zens and the welfare of the state will be best sub- 
served by such exercise of the powers as they deem 
best. Now if a father who, by force of circumstances 
or simple choice, has intrusted the education of his 
child to the state or its lawfully appointed agents, 
can dictate to the state or its agents what amount, 
how little and how much, of the course of public in- 
struction is necessary for the welfare of the child, and 
can refuse to have him take more than he desires and 
commands, and the school authorities are powerless, 
then the object of the law is frustrated ; the expressed 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 65 

voice of the majority is without effect against the will 
of one man. 

It is urged, it is not intended to subvert the law 
or intent of the law providing for general education, 
but simply to allow the parent a reasonable choice of 
studies for his child. The word "reasonableness," 
then, is the bound ; the reasonableness of the demand 
of the parent, the limit. If there is reason in the 
claim of the parent, the lines laid by the law must be 
swerved more or less according to the amount of rea- 
son. Then there is no certainty ; the course of in- 
struction in school may be dependent upon such plans 
as respective parents may have. The discretionary 
power of school officers given by law exists only in 
name, and the simple duty remaining is to make such 
course of instruction as is best and possible of the 
studies chosen by parents in the exercise of parental 
prerogative. 

For where is the line of " reasonableness " to be 
drawn? What is a reasonable choice to-day is not 
to-morrow ; and the choice of one man, reasonable in 
his case, may be unreasonable when presented by an- 
other. There was a measure of reason in the demand 
of the "Wisconsin parent that his boy should devote 
extra time to aritlimetic, that he might be more valu- 
able to him, and the school boards are few that would 
not accede to the father's wish ; and yet it seems the 
board, having in view the value of education to the 
child, might demand that he receive some knowledge 
of the world and its peoples through the study of 
geography, as well as to keep in view the assistance 
he was to render his parent. Suppose the father 
5 



66 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

believed his own knowledge of arithmetic was suffi- 
cient for his whole fjimily, and desired his boy to 
devote his whole time to the study and practice of 
penmanship ; or, thinking his son's head not strong 
enough to wrestle with common fractions, should de> 
sire him to confine his attention to grammar and 
spelling, which would enable him to speak and write 
correctly and appear well among his fellows. A man 
who never went to school and runs the same sawmill 
that his father before him did, who keeps his ac- 
counts with a piece of chalk on a slab, and cannot 
see the necessity or gain of his children knowing 
more than he does, may make a choice of studies for 
them based upon his own ignorance; a choice with 
some sprinkle of reasonableness perhaps, and yet a 
choice which will not enable them to take a level 
much above his, or that will contribute greatly to 
their improvement or pleasure. And the cases miglu 
be multiplied in which a father, having in mind his 
own interest, the health of his child, and his future 
work in life, would make a choice of study which 
M' ould appear reasonable, and yet, in the judgment of 
men appointed to secure the best results of education 
for one and all, would not be best either for the child, 
the parent, or the state. To allow the wish of one 
man might not interfere witli the welfiire of the 
school or the course of instruction therein, but if sev- 
eral or all the parents should make the same demand, 
and they might with equal reason, and of course with 
equal right, it might be impossible to do any efiectual 
or valuable work in the school. 
The advocate of the father's right may say such 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 67 

cases are not likely to arise. Why not as likely to 
arise as that a fair and prudent school board will re- 
fuse to listen to the reasonable wish of parents ? The 
demand in each case is reasonable, and the parent 
makes it as of right. It is as fair to argue that sev- 
eral instances of reasonableness become an aggregate 
of unreasonableness, as to argue that a school board, 
chosen for their good judgment in the matter, in the 
exercise of lawful powers will refuse to grant the rea- 
sonable request of a father, and thereby make a woe- 
ful mistake and do a woeful wrong. 

The claim of parental right, as against a right as- 
sumed by government or unfairly exercised, is one 
that the citizens of this country would not be slow to 
assert. The fact that among the great population of 
the states, in all the years the systems of public in- 
struction have been in operation, but a very few cases 
of this character have arisen, goes to show that there 
has not been any serious conflict between the school 
officers and parents ; and that such officers and their 
teachers have heeded the reasonable requests of par- 
ents and pupils. Is it not safer to let the matter of 
defining a course of study rest in the judgment and 
discretion of the school authorities than to submit 
it to the individual whims and opinions of parents, 
trusting rather to the good sense of the authorities to 
make a wise disposal of individual cases, than to 
announce the right of every man to set up his own 
wish and desire ? Is it not more in accord with rea- 
son, and in support of the end and aim of public in- 
struction ? The reasoning of the court in the Maine 
case of Dondhoe v. RicJiards, ante, p. 24, seems to meet 



68 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

and overturn that of the court in the- Wisconsin case 
as to the principles governing the power and .author- 
ity given by statute to school boards and teachers as 
against the right of parents. Certainly no larger or 
more explicit grant of power was given by the Maine 
statute than by the Wisconsin. 

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in the case 
of Kidder v. Chellis, ante, p. 53, directly denies the 
rule of law as laid down in Morro-w v. Wood^ and evi- 
dently deems it unnecessary to argue for the power 
of public - school oflolcers and teachers to regulate 
studies as against the parental right. And that court 
further decides that the exercise of the authority to 
prescribe and enforce studies is not dependent upon 
the technical observance of the law in regard to the 
appointment of teachers and the publication of rules 
and regulations by the school board. 

RULES IN OTHER CASES. 
Massachusetts, 1%&^.—Spiller\. Wohiirn, 12 All. 127. 

The school committee of Woburn, Mass., ordered 
that the schools should be opened in the morning 
with reading from the Bible and prayer, and that 
the scholars should bow their heads during the 
prayer. Because of some objection made to the 
latter portion of the order, the committee modified 
it, and directed that any scholar, whose parent re- 
quested it, should be excused from bowing the head. 
The father of a girl named Ella R. Spiller refused to 
request that she be excused, and ordered her not to 
obey that part of the order. She refused to bow 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 69 

her head during prayer, and was excluded from the 
school until she should comply with the rule, or her 
parent should request her exemption. She then in- 
stituted a suit against the town. The Supreme Court 
decided that the rule was reasonable and proper. 

Opinion : " The power of the school committee of 
a town to pass all reasonable rules and regulations 
for the government, discipline, and management of 
the public schools under their general charge and 
superintendence is clear and unquestionable. (Gen. 
Sts. c. 38, § 16;* Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198; 
Sherman v. Charlestown, 8 Cush. 160.) Equally 
clear is it that the committee of the town of Wo- 
burn did not exceed their authority in passing an 
order that the Bible should be read and prayer 
offered at the opening of the schools on the morn- 
ing of each day. No more appropriate method 
could be adopted of keeping in the minds of both 
teachers and scholars that one of the chief objects 
of education, as declared by the statutes of this com- 
monwealth, and which teachers are especially en- 
joined to carry into effect, is 'to impress on the 
minds of children and youth committed to their 
care and instruction the principles of piety and jus- 
tice, and a sacred regard for truth.' (Gen. Sts. c. 38, 

* " Every town shall, at the annual meeting, choose, by 
written ballots, a board of school comraittee, which shall 
have the general charge and superintendence of all the pub- 
lic schools in town." (Same in Public Sts., c. 44, § 21.) 



70 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

§ 10 ; St. 1862, c. 57.) We do not mean to say 
that it would be competetit for a school committee 
to pass an order or regulation requiring pupils to 
conform to any religious rite or observance, or to 
go through with any religious forms or ceremonies, 
which were inconsistent with or contrary to their 
religious convictions or conscientious scruples. Such 
a requisition would be a violation of the spirit of 
the clause in the Constitution, Pt. 1, Art. II., which 
provides that no one shall be hurt or molested in his 
person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the 
manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of 
his own conscience ; and it would also be inconsist- 
ent with the plain intention of the legislature, in pro- 
viding that no one shall be excluded from a public 
school on account of religious opinions (Gen. Sts., 
c. 41, § 9), and in requiring that the daily reading 
of the Bible in public schools shall be without writ- 
ten note or oral comment, and in providing that no 
pupil shall be called on to read any particular version, 
whose parent or guardian shall declare that he has 
conscientious scruples against allowing him to read 
therefrom. (St. 1862, c. 57.) Having in view the 
manifest spirit and intention of these provisions, an 
order or regulation, by a school committee, which 
would require a pupil to join in a religious rite or 
ceremony contrary to his or her religious opinions, 
or those of a parent or guardian, would be clearly 
unreasonable and invalid- 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 71 

" But we are unable to see that the regulation with 
which the plaintiff was required to comply can be 
justly said to fall within this category. In the first 
place, it did not prescribe an act which was neces- 
sarily one of devotion or religious ceremony. It 
went no further than to require the observance of 
quiet and decorum during the religious service with 
which the school was opened. It did not compel a 
pupil to join in the prayer, but only to assume an 
attitude which was calculated to prevent interrup- 
tions, by avoiding all communication with others 
during the service. In the next place, the regulation 
did not require a pupil to comply with that part of 
it prescribing the position of the head during prayer, 
if the parent requested a child to be excused from 
it. This was in analogy to the provision already 
cited in relation to the reading of a particular ver- 
sion of the Bible contained in St. 1862, c. 57, and 
takes away all ground of objection to the reason- 
ableness and validity of the order. 

"Under these circumstances, it not appearing that 
the plaintiff made any objection to a compliance with 
the regulation, except in obedience to the will of her 
father, we are of opinion that her exclusion from 
the school was justifiable, and furnishes no ground 
of action." 



^2 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

Iowa, 1881.— PerAms v. Directors, 56^ Iowa, 4:19. 

The board of directors in an Iowa district made a 
rule as follows : " Scholars who shall be guilty of 
defacing or injuring any school property shall be re- 
quired to pay all damage. Notice of such damage 
shall be sent to the parents or guardians of the pupil, 
and in default of payment the case shall be reported 
to the president of the board, who may proceed with 
it according to law. Scholars thus reported to the 
president shall not afterward be allowed to attend 
until payment of damages shall be made, or the case 
otherwise adjusted." While engaged in a game of 
ball, at a proper time, near the school-house, one of 
the boys unintentionally, and by accident, batted a 
ball through one of the windows of the school-house, 
breaking a glass of about the value of three dollars. 
His parents refused to pay for it. The superintend- 
ent of the school would not allow the pupil to at- 
tend, which action was ratified by the directors, and 
suit was brought against them. The Supreme Court 
gave a decision against the directors. 

From opinion : " We are next to inquire whether 
defendants, as school directors, had authority to pro- 
mulgate and enforce the rule under which the plain- 
ti£E was excluded from the school. 

"It will be observed that plaintiff was guilty of no 
breach of discipline or of any offence against good 
order. 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 1^ 

" By an accident, and without any evil purpose, lie 
broke a window glass. The rule requires him to pay 
the damage done, and in default thereof authorizes 
the directors to exclude him from the school. We 
may admit that he ought to pay the damages and is 
liable therefor. But we think his omission to per- 
form this duty cannot be punished by his expulsion 
from the school. The state does not deprive its citi- 
zens of their property, or their liberty, or of any 
rights, except as a punishment for a crime. It would 
be very harsh and obviously unjust to deprive a 
child of education for the reason that through 
accident and without intention of wrong he de- 
stroyed property of the school district. Doubtless 
a child may be expelled from school as a punish- 
ment for breach of discipline or for offences against 
good morals, but not for innocent acts. 

" In this case the plaintiff was expelled, not because 
he broke the glass, but because he did not pay the 
damage sustained by the breaking. His default in 
this respect was no breach of good order or good 
morals. The rule requiring him to make payment 
is not intended to secure good order, but to enforce 
an obligation to pay a sum of money. 

" We are clearly of opinion that the directors have 
no authority to promulgate or enforce such a rule." 

Note. — The law of New Jersey provides for suspen- 
sion as penalty for damage to school property : " Any 
pupil who shall in any way cut, deface, or otherwise 



Y4 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

injure any school-house, fences or outbuildings thereof, 
shall be liable to suspension and punishment, and the 
parents of sucli pupil shall be liable in damages." 

SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION. 

For case of expulsion for immoral practices out 
of school, see page 91. (8 Cush. 160.) 

For case of expulsion for refusing to bow the head 
during prayer, see page 68. (12 All. 127.) 

For cases of expulsion and suspension for tardi- 
ness and absence, see page 9 (116 Mass. 366), and 
page 20 (71 Mo. 628). 

For cases of expulsion for refusal to study certain 
branches, see page 41 (79 111. 567), and page 33 
(32 Vt. 226). 

For case of expulsion for not paying for glass 
broken in school-house, see page 72. (56 Iowa, 
479.) 

For case of refusal to admit scholar because of 
deficiency in one study, see page 46. (87 111. 303.) 

For case of expulsion for publishing article reflect- 
ing upon school board, see page 99. (30 Iowa, 
429.) 

For case where pupil was expelled for attending 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 75 

social parties, contrary to rule of the school board, 
see page 102. (66 Mo. 286.) 

For case where court intimated that suspension 
was the proper course to pursue, instead of whip- 
ping-, where child, in obedience to parent, refuses to 
study certain branches, see pages 50, 122. (50 Iowa, 
152.) 

For case of expulsion where scholars were absent 
from school to attend religious services by command 
of parents and priest, but without consent of school 
committee, see page 10. (48 Yt. 444.) 

For case of expulsion of Catholic child for refusal 
to comply with a rule requiring pupils to read in the 
Protestant version of the Bible, see page 24 (38 
Me. 379) ; and for case of suspension of Catholic 
boy for refusing to lay aside his books during the 
reading from the Bible, see page 134. (95 111. 263.) 

For case where pupil, after being expelled from 
school, was ejected from school building while at- 
tending a public entertainment therein, see page 86. 
(3 Pitts. R. 264.) 

For case where boy was ejected from the school- 
house for using saucy and profane language to the 
school committee, see page 88. (41 Conn. 442.) 

For case of suspension for not declaiming, see 
page 52. {Kidder v. ChelUs, 59 N. H. 473.) 



76 POWER AND AUXHORITY OF 

Massachusetts, 1870. — Hodgkim v. Rockport^ 105 Mass. 475. 

Henry Ilodgkins was expelled from school by the 
committee of Rockport, Mass., for acts of misconduct 
which consisted of *' whisperinc;, laughing*, acts of 
playfulness and rudeness to other pupils, inattention 
to study, and conduct tending to cause confusion 
and distract the attention of other scholars from 
their studies and recitations." Before expulsion the 
pupil was remonstrated with, and admonished by 
the teacher and members of the committee. The 
boy instituted a suit against the town for this exclu- 
sion from school. The Supreme Court decided that 
the exclusion was lawful. 

From the opinion : ^' The sixteenth section of 
chapter thirty-eight of the General Statutes provides 
that the school committee 'shall have the general 
charge and superintendence of all the public schools 
in town.' This general power, by necessary impli- 
cation, includes the power to make all reasonable 
rules and regulations for the discipline, government, 
and management of the schools, and also the power 
to exclude children from school for sufficient cause. 
(Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198 ; Sherman v. Charles- 
town, 8 Cush. 160 ; Sjyiller v. Wohurn, 12 All. 127.) 
And when a scholar is guilty of misconduct which 
injuriously affects the discipline and management 
of the school, we think the law vests in the school 
committee the power of determining whether the 
welfare of the school requires his exclusion. 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 77 

" They are required by law to visit the schools fre- 
qaentl}^ for the purpose of inquiring * into the regu- 
lation and discipline of the schools, and the habits 
and proficiency of the scholars therein ' (Gen. Sts. 
c. 38, § 26) ; and they are thus in a situation to judge, 
better than any other tribunal, what effect such mis- 
conduct has upon the usefulness of the school and 
the welfare of the other scholars ; and if they exer- 
cise this power in good faith, their decision is not 
subject to revision by the court. 

*' In the case at bar, the committee, acting in good 
faith, excluded the plaintiff from school on account 
of his general persistence in disobeying the rules of 
the school, to the injury of the school. He was guilty 
of acts of misconduct which, if persisted in, it is 
clear, might seriously interfere with the discipline 
and impair the usefulness of the school. Whether 
they had such an effect upon the welfare of the 
school as to require his expulsion was a question 
within the discretion of the committee, and upon 
which their action is conclusive." 

Vermont, ISH.— Scott v. School District, 46 Vt. 452. 

A teacher in Vermont expelled from her school 
the son of the prudential committee, for disobedience 
of the rules of the school. The father, as such com- 
mittee, insisted upon her taking the boy back. The 
teacher refused, quit the school, and at the close of 
the term sued to recover her salary. In this suit, 



78 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

which resulted in tlie teacher's favor,, the following 
principles were laid down by the Supreme Court : 

" The teacher could not perform the duties of her 
employment without maintaining proper and neces- 
sary discipline in the school, and when all her other 
means for doing so failed in respect to the boy, it 
was her right, and might be her duty, to expel him, 
to save the rest of the school from being injured by 
his presence. It >vas not the duty of the teacher, 
under the contract, to teach , the school without 
maintaining proper and necessary discipline in it; 
and if the committee insisted that she should have 
the boy there, when she could not have him there 
and the discipline too, it was equivalent to insisting 
that she should teach the school Avithout the dis- 
cipline, which she was not bound to do." * 

Wisconsin, 1818.— State v. Barton,^ Wis. 150. 

A teacher in Wisconsin suspended a boy for 
" continued misconduct," or " general bad conduct," 
and the suspension was subsequently approved by 
the school board. In a suit brought to compel his 
reinstatement, the Supreme Court considered the 
rights and powers of teachers in matters of suspen- 
sion and expulsion. 

Extract from opinion : " The teacher is responsir 
ble for the discipline of his school, and for the prog-^ 

* See Tennessee case, p. 80, and note, p. 82. 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 79 

ress, conduct, and deportment of his pupils. It is 
his imperative duty to maintain good order, and to 
require of his pupils a faithful performance of their 
duties. If he fails to do so he is unfit for his posi- 
tion. To enable him to discharge these duties ef- 
fectually he must necessarily have the power to en- 
force prompt obedience to his lawful commands. 
For this reason the law gives him the power, in 
proper cases, to inflict corporal punishment upon re- 
fractory pupils. But there are cases of misconduct 
for which such punishment is an inadequate remedy. 
If the offender is incorrigible, suspension or expul- 
sion is the only adequate remedy. In general, no 
doubt, the teacher should report a case of that kind 
to the proper board for its action in the first in- 
stance, if no delay will necessarily result from that 
course prejudicial to the best interests of the school. 
But the conduct of the recusant pupil may be such 
that his presence in the school for a day or an hour 
may be disastrous to the discipline of the school, 
and even to the morals of the other pupils. In such 
a case it seems absolutely essential to the welfare of 
the school that the teacher should have the power to 
suspend the offender at once from the privileges of 
the school ; and he must necessarily decide for him- 
self whether the case requires that remedy. If he 
suspends the pupil, he should promptly report his 
action and his reasons therefor to the proper board. 
It will seldom be necessary for the teacher in charge 



so POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

of a district school to exercise this power, because 
usually he can communicate readily with the dis- 
trict board, and obtain the direction and order of 
the board in the matter. But where the govern- 
ment of a public school is vested in a board of edu- 
cation (as in the present case) with a more numerous 
membership than district boards, and which holds 
stated meetings for the transaction of business, 'the 
facilities for speedy communication with the board 
may be greatly decreased, and more time must usu- 
ally elapse before the board can act upon a com- 
plaint of the teacher. In those schools the occa- 
sions which require the action of the teacher in the 
first instance will occur more frequently than in the 
district schools. We conclude, therefore, that the 
teacher has, in a proper case, the inherent power to 
suspend a pupil from the privileges of his school, 
unless he has been deprived of the power by the af- 
firmative action of the proper board." 

Tennessee, 1880. — ParJcer v. School District^ 5 Lea, 525. 

A teacher in Tennessee published certain rules for 
his school, one of which was as follows: "Pupils 
must abstain from the common use of tobacco and 
ardent spirits." The school directors objected to 
that part in relation to tobacco, and he was em- 
ployed upon the understanding and condition that 
the rule in relation to the use of tobacco should not 
be enforced on the school grounds outside of the 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 81 

scliool-house. After some days he suspended two 
of the pupils for using tobacco on the school grounds 
outside the school -house. The directors insisted 
that the pupils should be restored. The teacher re- 
fused to abrogate or modify his rule in regard to 
tobacco and to allow the pupils to continue in 
school with the privilege of using tobacco on the 
school grounds; and the directors thereupon dis- 
charged him. 

In a suit concerning the salary of the teacher it 
was decided by the Supreme Court that, under the 
provisions of the state law, the teacher could suspend 
but not expel, and his decision was subject to the 
action of the directors. 

The following sections of the law were cited by 
the court. School directors "to suspend or dismiss 
pupils when the prosperity or efficiency of the school 
requires it." "Any teacher of a public school may, 
for sufficient cause, suspend pupils from attendance 
on the schools until the case is decided by the board 
of school directors, which shall be with as little de- 
lay as possible." 

Extract from opinion : " From these provisions 
[recited above] it is apparent that a teacher of a 
public school, while he has the right to suspend a 
pupil until the case is decided by the directors, can- 
not, without the concurrence of the directors, per- 
manently deprive a pupil, within the ages, and resid- 
ing within the district, of the privileges of the school. 
6 



82 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

The power to dismiss a pupil is alone given to the 
directors, and their decision must control. 

" The refusal of a teacher to receive and admit to 
the privileges of the school a pupil whom the di- 
rectors decide shall be received, or an attempt upon 
the part of the teacher to dismiss a pupil whom the 
directors decide shall not be dismissed, is, we think, 
such * improper conduct' as would authorize the di- 
rectors to dismiss the teacher, for this would be to 
deny to the pupils the privileges of the public school 
secured to them by the law.* 

" It is unnecessary for us to express any opinion 
as to the wisdom or propriety of the rule in regard 
to the use of tobacco, about which the controversy 
arose. It is enough to say that this and all ques- 
tions of a similar character are by the law intrusted 
to the wisdom and discretion of the school directors, 
and their decision must in general be conclusive. If 
we could in any case control their discretion, the 
present is not a case for the exercise of such power." 

* The rule as thus broadly asserted apparently conflicts 
with that expressed in the Vermont case (p. 77), but it is to 
be noted that the Tennessee case turned upon the provision 
of the statute cited in the opinion ; and the real issue between 
the teacher and school board was concerning the adoption of 
a by-law, and the teacher violated a condition of his employ- 
ment in enforcing a rule annulled by them. 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 83 

Massachusetts, 1882. — Davis v. Boston, 133 Mass. 103. 

Joseph F. Davis was a pupil in a grammar school 
in the city of Boston. He refused to submit to cor- 
poral punishment for disobedience and impertinence 
in school, and was ordered by his teacher to go to 
the principal of the school ; he went home instead, 
but returned after several days and offered to sub- 
mit to punishment; after the teacher commenced 
to punish,- the boy refused to submit to further pun- 
ishment, and, as before, was ordered to report to the 
principal, and, as before, went home instead ; this 
was repeated several times. On the last occasion 
the teacher told him to go home, and told him he 
could not return to the school until he had taken 
his punishment. The boy and his father then had 
an interview with the principal, to whom the boy 
said he would receive his punishment, but could not 
say he was willing to receive it. The principal told 
the boy to go home, and that he would not have 
him in school unless he said he was willing to be 
punished. The father then requested of the princi- 
pal the reasons for excluding his boy, and received 
the following reply from the principal : " In re- 
sponse to your request why your boy ' has been 
excluded from school,' I have to say what you al- 
ready know: (l) that he has not been absolutely 
excluded from school ; and (2) that I am willing to 
receive the boy when he comes in an obedient spirit 



64 POWiJR AND AUTHORITY OF 

and willing- to receive his punishment, to be given 
for impertinence 'to his teacher. All'ow me further 
to state that, if you are dissatisfied with my meth- 
ods of discipline, you can properly appeal to the 
school committee." 

In an action against the city for unlawful exclu- 
sion from school the Superior Court directed a ver- 
dict for the defendant. The boy then appealed .to 
the Supreme Court, where the judgment of the 
lower court was affirmed. It was held the boy was 
not expelled from school. It Avas also decided that 
teachers may suspend pupils, but the expulsion rests 
with the school authorities. 

Opinion : "This action is brought under the stat- 
ute which provides that a child unlawfully excluded 
from any public school shall recover damages there- 
for in an action of tort, to be brought in the name 
of such child, by his guardian or next friend, against 
the city or town by which such school is supported." 
(Gen. Sts. c. 41, § 11 ; Pub. Sts. c. 47, § 12.) 

" The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff, tended to show that he was guilty 
of several acts of disobedience and insubordination 
in the school, for which the teacher sent him to his 
home ; that afterwards his father returned with him, 
and had an interview with the principal of the 
school, in which the principal said that the school 
committee would not allow him to punish the plain- 
tiff unless he said that he was willing to be pun- 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 85 

ished, and, upon the plaintiff's refusing to say so, 
he told him *to go home, and that he would not 
have him in school unless he said he was willing to 
be punished.' The father afterwards requested the 
teacher to state the grounds upon which the boy 
had been 'excluded from school;' and received an 
answer, which is set forth in the report. There- 
upon, without any appeal to the school committee, 
this action was brought. 

"We are of opinion that the Superior Court 
rightly ruled that the action could not be main- 
tained. The intention of the statute is to give a 
remedy to a child who is unlawfully excluded from 
school by the proper authorities, who in this matter 
represent the city or town. A teacher has no au- 
thority to exclude a child from school, unless he 
acts under the order of the school committee, of 
which there was no evidence in this case. The laws 
vest in the school committee the charge and super- 
intendence of the schools. They alone have the 
right to exclude any child from school. 

" If a teacher sends a child home from school, 
there is no hardship in requiring the parent to ap- 
peal to the committee. Unless the teacher is acting 
under some order of the committee, this is the only 
way of ascertaining whether the proper authorities^ 
for whose action the city or town is made responsi- 
ble, have excluded the child. On the other hand, to 
hold that wlienever a teacher sends a child home aa 



•86 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

a punishment the parent may treat it as an expul- 
sion and sue the 'city or town, would lead to vexa- 
tious litigation and impair the discipline and useful- 
ness of the schools. {Spear v. Cummings, 23 Pick. 
224; Sherman Y. Charlestown^ 8 Cush. 160; Hodg^ 
kins V. RocJcport, 105 Mass. 475 ; Learock v. Put- 
naniy 111 Mass. 499.) 

" The plaintiff in this case, therefore, has failed-to 
show an expulsion from school for which the city is 
liable under the statute." 

Pennsylvania, 1870. — Hughes y. Goodell, 3 Pitts. Rep. 264. 

The following case is reported in the Pennsylva- 
nia books, although not a decision of the court of 
last resort of that state. A decision, however, of so 
righteous a character as to merit a place here, and 
the approval of students and their lady friends ev- 
erywhere. 

A student in a state normal school was, for some 
not very grievous matter, expelled by the principal 
from that school and all the normal schools of the 
state, no matter where situated, and for all time to 
come. Some time after, an exhibition was given by 
the school, in the school building, to which all the 
public were invited and tickets were sold. On the 
evening of the exhibition the expelled student and a 
lady friend purchased tickets and were admitted to 
the hall, taking seats near the centre thereof. About 
the time the hall was filled the principal and assist- 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 87 

ants forcibly put the young man out of the building 
and out of the school grounds. He then invoked 
the law to give him damages against them, and was 
successful. 

From opinion : " While the teachers or directors 
may expel a scholar from the school for sufficient 
reasons, and deprive him of its advantages, it does 
not follow, by any means, that they can inflict a 
perpetual disability upon the offending student. If 
he is afflicted with a contagious disease, or possesses 
sucli a bad moral character as to endanger the health 
or pollute the morals of those with whom he comes 
in contact, he may, from motives of public policy, 
be excluded from their association. 

" But for a technical violation of school regula- 
tions, while he may be expelled from the school, he 
cannot be further punished by its guardians by the 
infliction of disabilities in derogation of his rights as 
a citizen. ... 

"Now, to say that a student expelled from a 
school for disobedience to some municipal regula- 
tion should be excluded from attending a prayer- 
meeting or public lecture in the school-house or 
college premises for all time to come, without any 
evidence of improper conduct or suspicion of im- 
proper purposes, would be an exercise of tyranny 
over his private rights not vested in the trustees, 
directors, or professors of our educational institu- 
tions. 



88 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

" A scholar may forfeit his rights to a place in 
the school or college by the violation of some rule 
that involves no moral turpitude. And, so far as 
appears, that was the condition of this plaintiff. If 
the rule of right in the professors be as great as is 
claimed in this case, he might have been sued in 
trespass or forcibly expelled for attending the fu- 
neral of his mother upon the premises ten years 
after his expulsion." 

Connecticut, 18'74. — Peck v. Smith, 41 Conn. 442. 

A district-school committee-man in Connecticut _ 
went to a school-house to build a fire. He observed 
some chalk-marks- on the funnel, and asked a large 
boy, sixteen years of age, who was present with 
three or four younger pupils, if he knew wht) made 
them. The boy replied, " I did." The committee- 
man asked, " What for?" The boy answered, " For 
nothing but fun ; for no hurt and for no good." 
The committee then asked him if he could not get 
off the marks better than he had done. The boy 
replied, in a saucy way, that he " supposed that he 
could take a hoe or a scraper and scratch them off 
a little more ; that the teacher was satisfied with it." 
The committee then called the boy saucy and im- 
pudent, and told him he wanted no more of his 
" lip." The boy gave answer that, in his opinion, 
the committee-man was the saucier of the two. 
He advanced towards the boy with hand raised as 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 8^ 

if to strike liim, when the boy began to swear, and 
" dared him " to strike. He then told the boy he 
must stop swearing. The boy replied that he would 
not, for him or any " G — d d — n m — n," and asked 
the committee-man if he desired him to leave school. 
The committee-man told him he did not, but wanted 
him to remain and behave himself. The boy con- 
tinuing to swear, he was told to take his things and 
go. Not seeming to haste, he was told to hurry up. 
lie responded that he wouldn't go until he got 
ready, whereupon the committee-man took hold of 
his shoulder and put him out of the school-house, 
using sufficient force for the purpose. The commit- 
tee-man was then sued for damages. The Supreme 
Court decided that the action of the committee-man 
was justified ; and that it was not an expulsion from 
the school. 

From opinion : " From the facts detailed in the 
motion the act of the defendant in removing the 
plaintiff from the school-house is abundantly justi- 
fied, and may properly be commended. The school 
for the day had not commenced. The defendant, 
being at the school-house performing certain duties 
connected with the school, called the attention of 
the plaintiff to certain acts, not specially culpable in 
character, which he acknowledged he had commit- 
ted. His bearing and manner were insulting and 
offensive, and the language in which he indulged 
was grossly profane. Such language, reprehensible 



90 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

at all times, should not have been allowed to pass 
with impunity from a school-boy of the 'older class, 
within the walls of a school-house, in the presence 
and hearing of younger pupils. After being told to 
leave he so conducted that it was proper to remove 
him, no unnecessary force being used to attain that 
object. . . . 

"All the force used against the plaintiff is fully 
justified, and the judgment for the defendant should 
not be disturbed. The plaintiff stands here on his 
legal rights, and is certainly entitled to enjoy them, 
but his position on this record is such that he 
should have them in strict measure, not running 
over." * 

* A teacher in Vermont having forbidden a boy to further 
attend school unless he would make apology for certain mis- 
conduct, and he refusing to leave or apologize, sent for the 
committee, who ordered the boy to apologize or leave. The 
boy would not leave, and the committee attempted to remove 
him, when another scholar interfered. The last - mentioned 
boy was found guilty of an assault and battery upon the 
committee. {State v. Williams, 2V Yt. '755.) This case and 
the Connecticut case, Peck v. Smith ( p. 88 ), are the only 
ones bearing upon the right of school officials to act in per- 
son in the schoolroom. 

The following opinion of an eminent educational writer 
upon this point is deemed worthy of insertion here. " Dur- 
ing the period of visitation the committee have the entire 
control of the school. For the time being it is their school 
and the teacher is their servant. They may decide what 
classes shall be called upon to perform exercises, and in what 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 91 



RIGHTS AND POWERS OVER PUPILS FOR ACTS COM- 
MITTED OUT OF SCHOOL. 

Massachusetts, 1851. — Sherman v. Charlestown, 8 Cush. 160. 

A girl named Charlotte A. Sherman was expelled 
from the schools by the school committee of 
Charlestown, Mass., for acts of immorality and li- 
centiousness committed outside the school. The 
laws of that state provide that any child unlawfully 
excluded from school may have an action for dam- 
ages against the city or town supporting the school. 
The girl above named instituted an action, but failed 
therein, the Supreme Court deciding that she was 
lawfully excluded. 

From the opinion : " The argument for the plain- 
tiff is, that it is the right of every child between 
se.ven and sixteen to go to the public school for 
instruction; that this right is absolute and inde- 

studies. They may direct the teacher to conduct the ex- 
amination, or may conduct it wholly themselves, or they may 
combine both methods. In fine, they may dismiss the 
teacher for the hour, and pursue the examination in his ab- 
sence. ... 

*' Should any scholar misbehave himself, or prove refractory 
or contumacious to the committee, while they are engaged in 
examining the school, it is presumed they have an authority 
to suspend, to expel, or to punish on the spot, in the same 
way that the teacher may do in case of like misconduct com- 
mitted against himself." — (Horace Mann, Sec. Mass. Board 
Ed., 10th Rep. p. 183.) 



92 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

feasible ; that if a young person, male or female, 
sustains a bad moral cbaracter, and is guilty of 
gross acts of notorious misconduct, out of school, 
provided there is no violation of the rules of the 
school, and no misconduct in school, such pupil 
cannot be rightfully excluded for any cause, and of 
course every exclusion must be wrongful. If such 
were the intent of the legislature, it is strange that 
they should have used such a significant qualifying 
term as that of ' unlawfully,' implying that there 
might be a lawful exclusion from which no such 
consequence would follow. 

" On general principles it would seem strange if, 
in the establishment of such a great public institu- 
tion as that of the public schools, in the benefits of 
which the whole community has so deep and vital 
an interest, there were no power vested anywhere 
suflScient to protect the schools thus established 
from the noxious influence of any one whose pres- 
ence and influence would be injurious to the whole, 
and subversive of the purposes manifestly contem- 
plated by their establishment. But the court are 
of opinion that the schools have not been left by 
the law without reasonable protection in this re- 
spect; and that a power is vested in the general 
school committee, or the master, with their appro- 
bation and direction, to exclude a pupil, although 
within the prescribed age of seven and sixteen, for 
good and sufficient cause; and that the notorious 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 93 

immoral propensities, practices, and habits of any 
one claiming admission as a pupil, if proved to the, 
satisfaction of the committee, do constitute a good 
and sufficient cause for such exclusion. 

" This power is rather to be drawn from the gen- 
eral provisions of the law on this subject, and their 
application to the subject-matter, than from any- 
specific enactment. Such authority must, from 
the necessity of the case, be conferred in general 
terms. ... 

" In the first place, it is obvious, indeed, it is stren- 
uously argued in behalf of the plaintiff, that these 
schools are established for the benefit of all the in- 
habitants. The enjoyment of this benefit is there- 
fore a common, not an exclusive personal, right; 
then, like other common rights, that of way, for in- 
stance, it must be exercised under such limitations 
and restrictions that it shall not interfere with the 
equal and co-extensive rights of others. Take the 
case of contagious disease: can it be doubted that 
the presence of a pupil infected could be lawfully 
prohibited, not for any fault or crime, or wrong con- 
duct, but simply because his attempt to insist upon 
his right to attend, under such circumstances, would 
be dangerous and noxious, and so an interruption 
of the equal and common right? It seems to be 
admitted — if not, it could hardly be questioned — 
that for misconduct in school, for disobedience to 
its reasonable regulations, a pupil may be excluded. 



94 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

Why so ? There is no express provision in the law 
authorizing such exclusion. It results by, necessary 
implication from the provisions of law requiring 
good discipline. It proves that the right to attend 
is not absolute and unqualified, but one to be en- 
joyed by all under reasonable conditions. 

"But it is argued, that though good discipline 
may be maintained within the school, yet the mas- 
ter and the committee have no right to look be- 
yond the walls of the school, to take notice of the 
conduct of its pupils. We cannot perceive the force 
of this distinction, pressed to the extent to which 
the argument attempts to carry it. Truancy is a 
fault committed wholly beyond the precincts of the 
school, yet no example is more contaminating, no 
malconduct more subversive of discipline. May not 
an incorrigible truant be expelled, not as a punish- 
ment merely, but as a protection to others from in- 
jurious example and influence. Children of both 
sexes, and of various ages, capacities, and suscepti- 
bilities must be thrown together on their way to 
and from school, at their amusements out of school- 
hours, under such circumstances as to exert a pow- 
erful influence on each other. 

" The power, in the last resort, we think, is vested 
in the school committee. By Rev. Sts. c. 23, § 10, 
the inhabitants of every town are required to 
choose by ballot a school committee, who shall 
have the general charge and superintendence of all 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 95 

the public schools in such town. In some respects 
their duties are specially prescribed ; in others they 
result from the general power of superintendence 
and visitation. . . . 

" Supposing, then, that the school committee have 
power, upon a proper occasion, to exclude a pupil, 
we can have no doubt that open, gross immorality 
in a female, manifested by licentious propensities, 
language, manners, and habits, amounting even to 
actual prostitution, although not manifested in the 
school, are a sufficient ground on which to prohibit 
her attending the public school. . . . 

"It must be considered that the power of all teach- 
ers of schools, and of the committees or other man- 
agers under whose direction they act, is a parental 
authority, to be exercised for the best good of the 
whole. It was said in the argument that if the 
plaintiff had violated the laws of the country, be- 
ing of an age to be responsible for her conduct, she 
was liable to be prosecuted and punished, before 
the tribunals of justice. Suppose she was so liable, 
she was not the less unfit to be the member of a 
public school. The two powers are vested and are 
to be exercised diverso intuitu, the one to punish of- 
fences against the law, the other to maintain the 
purity and discipline of the school, and secure the 
great public objects for which it was established. 
The court are therefore satisfied that, upon proof 
of the facts tendered by the defendants, the school 



96 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

committee were justified in excluding the plaintiff, 
and that sueli exclusion was not wrongful." 

Vermont, 1859. — Zander v. Seaver, 82 Vt. 114. 

Feter Lander, Jr., aged about eleven, attended a 
school in Burlington, Yt., of which a man named 
A. B. Seaver was teacher. One day, about an hour 
and a half after the close of the school in the after- 
noon, and after he had returned to his home, and 
while driving his father's cow from the pasture by 
the teacher's house, Lander called the teacher *' old 
Jack Seaver." This language was used in the pres- 
ence of some fellow-pupils and within the hearing 
of Seaver. The next morning after the school was 
opened the teacher reprimanded Lander for using 
the insulting language the evening before, and then 
whipped him with a small rawhide. The boy then 
brought action of trespass against the teacher for 
assault and battery. 

From opinion : " The first question presented is, 
has a schoolmaster the right to punish his pupils for 
acts of misbehavior committed after the school has 
been dismissed, and the pupil has returned home and 
is engaged in his father's service ? 

" It is conceded that his right to punish extends 
to school-hours, and there seems to be no reasonable 
doubt that the supervision and control of the mas- 
ter over the scholar extend from the time he leaves 
home to go to school till he returns home from 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 97 

school. Most parents would expect and desire that 
teachers should take care that their children, in go- 
ing to and returning from school, should not loiter 
or seek evil company, or frequent vicious places of 
resort ; but in this case, as appears from the bill of 
exceptions, the offence was committed an hour and 
a half after the school was dismissed, and after the 
boy had returned home and while he was engaged 
in his father's service. When the child has returned 
home, or to his parent's control, then the parental 
authority is resumed and the control of the teacher 
ceases, and then, for all ordinary acts of misbehav- 
ior, the parent alone has the power to punish. It is 
claimed, however, that in this case the boy, " while in 
the presence of other pupils of the same school, used 
towards the master and in his hearing contemptu- 
ous language, with a design to insult him, and which 
had a direct and immediate tendency to bring the 
authority of the master over his pupils into con- 
tempt, and lessen his hold upon them and his con- 
trol over the school. This, under the charge of the 
court, must have been found by the jury. 

" This misbehavior, it is especially to be ob- 
served, has a direct and immediate tendency to in- 
jure the school, to subvert the master's authority, 
and to beget disorder and insubordination. It is 
not misbehavior generally or towards other per- 
sons, or even towards the master in matters in no 
way connected with or affecting the school. For 
7 



98 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

as to such misconduct, committed by the child af- 
ter his return home from school, we think the par- 
ents, and they alone, have the power of punish- 
ment. 

" But where the offence has a direct and immedi- 
ate tendency to injure the school and bring the mas- 
ter's authority into contempt, as in this case, when 
done in the presence of other scholars and of the 
master, and with a design to insult him, we think 
he has the right to punish the scholar for such acts 
if he comes again to school. 

" The misbehavior must not have merely a remote 
and indirect tendency to injure the school. All im- 
proper conduct or language may perhaps have, by 
influence and example, a remote tendency of that 
kind. But the tendency of the acts so done out of 
the teacher's supervision, for which he may punish, 
must be direct and immediate in their bearing upon 
the welfare of the school, or the authority of the 
master and the respect due to him. Cases may 
readily be supposed which lie very near the line, 
and it will often be difficult to distinguish between 
the acts which have such an immediate and those 
which have such a remote tendency. Hence each 
case must be determined by its peculiar circum- 
stances. 

" Acts done to injure or deface the schoolroom, 
to destroy the books of scholars, or the books or 
apparatus for instruction, or the instruments of pun- 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 99 

ishment of the master ; language used to other schol- 
ars to stir up disorder and insubordination, or to 
heap odium and disgrace upon the master; writ- 
ings and pictures placed so as to suggest evil and 
corrupt language, images, and thoughts to the youth 
who must frequent the school — all such or similar 
acts tend directly to impair the usefulness of the 
school, the welfare of the scholars, and the authority 
of the master. By common consent and by the 
uniform custom in our New England schools the 
master has always been deemed to have the right 
to punish such offences. Such power is essential 
to the preservation of order, decency, decorum, and 
good government in schools." 

Iowa, 1870. — Murphy v. Directors, 30 Iowa, 429. 

The directors of a district in Iowa made a visit 
to a school, and, after the close of an exercise in 
rhetoric, made remarks commending and criticising 
what in their judgment deserved. A few days 
afterwards one of the pupils, a boy named Murphy, 
wrote and had published in a newspaper an article 
which, it was alleged, held the directors up to ridi- 
cule, was impudent, scandalous, and tended to im- 
pair the authority and usefulness of the board. The 
board, learning that said article was creating insub- 
ordination in the school and inciting disregard of 
their authority in other pupils, directed the teacher 
to suspend Murphy until such time as he would 



100 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

apologize. The boy instituted action against the 
directors, and was successful. 

From opinion : "... And this question itself 
rests upon the extent of the power conferred by 
statute upon the boards of school directors in re- 
spect to the suspension of pupils from the privi- 
leges of the schools. Our statute provides that the 
directors shall have power to dismiss any pupils 
from school for gross immorality or for persistent 
violation of the regulations of the school, and to 
readmit them, etc. (Rev. § 2054), and it is also 
made their duty to aid the teachers in establish- 
ing and enforcing rules for the government of the 
schools. (Laws of 1862, c. 172, § 27.) 

" The answer in this case does not aver that this 
plaintiff was guilty of, or even charged with, gross 
immorality or the violation of any regulation of the 
school ; nor is.it averred that the article plaintiff is 
charged with having written and caused to be pub- 
lished was immoral or done in violation of any reg- 
ulation of the school. The statute does not author- 
ize the board of directors to suspend pupils for acts 
tending to destroy the peace and harmony of the 
school, or inciting insubordination in others, or for 
ridicule of the directors, in the absence of any reg- 
ulation prohibiting such acts. And while we would 
not interfere with the action of the board within the 
range of their jurisdiction and legal discretion, we . 
cannot sanction an exercise of authority not con- 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 101 

ferred by statute, or the enforcement of penalties 
essentially ex post factOj under the guise of sound 
discretion. "When proper regulations for the gov- 
ernment of the school are made and brought to the 
knowledge of the pupils, they may be held to the 
penalties for their violation ; but for the board to 
visit the severest penalty within their power upon a 
pupil for an act out of school not prohibited either 
expressly or by implication, even by a general regu- 
lation, it is at variance with both the letter and 
spirit of our laws." * 

* But in a later case in Iowa, hereinbefore reported (ante, 
p. 3, 31 Iowa, 662), where expulsion from school was di- 
rected for violation of rule in relation to absence and tardi- 
ness, the following rule was laid down and the "Vermont case 
cited in support of it : "If the effect of acts done out of 
school - houses reach within the schoolroom during school- 
hours, and are detrimental to good order and the best inter- 
ests of the pupils, it is evident that such acts may be forbid- 
den. Truancy is a fault committed away from school. Can 
it be pretended that it cannot be reached for correction by 
the school board and teachers ? A pupil may engage in 
sports beyond school that will render him unfit to study dur- 
ing school-hours. Cannot these sports be forbidden ? The 
view that acts, to be within the authority of the school board 
and teachers for discipline and correction, must be done with- 
in school-hours, is narrow and without regard to the spirit of 
the law and the best interests of our common schools. It is 
in conflict, too, with authority. See upon this point Lan- 
der V. Seav€i% 32 Yt. 114; Sherman v. Charlestown^ 8 Cush. 
160. The doctrine we have above endeavored to state is, 
in these cases, distinctly announced." 



102 POWEE AND AUTHORITY OF 

Missouri, ISII.— Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286. 

The school directors of the town of Tipton, in 
Missouri, made a rule that no pupil should attend 
social parties during the school terra. A boy named 
Dritt, with the permission of his father and mother, 
attended an evening party composed of the young 
people of the town. And it was alleged their con- 
duct " was strictly innocent, inoffensive, and moral, 
tending only to social culture." For thus attending 
the party, in violation of the rule, he was expelled 
from school. He then sued the directors, and it was 
held by the Supreme Court that, while he could not 
maintain an action against the directors because they 
had not acted maliciously, they had exceeded their 
authority in making the rule. 

From opinion : " The directors of a school dis- 
trict are invested with the power and authority to 
make and execute all needful rules and regulations 
for the government, management, and control of 
such school as they may think proper, not incon- 
sistent with the laws of the land. Under the pow- 
er thus conferred the directors are not authorized 
to prescribe a rule which undertakes to regulate 
the conduct of the children within the district, 
who have a right to attend the school, after they 
are dismissed from it and remitted to the custody 
and care of the parent or guardian. They have 
the unquestioned right to make needful rules for 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 103 

the control of the pupils while at school, and un- 
der the charge of the person or persons who teach 
it, and it would be the duty of the teacher to en- 
force such rules when made. While in the teacher's 
charge the parent would have no right to invade 
the schoolroom and interfere with him in its man- 
agement. On the other hand, when the pupil is re- 
leased, and sent back to his home, neither the teach- 
er nor directors have the authority to follow him 
thither and govern his conduct while under the pa- 
rental eye. 

" It certainly could not have been the design of 
the legislature to take from the parent the control of 
his child while not at school and invest it in a board 
of directors and teacher of a school. If they can 
prescribe a rule which denies to the parent the right 
to allow his child to attend a social gathering, ex- 
cept upon pain of expulsion from a school which 
the law gives him the right to attend, may they not 
prescribe a rule which would forbid the parent from 
allowing the child to attend a particular church, or 
any church at all, and thus step in, in loco parentis^ 
and supersede entirely parental authority ? For of- 
fences committed by the scholar while at school, he 
is amenable to the laws of the school ; when not at 
school, but under the charge of the parent or guar- 
dian, he is answerable alone to him. 

"A person teaching a private school may say 
upon what terms he or she will accept scholars, and 



104 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

may demand, before receiving a scholar to be tangbt, 
that the parents shall surrender so much of his or 
her parental authority as not to allow the scholar, 
during the terra, to attend social parties, balls, thea- 
tres, etc., except on pain of expulsion. This would 
be a matter of contract, and no one has a right to 
send a scholar to such a school except on the terms 
prescribed by those who teach it. 

** This is not so in regard to public schools, which 
every child within school age has a right, under the 
law, to attend, subject, while so attending, to be gov- 
erned by such needful rules as may be prescribed. 
When the schoolroom is entered by the pupil the 
authority of the parent ceases and that of the 
teacher begins; when sent to his home the author- 
ity of the teacher ends and that of the parent is re- 
sumed. For his conduct when at school he may 
be punished oi' even expelled, under proper circum- 
stances ; for his conduct when at home he is sub- 
ject to domestic control. The directors, in prescrib- 
ing the rule that scholars who attended a social party 
should be expelled from school, went beyond their 
power and invaded the right of the parent to gov- 
ern the conduct of his child when solely under his 
charge." 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 105 



DECISIONS IN RELATION TO CORPORAL PUNISHMENT. 

North Carolina, 1837. — State v. Pendergrass^ 2 Dev. & Batt. 
365. 

A lady teacher in North Carolina, after mild treat- 
ment had failed, whipped one of her young pupils 
with a switch, leaving marks upon the body ; which 
marks, however, disappeared in a few days. The 
teacher was indicted and tried for assault and bat- 
tery. The following opinion of the Supreme Court, 
sustaining her action, is considered as defining the 
extreme limit of the teacher's authority as to bodily 
punishment. 

Opinion : " It is not easy to state with precision 
the power which the law grants to schoolmasters 
and teachers with respect to the correction of their 
pupils. It is analogous to that which belongs to 
parents, and the authority of the teacher is regarded 
as a delegation of parental authority. One of the 
most sacred duties of parents is to train up and 
qualify their children for becoming useful and vir- 
tuous members of society ; this duty cannot be ef- 
fectually performed without the ability to command 
obedience, to control stubbornness, to quicken dili- 
gence, and to reform bad habits ; and to enable him 
to exercise this salutary sway he is armed with the 
power to administer moderate correction, when he 
shall believe it to be just and necessary. The 
teacher is the substitute of the parent; is charged 



106 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

in part with the performance of his duties, and in 
the exercise of those delegated duties is invested 
with his power. 

" The law has not undertaken to prescribe stated 
punishments for particular offences, but has con- 
tented itself with the general grant of the power of 
moderate correction, and has confided the gradation 
of punishments, within the limits of this grant, to 
the discretion of the teacher. The line which sepa- 
rates moderate correction from immoderate punish- 
ment can only be ascertained by reference to gen- 
eral principles. The welfare of the child is the 
main purpose for which pain is permitted to be in- 
flicted. Any punishment, therefore, which may se- 
riously endanger life, limbs, or health, or shall dis- 
figure the child, or cause any other permanent in- 
jury, may be pronounced in itself immoderate, as 
not only being unnecessary for, but inconsistent 
with, the purpose for which correction is authorized. 
But any correction, however severe, which produces 
temporary pain only, and no permanent ill, cannot 
be so pronounced, since it may have been necessary 
for the reformation of the child, and does not in- 
juriously affect its future welfare. 

" We hold, therefore, that it may be laid down as 
a general rule, that teachers exceed the limits of 
their authority when they cause lasting mischief ; 
but act within the limits of it when they inflict 
temporary pain. 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 107 

" When the correction administered is not in it- 
self immoderate, and therefore beyond the authority 
of the teacher, its legality or illegality must depend 
entirely, we think, on the qui animo with which it 
was administered. Within the sphere of his au- 
thority the master is the judge when correction is 
required, and of the degree of correction necessary ; 
and, like all others intrusted with a discretion, he 
cannot be made penally responsible for error of 
judgment, bnt only for wickedness of purpose. The 
best and wisest of mortals are weak and erring 
creatures, and in the exercise of functions in which 
their judgment is to be the guide cannot, be right- 
fully required to engage for more than honesty of 
purpose and diligence of exertion. His judgment 
must be presumed correct^ because he is the judge, 
and also because of the difficulty of proving the of- 
fence, or accumulation of offences, that called for 
correction ; of showing the peculiar temperament, 
disposition, and habits of the individual corrected ; 
and of exhibiting the various milder means that 
may have been ineffectually used before correction 
was resorted to. 

" But the master may be punishable when he 
does not transcend the powers granted, if he grossly 
abuse them. If he use his authority as a cover for 
malice, and, under pretence of administering correc- 
tion, gratify his own bad passions, the mask of the 
judge shall be taken off, and he will stand amenable 



108 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

to justice as an individual not invested with judicial 
power. 

" We believe that these are the rules applicable to 
the decision of the case before us. If they be, there 
was error in the instruction given to the jury, that 
if the child was whipped by the defendant so as to 
occasion the marks described by the prosecutor the 
defendant had exceeded her authority, and was guil- 
ty as charged. The marks were all temporary, and 
in a short time all disappeared. No permanent in- 
jury was done to the child. The only appearances 
that could warrant the belief or suspicion that the 
correction threatened permanent injury were the 
bruises on the neck and the arms ; and these, to say, 
the least, were too equivocal to justify the court in 
assuming that they did threaten such mischief. We 
think that the instruction on this point should have 
been, that unless the jury could clearly infer from 
the evidence that the correction inflicted had pro- 
duced, or was in its nature calculated to produce, 
lasting injury to the child, it did not exceed the 
limits of the power which had been granted to the 
defendant. We think, also, that the jury should 
have been further instructed, that however severe 
the pain inflicted, and however, in their judgment, 
it might seem disproportionate to the alleged negli- 
gence or offence of so young and tender a child, 
yet if it did not produce or threaten lasting mis- 
chief it was their dut)^ to acquit the defendant ; un- 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 109 

less the facts testified induced a conviction in their 
minds that the defendant did not act honestly in 
the performance of duty according to her sense of 
right, but, under the pretext of duty, was gratifying 
malice. 

*' We think that rules less liberal towards teach- 
ers cannot be laid down without breaking in upon 
the authority necessary for preserving discipline 
and commanding respect; and that although these 
rules leave it in their power to commit acts of in- 
discreet severity with legal impunity, these indis- 
cretions will probably find their check and correc- 
tion in parental affection and in public opinion ; 
and, if they should not, that they must be tolerated 
as a part of those imperfections and inconveniences 
which no human laws can wholly remove or re- 



Vermont, 18iQ.— Hathaway v. liice, 19 Yt. 102. 

A Vermont schoolmaster was charged with gross 
abuse of one of his scholars by beating with clubs, 
sticks, fists, etc. The teacher demurred, as it is 
termed in legal phrase, to the declaration or state- 
ment of injury of the plaintiff, relying by his de- 
murrer upon his office of schoolmaster ; that the 
punishment was inflicted by him as such, and was 
moderate, not proving to the court the real facts in 
justification. This, under a rule of legal pleading, 
was admitting the truth of plaintiff's charge, and 



110 POWER AND AUTHORITY OP 

defending only upon the point that because he was 
a teacher he was ilot liable. The Supreme Court 
overruled his demurrer, and in course of the opin- 
ion say : 

" We are brought, then, to the question, whether 
a suflScient justification is disclosed for all that is 
alleged against the defendant. The plea is based 
upon the right of a schoolmaster to correct his 
scholar, a right which has always been practically 
and judicially sanctioned. But it rests upon similar 
ground as the right to correct a child or servant, 
and the chastisement must not exceed the limits 
of a moderate correction, (l Hawk. P. C. 130; 1 
Stephen's N. P. 219.) And though courts are bound, 
with a view to the maintenance of necessary order 
and decorum in schools, to look with all reasonable 
indulgence upon the exercise of this right, yet when- 
ever the correction, as confessed by the pleadings or 
as proved on trial, shall appear to have been clearly 
excessive and cruel, it must be adjudged illegal." 

Maine, 184.1,— Stevens v. Fassett, 21 Me. 266. 

In a school in Maine a pupil, a large boy over 
twenty-one years of age, who had been permitted to 
occupy the teacher's desk, refused to leave it. The 
Supreme Court decided that sufficient force could 
be used by the master to get possession of his chair 
and desk, and he could ask assistance of others 
without the direction or knowledo'e of the commit- 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. Ill 

tee. The following general principles concerning 
corporal punishment, and expressing the law as laid 
down by the common-law writers cited therein, are 
taken from the opinion. 

" The right of the parent to keep the child in or- 
der and obedience is secured by the common law. 
He may lawfully correct his child, being under ago, 
in a reasonable manner, for this is for the benefit of 
his education. He may delegate also a part of his 
parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or 
schoolmaster of his child, who is then in loco pa- 
rentis, and has such portion of the power of the 
parent committed to his charge — viz., that of re- 
straint and correction — as may be necessary to an- 
swer the purpose for which he is employed. (1 
Black. Com. 453, 454 ; 1 Hale's P. C. 473, 474.) 
* The rights of parents [over their children] result 
from their duties. As they are bound to maintain 
and educate their children, the law has given them 
the right to such authority ; and, in support of that 
authority, a right to the exercise of such discipline 
as may be requisite for the discharge of their sacred 
trust.* 'The power allowed by law to the parent 
over the person of the child may be delegated to a 
tutor or instructor, the better to accomplish the pur- 
poses of education.' (2 Kent's Com. 169 ,170.) Al- 
though the town school is instituted by the author- 
ity of the statute, the children are to be considered 
as put in charge of the instructor for the same pur- 



112 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

pose, and he clothed with the same powej as when 
he is directly employed by the parents. The power 
of the parent to restrain and coerce obedience in 
children cannot be doubted, and it has seldom or 
never been denied. The power delegated to the 
master by the parent must be accompanied for the 
time being with the same right, as incidental, or the 
object sought must fail of accomplishment. 

"The practice, which has generally prevailed in 
our town schools since the settlement of the coun- 
try, has been in accordance with the law thus ex- 
pressed, and resort has been had to personal chas- 
tisement where milder means of restraint have been 
unavailing. . . . 

" If the teacher is authorized to inflict corporal 
punishment for the purpose of securing obedience 
to his reasonable rules and commands, and thereby 
to render the school what it is contemplated by the 
law that it shall be, it follows that he has the 
right to direct how and when each pupil shall at- 
tend to his appropriate duties, and the manner in 
which they shall demean themselves, provided that 
in all this nothing unreasonable is demanded. It 
cannot be contended that, as the teacher has respon- 
sible duties to perform, he is not entitled to the rea- 
sonable means by which to perform them. He has 
a right to the house prepared by the district, and 
the seat in it assigned for his occupation. If a 
scholar should attempt to debar him from entering 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 113 

the former, or should occupy the latter to the ex- 
clusion of the teacher, he would be a subject of 
punishment, and force sufficient, at least, to obtain 
their possession could be used, if there was an abso- 
lute refusal on the part of the usurper to surrender 
them." 

Indiana, 185Z.— Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 291. 

The following opinion as to the right and meas- 
ure of bodily punishment was rendered in a case in 
the Supreme Court of Indiana. Action by pupil 
against teacher for assault. 

" The law still tolerates corporal punishment in 
the schoolroom. The authorities are all that way, 
and the legislature has not thought proper to inter- 
fere. The public seem to cling to a despotism in 
the government of schools which has been discarded 
everywhere else. Whether such training be conge- 
nial to our institutions, and favorable to the full de- 
velopment of the future man, is worthy of serious 
consideration, though not for us to discuss. 

" In one respect the tendency of the rod is so ev- 
idently evil that it might perhaps be arrested on the 
ground of public policy. The practice has an in- 
herent proneness to abuse. The very act of whip- 
ping engenders passion, and very generally leads to 
excess. Where one or two stripes only were at first 
intended, several usually follow, each increasing in 
vigor as the act of striking inflames the passions, 
8 



114 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

This is a matter of daily observation and experience. 
Hence the spirit of the law is, and the leaning of 
the courts should be, to discountenance a practice 
which tends to excite human passions to heated and 
excessive action, ending in abuse and breaches of 
the peace. Such a system of petty tyranny cannot 
be watched too cautiously, nor guarded too strictly. 
The tender age of the sufferers forbids that its 
slightest abuses should be tolerated. So long as 
the power to punish corporally in school exists, 
it needs to be put under wholesome restriction. 
Teachers should, therefore, understand that when- 
ever correction is administered in anger or insolence, 
or in any other manner than moderation and kind- 
ness, accompanied with that affectionate moral sua- 
sion so eminently due from one placed by the law 
in loco parentis — in the sacred relation of parent — 
the courts must consider them guilty of assault and 
battery, the more aggravated and wanton in propor- 
tion to the tender 5^ears and dependent position of 
the pupil. . . . All that can be done without the 
aid of legislation is to hold each case strictly within 
the rule; and if the correction be in anger, or in 
any other respect immoderately or improperly ad- 
ministered, to hold the unworthy perpetrator guilty 
of assault and battery. . . . 

" The law having elevated the teacher to the place 
of the parent, if he is still to sustain that sacred re- 
lation it becomes him to be careful in the exercise 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 115 

of his authority, and not make his power a pretext 
for cruelty and oppression. (14 Johns. R. 119.) 
Whenever he undertakes to exercise it, the cause 
must be sufficient, the instrument suitable to the 
purpose; the manner and extent of the correction, 
the part of the person to which it is applied, the 
temper in which it is inflicted, all should be distin- 
guished with the kindness, prudence, and propriety 
which become the station." 

Indiana, 1853.— Gardner v. State, 4 Ind. 633. 

In another school in Indiana a boy named Stew- 
ard missed in spelling the word "commerce," and 
refused to try the word again. The teacher, named 
Gardner, became angry and commenced beating 
him. He wore out two whips on hira, and in the 
progress of the chastisement gave a blow or two 
with his fist on the head, and a couple of kicks 
in the face. The following is an extract from the 
opinion of the Supreme Court sustaining a convic- 
tion of Gardner for assault and battery : 

"... In a recent case v/e had occasion to examine 
the law relative to the right of teachers to chastise 
their pupils, Cooper' v. Mc Junking ante, p. 113 (case 
last cited). 

We adhere to the doctrine there laid down. 
Such outrages on the child, even though he be tru- 
ant and perhaps stubborn, are more than parental 
feeling can bear. To prevent retaliation and breach- 



116 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

es of the peace, it becomes a matter of pablic policy 
to punish the offender. If the law in such cases is 
properly administered, those whose feelings are out- 
raged will have no apology for taking redress into 
their own hands; they will peaceably abide the ad- 
judication of the courts. If, on the contrary, the 
law is loosely and indulgently administered, the 
tendency is to stimulate the aggrieved to seek per- 
sonal redress. As a matter of public policy, courts 
and juries should, therefore, hold a strong and stern 
hand over teachers who abuse their sacred and re- 
sponsible position." 

Massachusetts, 1855.— Com. v. Randall, 4 Gray, 36. 

Alonzo D. Randall, teacher of a school in Palmer, 
Mass., punished a girl with a ferule for being obsti- 
nate, telling falsehoods, and for using insolent lan- 
guage before and during the punishment. The 
teacher ceased punishing when the girl acknowl- 
edged her fault, asked to be forgiven, and promised 
better behavior. The teacher was tried for an as- 
sault and battery and found guilty in the lower 
court. In that court he asked the judge to instruct 
the jury as follows : " That a school teacher is ame- 
nable to the laws in a criminal prosecution for pun- 
ishing a scholar only when he acts malo animo, 
from vindictive feelings, or under the violent im- 
pulses of passion or malevolence ; he is not liable for 
errors of opinion or mistakes of judgment merely, 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 117 

provided he is governed by an Iionest purpose of 
heart to promote, by the discipline employed, the 
highest welfare of the school and the best interest 
of the scholar ; that he is liable in a criminal prose- 
cution for punishing a scholar only when the amount 
of punishment inflicted is more than adequate to 
subdue the scholar and secure obedience to the rules 
of the school." 

The judge refused to instruct the jury as above 
requested, but instructed thera as follows : " That a 
teacher had a right to inflict corporal punishment 
upon a scholar; that the case proved was one in 
which such punishment might properly be inflicted ; 
that the instrument used (a ferule) was a proper 
one ; that in inflicting corporal punishment a teach- 
er must exercise reasonable judgment and discretion, 
and must be governed, as to the mode and severity 
of the punishment, by the nature of the offence, by 
the age, size, and apparent powers of endurance of 
the pupil ; that the only question in this case was 
whether the punishment was excessive and im- 
proper ; that if they should find the punishment to 
have been reasonable and proper the defendant 
could not be deemed guilty of an assault and bat- 
tery ; but if, upon all the evidence in the case, they 
should find the punishment to have been improper 
and excessive, the defendant might properly be 
found guilty upon this complaint." 

The teacher was dissatisfied with this ruling, and 



118 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

carried the case to the Supreme Court, where the 
ruling Avas sustained. 

From opinion: "The instructions given tended 
to justify the defendant in punishing his pupils with 
greater severity than is consistent with a just and 
humane exercise of the authority conferred on him 
by law. To say the least, they were sufficiently fa- 
vorable to the defendant. If, in inflicting punish- 
ment upon his pupil, he wont beyond the limit of 
moderate castigation, and, either in the mode or de- 
gree of correction, was guilty of any unreasonable 
and disproportionate violence or force, he was clear- 
ly liable for such excess in a criminal prosecution. 
(1 Hawk. c. 60, § 23 ; 1 Russell on Crimes [7th 
Amer. ed.], 755 ; Bac. Ab. x\ssault and Battery, C.) 
It is undoubtedly true that, in order to support an 
indictment for an assault and battery, it is necessary 
to show that it was committed ex intentione, and 
that if the criminal intent is wanting the offence is 
not made out. But this intent is always inferred 
from the unlawful act. The unreasonable and ex- 
cessive use of force on the person of another being 
proved, the wrongful intent is a necessary and legit- 
imate conclusion in all cases where the act was de- 
signedly committed. It then becomes an assault and 
battery, because purposely inflicted without justifi- 
cation or excuse. Whether, under all the facts, the 
punishment of the pupil is excessive must be left to 
the jury." 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 119 

Tennessee, 1859. — Anderson v. State, 3 Head's R. 455. 

While the teacher in a Tennessee school was hear- 
ing a class, one of the scholars, a small boy named 
Layne, spoke out and said, "Four and one make 
five," in a low tone of voice. The teacher inquired, 
" Who spoke out ?" Layne answered that he did. 
The teacher called him up, and told him to stand 
until the class was through. The teacher asked him 
what he spoke out for. He said he spoke before 
he thought, and commenced crying, and said he 
would do so no more. The teacher then told him 
to pull off his coat ; that no excuse would do. He 
pulled off his coat. He then hit him about a dozen 
licks with a switch about as large as his thumb or 
finger, and two or three feet long. The little boy 
never had attended the school until the day before. 
The teacher was found guilty of assault and battery, 
and the conviction was sustained by the Supreme 
Court. 

From opinion: "Upon these facts the defendant 
was clearly guilty of an illegal act. There was no 
sufficient cause for the whipping. The offence was 
very slight, and entirely unintentional. It was the 
first violation of the rules on the part of the little 
boy ; he was a new scholar, that being his second 
day in the school, and his apology, repentance, and 
promise to * do so no more ' ought to have saved 
him from the lash. The chastisement, under these 



120 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

circumstances, was not only cruel, but an unauthor- 
ized exercise of power. Cases like this are calcu- 
lated to produce the deeds of violence against teach- 
ers which so often occur on the part of the parents 
and brothers of students. 

*' The law has very properly guarded the rights 
of both parties, where this and similar relations ex- 
ist. The authority given to the teacher must not 
be abused, but exercised with discretion and moder- 
ation. He must necessarily have the power to en- 
force obedience to his rules, and even to use the rod 
when necessary, biit not wantonly and without cause. 
Nor must his chastisement be cruel or excessive, but 
reasonably proportioned to the offence, and in the 
bounds of moderation. It is of the first importance 
that the authority of the schoolmaster should be 
firmly maintained, but still it must be kept within 
proper limits. The scholar being helpless, and in 
the power of his teacher, that power should be re- 
strained, and not allowed to be wantonly abused 
with impunity. Where this is done the courts 
must afford the proper redress, and prevent the 
temptation from being presented to parents and re- 
lations to take vengeance into their own hands. 
The government of a school should be patriarchal 
rather than despotic. If it be a monarchy, it should 
be a limited one, and not absolute." 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 121 

Yermont, 1859.— Zander v. Seaver, 32 Yt. 114. 

In the Yermont case of Lander v. Seaver, where a 
boy was punished for calling his teacher names out 
of school (see page 96), the court, in relation to 
corporal punishment, approved the law as expressed 
in the case of Hathaway v. Rice, 19 Yt. 102 (see 
page 109), and in 4 Gray, 36 (see page 116). 

From opinion : "... The law, as we deem it to 
exist, is this : A schoolmaster has the right to inflict 
reasonable corporal punishment. He must exercise 
reasonable judgment and discretion in determining 
when to punish, and to what oxtent. In deter- 
mining upon what is a reasonable punishment va- 
rious considerations must be regarded -— the nat- 
ure of the offence, the apparent motive and 
di&position of the offender, the influence of his 
example and conduct upon others, and the sex, 
age, size, and strength of pupil to be punished. 
Among reasonable persons much difference prevails 
as to the circumstances which will justify the in- 
fliction of punishment, and the extent to which 
it may properly be administered. On account of 
this difference of opinion, and the difficulty which 
exists in determining what is a reasonable punish- 
ment, and the advantage which the master has by 
being on the spot to know all the circumstances 
—the manner, looks, tones, gestures, and language 
of the offender (which are not always easily described) 



122 POWER AND AUTlfORITY OF 

— ^and thus to form a correct opinion as to the neces- 
sity and extent of the punishment, considerable allow- 
ance should be made to the teacher by way of protect- 
ing him in the exercise of his discretion. Especially 
should he have this indulgence when he appears to 
have acted from good motives and not from anger or 
malice. Hence the teacher is not to be held liable 
on the ground of excess of punishment unless the 
punishment is clearly excessive, and would be so held 
in the general judgment of reasonable men. If the 
punishment be thus clearly excessive, then the mas- 
ter should be held liable for such excess, though he 
acted from good motives in inflicting the punish- 
ment, and in his own judgment considered it neces- 
sary and not excessive. But if there is any rea- 
sonable doubt whether the punishment was exces- 
sive, the master should have the benefit of the 
doubt." 

Iowa, 1878. — State v. Mizmr, 50 Iowa, 152. 

In the Iowa case hereinbefore cited, page 50 (50 
Iowa, 152), where a scholar was punished for not re- 
citing in algebra, the court expressed an opinion upon 
the subject of corporal punishment. In the lower 
court the jury received the following instruction : 
" In the absence of all proof the law presumes that 
a father or school-teacher punishes a child of 
the father or the pupil of the teacher for a reason- 
able cause and in a moderate and reasonable man- 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 123 

ner. But this presumption, like all other legal pre- 
sumptions, may be rebutted by the proof." This 
instruction was sustained by the Supreme Court. 

From opinion : " It is urged this instruction is 
erroneous, for the reason that the teacher is not liable 
because of the punishment inflicted, but only in the 
event that it was excessive, and the evidence fails 
to show such was the case. 

" Forty years ago it was held, that * when the 
correction administered is not in itself immoderate, 
and therefore beyond the authority of the teacher, 
its legality or illegality must depend entirely, we 
think, on the quo animo with which it is adminis- 
tered. Within the sphere of his authority the mas- 
ter is the judge when correction is required, and of 
the degree of correction ; and, like all others in- 
trusted with a discretion, he cannot be made penally 
responsible for error of judgment, but only for wick- 
edness of purpose.' {State v. Pendergrass, 2 Dev. 
& Batt. 355.) 

"Twenty years later an instruction was refused 
which announced the rule that a teacher was not 
amenable criminally unless he inflicted the punish- 
ment with a bad intent, from vindictive feelings, and 
an instruction given which recognized the right to 
chastise a scholar by whipping, and the proof was 
sufficient to justify the instrument used as being a 
proper one, but that in ' inflicting corporal punish- 
ment the teacher must exercise reasonable judgment 



124 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

and discretion as to the mode and severity^ of the 
punishment by the nature of the offence, and by the 
age, size, and apparent power of endurance of the 
pupil.' 

" As to this instruction it was said : * The instruc- 
tions given tended to justify the defendant in pun- 
ishing his pupils with greater severity than is con- 
sistent with a just and humane exercise of the 
authority conferred on him by law. To say the 
least, they were sufficiently favorable to the defend- 
ant.' (Commonwealth v. Randall, 4 Gray, 36.) 

" We concur with the Supreme Court of Massa- 
chusetts in the case last cited, and further than this 
we have no occasion to go in the present case. But 
if the rule of the first case cited is the correct one, 
then we have no hesitation in saying there was no 
error in the instruction of the court, because the 
punishment was immoderate and excessive, if the 
testimony of the witnesses for the state is true, and 
this was a question for the jury. Any punishment 
with a rod which leaves marks or welts on the per- 
son of the pupil for two months afterward, or much 
less time, is immoderate and excessive, and the 
court would have been justified in so instructing the 
jury." 

Indiana, l^^^.—Dannenlwffer v. State, 69 Ind. 295. 

A Catholic priest, having charge of a Catholic 
school in Indiana, punished a boy under the follow- 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 125 

ing circumstances: He, with others, attended the 
funeral of a Protestant boy as pall-bearers. When 
they went to school the next day they were required 
by the lady teacher in charge, subordinate to the 
priest, to give an excuse for their absence from 
school, but they refused to give any. She then gave 
the boys a note directed to the priest, but they ran 
home and did not deliver the note. The next day 
the priest whipped them for their disobedience of 
the order of the teacher in not delivering the note. 
The priest was sustained by the Supreme Court, 
and the case of Cooper v. McJunkin^ 4 Ind. 291, was 
cited and approved.*"^ 

♦Dannenhoffer was again indicted for whipping another 
boy under the same circumstances, and in the court below 
was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of five dollars. 
The case came before the Supreme Court in 1881. {Dannen- 
hoffer V. State, 79 Ind. 75.) On the trial below the defendant 
was asked this question by his counsel: "State whether or 
not that Tekulve (the person on whom the battery was 
charged to have been committed) attended the funeral of 
Clark had anything to do with the punishment administered 
on that occasion, or if it was any part of the cause." 

The counsel for the state objected to this question, and the 
trial judge ruled it out. 

The Supreme Court decided that the question was a proper 
one, and granted a new trial, saying : " It was important to 
know whether the defendant punished the boy for going to 
the funeral, or for other disobedience and insubordination." 



126 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

Pennsylvania. — Com, v. Seed, 5 Penn. L. J. K 78 (reported 
1851). 

This case arose in one of the courts of Phila- 
delphia. A child had played truant. She was 
sent by her parent with an elder sister to school. 
When the door was reached she refused to go in, 
showing great violence of temper. An assistant 
teacher endeavored to persuade her to enter, but 
without effect. The principal then appeared and 
took her into the room, where the violence continued, 
manifested by jumping and screaming. The teacher 
talked mildly to the child, and ordered obedience, 
and finally threatened a whipping, but all to no pur- 
pose. She then whipped her with a small rattan. 
After a few blows she reasoned with the child, but 
the child continuing to be obstinate the whipping 
was continued until the child yielded. The teacher 
was complained of for assault and battery. 

From judge's opinion : " What is there in all 
this which shows malice or cruelty on the part 
of the teacher? What is there in the language 
of the law which shows a 'wicked motive' ? I can 
see nothing. The teacher required obedience to 
the rules of the school and it was refused. That 
punishment is used which she thinks is best cal- 
culated to produce submission, and in the man- 
ner and form common in all schools. This au- 
thority the law has delegated to her, and for the 
exercise of it, although we might differ in opinion 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 127 

as to the manner in which it was done, at least the 
court will not punish for or correct an error of judg- 
ment. But from the facts disclosed I do not think 
there was even an error in that particular. She 
entered upon the performance of her duty with 
moderation and firmness as well as a determination 
to produce submission, which she pursued till it was 
accomplished, by the best means which her judgment 
dictated. In this we think she was right. Had she 
done less, the directors of the school might with 
propriety have thought she was culpable ; and for 
these things the law does not hold her responsible. 

" But it has been said there were marks of violence 
on the child the next day, caused by blows from the 
rattan. But this is but a slight circumstance to 
show the motive. It is much greater evidence of 
the obstinacy and perseverance of the child. The 
instrument employed was a small, smooth rattan, 
certainly a moderation in the instrument used, in 
these days of improvement in education, and in 
most that is useful, or which adds to the comfort of 
man. For many of us can well recollect when the 
birch or hickory stick, with some rather sharp knots 
thereon, was the instrument for flagellation, and 
our parents did not complain. 

"To hold that under such circumstances a teacher 
should be liable to a criminal prosecution would be 
subversive of all government and order in our schools. 
Without a firm controlling power is exercised by 



128 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

school-teachers, in exacting obedience, submission, 
united with quiet' and good order in the schools, the 
public money is worse than wasted. Obedience to 
parental authority should be taught in the fami- 
ly, and must be maintained in our schools, or we 
shall have no obedience in the laws of our govern- 
ment. ... 

" The character and interest of the teacher, com- 
bined with the refinement which education gives 
to the human mind, in softening the heart, like pa- 
rental love, is generally found a sufficient protec-. 
tion for the children. But, if these fail, the law af- 
fords ample protection against cruelty and oppression, 
while it is a shield to those who, in their sphere, 
have, as in this case, only done their duty." 

For cases where the court held that punishing 
a pupil for refusing to study certain branches was 
unjustifiable, see p. 34 (35 Wis. 59) and pp. 50, 122^ 
(50 Iowa, 152). 

The following is the law of New Jersey: 

" No teacher shall be permitted to inflict corporal 
punishment upon any child in any school in this 
state." (Rev. Stat. 1877, p. 1087.) 

The following extract is from the New York 
Penal Code : " The use, or attempt, or offer to use 
force or violence upon or towards the person of an- 
other is not unlawful in the following cases, . . . 
when committed by a parent or the authorized agent 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 129 

of any parent, or by any guardian, master, or teacher, 
in the exercise of a lawful authority to restrain or 
correct his child, ward, apprentice, or scholar, and 
the force or violence used is reasonable in manner 
and moderate in degree." (Rev. Stat. vol. 4, Penal 
Code, CO, §223.) 

Note. — An examination of the decisions shows that 
the courts, with entire unanimity, affirm the right of 
teachers to administer bodily punishment to compel 
obedience to their lawful commands; but that upon 
the measure or degree of the punishment and the lia- 
bility of the teacher for abuse of the right the courts 
differ. 

The decisions may be arranged in tw^o classes, re- 
spectively represented by State v. Pendergrass, 3 Dev. 
«fe Batt, 365 (N. C. 1837) [p. 105] ; and Com. v. Randall, 
4 Gray, 36 (Mass. 1855) [p. 116]. The first-named case 
decides that the teacher acts judicially in determining 
the necessity and extent of punishment, and is not lia- 
ble unless he produces lasting injury to body or health, 
or punishes with malice, bad passion, or wickedness 
of purpose. The second case is to the effect that the 
teacher must exercise reasonable judgment, and if 
he goes beyond the limit of moderate castigation and 
uses any unreasonable and disproportionate violence 
or force, either in mode or degree of correction, he is 
liable in a criminal prosecution. 

The rule established by the first case is supported by 
Com. V. Seed, 5 Pa. L. J, 78 (p. 126), and is cited and ap- 
proved in four subsequent cases in North Carolina — 
State V. Stalcup, 2 Ired. 50 ; Slate v. Black, Winst. 266 ; 



130. POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

State V. Rliodes, Phil. 453 ; and State v. AJford, 68 N. C. 
322 (1873), in wliich Judge Gaston, by whom the opin- 
ion was given in the Pendergrass case, is spoken of 
as "humane a judge as ever presided in a court." 

The rule laid down in the Massachusetts case, thougli 
in substance first announced by the Supreme Court of 
Indiana in Cooper v. McJunMn, 4 Ind. 291 (1853), is 
supported by Gardner v. State, 4 Ind. 633 (p. 115); 
Anderson v. State, 3 Head. 455 (Tenn. 1859) [p. 119]; 
Lander v. Seavei% 32 Vt. 114 (p. 96); State y. Mizner, 
50 Iowa, 162 (p. 50); DannenTioffer v. State, 69 Ind. 295 
(p. 124). 

It is to be presumed, in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary, that the teacher punishes in the exercise 
of an honest judgment, and not maliciously; and that 
the punishment is not excessive. {Anderson v. State, 3 
Head. 455, Tenn.; Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114; State 
V. Mizner, 50 Iowa, 152.) 

RULES NEED NOT BE RECORDED ; AND RULES MADE 
BY TEACHER OR PART OF BOARD, SUBSEQUENTLY 
RATIFIED BY FULL BOARD, ARE BINDING. 

Above points decided in Hodghins v. Rochport^ 
105 Mass. 475, ante, p. 76. The court said, " Much 
of the power of the committee, as to the preser- 
vation of order and the maintenance of discipline, 
must necessarily be delegated to its different mem- 
bers and the teachers, and must be exercised without 
any vote or record." 

And in Russell v. Lynnfield, 116 Mass. 366, ante, 
p. 9, the above case was cited, and the court said : 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 131 

" The exclusion which the plaintiff complains of in 
this case Avas by the school-teacher, acting under the 
direction of one member of the school committee. 
It is contended to have been unlawful solely because 
the rule in question had not been formally estab- 
lished or confirmed by vote of the school committee, 
duly entered upon their, records. The school com- 
mittee are required to have the general charge and 
superintendence of all the public schools in town, 
and to keep a record of their votes, orders, and pro- 
ceedings. (Gen. Stat. c. 38, § 16, 22.) But this does 
not imply that all rules and orders required for the 
discipline and good conduct of the schools shall be 
matter of record with the committee, or that every 
act in regard to the management of each school in 
these respects should be authorized or confirmed by 
formal vote. It would be practically impossible suf- 
ficiently to provide for such matters by a system of 
rules, however carefully prepared and promulgated. 
Much must necessarily be left to the individual mem- 
bers of the committee and to the teachers of the 
several schools." 

In State v. Burton^ 45 Wis. 150, ante, p. 78, the 
court said : 

"... In the school, as in the family, there exist 
on the part of the pupil the obligations of obedi- 
ence to lawful commands, subordination, civil deport- 
ment, respect for the rights of other pupils, and 
fidelity to duty. These obligations are inherent, in 



132 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

any proper school system, and constitute, so to speat, 
the common law of the school. Every pupil is pre- 
sumed to know this law, and is subject to it, whether 
it has or has not been re-enacted by the district 
board in the form of written rules and regulations. 
Indeed, it would seem impossible to frame rules 
which would cover all cases of insubordination and 
all acts of vicious tendency which the teacher is lia- 
ble to encounter daily and hourly." 

The above expression of the Wisconsin court was 
quoted and approved by the Supreme Court of In- 
diana in 69 Ind. 295, ante, p. 124. 

See Kidder v. Chellis, p. 52, for case where teach- 
er was sustained in enforcing a rule made by him 
in relation to declamations, and not ratified by the 
school committee. 

Note. — In California : " All pupils must comply with 
the regulations, pursue the required course of study, 
and submit to the authority of the teachers of such 
schools." 

lu Kentucky : " All pupils w^ho may be admitted to 
common schools shall comply with tlie regulations 
established in pursuance of law for the government of 
such schools." 

The law of Missouri provides " rules to take effect 
when a copy of the same, duly signed by a majority 
of the board, is deposited with the district clerk, 
whose duty it shall be to transmit forthwith a copy 
of the same to the teachers employed in the schools." 

In New Jersey: "The ]3upils of the public schools 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 133 

shall comply witli the regulations established in pur- 
suance of law for the government of such schools, 
. . . and shall submit to the authority of the teach- 
er." (See p. 164.) 

In Kcw Hampshire : Rules " being recorded by the 
town clerk and a copy thereof given to the teachers, 
and read in the schools, shall be binding upon scholars 
and teachers." (See p. 151.) 

The law of Rhode Island provides that the rules 
and regulations shall be put up in each school-house. 
(See p. 154.) 

In Wisconsin: Rules shall take effect "when a copy 
of the same, signed by a majority of the board, shall be 
filed with the clerk." (See p. 158.) 

PERSONS OVER SCHOOL AGE, OR OVER TWENTY- 
ONE YEARS OF AGE, WHO ATTEND SCHOOL ARE 
SUBJECT TO ALL RULES OF THE SCHOOL. . 

This point was decided in Stevens v. Fassett, Jr.^ 
27 Me. 266, ante, p. 110. 

From opinion : " It is not necessary to settle the 
question whether one living within the district, and 
not being between the ages of four and twenty-one 
years, can with propriety require the instructions of 
town school. If such does present liimself as a 
pupil, is received and instructed by the master, he 
cannot claim the privilege, and receive it, and at 
the same time be subject to none of the duties 
incident to a scholar. If disobedient, he is not 
exempt from liability to punishment so long as 



134 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

he is treated as having the character wKich lie as- 
sumes. He cannot plead his own voluntary act, 
and insist that it is illegal, as an excuse for cre- 
ating disturbances, and escape consequences which 
would attach to him either as a refractory, incorri- 
gible scholar, or as one who persists in interrupting 
the ordinary business of the school." 

The above opinion is cited and approved in State 
V. Mizner, 45 Iowa, 248. 

SCHOOL OFFICERS ACTING HONESTLY AND IN GOOD 
FAITH ARE NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE TO PUPILS 
OR PARENTS. 

The above proposition is sustained by the weight 
of authority. A late decision (1880) is that of the 
Supreme Court of Illinois: School directors made a 
rule that the teacher might read, as an opening ex- 
ercise every morning, not occupying more than fif- 
teen minutes, a chapter from the King James' trans- 
lation of the Bible. No one was required to be 
present or participate in such exercise unless he 
chose to do so, and while such exercise was being 
conducted every pupil was required to lay aside his 
books and remain quiet. A Catholic boy, for not 
laying aside his books, was suspended from " all the 
rights and privileges of said school until he should 
express a willingness to comply with the rule." By 
the school law of the state it was the duty of the 
directors to "adopt and enforce all necessary rules 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 135 

and regulations for the management and govern- 
ment of schools," and also authorized to " suspend 
or expel pupils for incorrigibly bad conduct, and no 
action shall lie against them for such expulsion or 
suspension." 

Though by the statute the officers were saved 
from suit in cases of suspension, etc., the decision 
did not turn upon this provision, but was based 
on the general rule of non-liability. 

From opinion : " In the performance of the du- 
ties imposed by law upon school directors they must 
exercise judgment and discretion. What rules and 
regulations will best promote the interests of the 
school under their immediate control, and what 
branches shall be taught and what text-books shall 
be used, are matters left to the determination of the 
directors, and must be settled by them from'the best 
lights they can obtain from any source, keeping al- 
ways in view the highest good of the whole school. 
Good order can only be obtained by enforcing dis- 
cipline, and this power is largely committed to the 
directors. They have the power of suspension or 
expulsion, tmd they may exercise that power as a 
means of discipline for the causes mentioned in the 
statute. The expulsion or suspension of a pupil 
from the benefits and privileges of the school for 
what is considered * incorrigibly bad conduct,' implies 
deliberation and decision on the part of the direc- 
tors, or, as it is sometimes expressed, they act judi- 



136 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

cially in a matter involving discretion in relation to 
the duties of their office. 

" The declaration in this case contains no averment 
that defendants, in suspending plaintiff from the ben- 
fits and privileges of the school, acted either wan- 
tonly or maliciously. That, we think, is a fatal de- 
fect in the declaration, and justified the decision of 
the Court sustaining the demurrer. 

"The absence of such an averment leaves the court 
freely to indulge the presumption that defendants 
acted in good faith in the matter of suspending 
plaintiff from the benefits of the school, whether 
they erred in their judgment or not. In such cases 
the law seems to be well settled there can be no 
action maintained against school officers where they 
act without malice. 

" The rule is certainly a reasonable one. A mere 
mistake in judgment, either as to their duties under 
the law or as to facts submitted to them, ought not 
to subject such officers to an action. They may 
judge wrongly, and so may a court or other tribunal, 
but the party complaining can have no action when 
such officers act in good faith and in the line of 
what they think is honestly their duty. Any other 
rule might work great hardship to honest men, who, 
with the best of motives, have faithfully endeavored 
to perform the duties of these inferior offices. Al- 
though of the utmost importance to the public, no 
considerable emoluments are attached to these minor 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 137 

offices, and the duties are usually performed by per- 
sons sincerely desiring to do good for their neigh- 
bors without any expectation of personal gains, and 
it would be a very harsh rule that would subject such 
officers to an action for damages for every mistake 
they may make in the honest and faithful discharge 
of their official duties as they understand them. It 
is not enough to aver the action of such officers was 
erroneous, but it must be averred and proved that 
such action Avas taken in bad faith, either wantonly 
or maliciousl3\ If in the discharge of their official 
duties such officers simply err, it is what other tri- 
bunals invested with judicial powers are liable to do. 

"A case not unlike the one before us was before 
the court in Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 389, and it 
was ruled, in accordance with what was thought to 
be a uniform course of decisions, that a public offi- 
cer, when acting in good faith, is never held liable 
for an erroneous judgment in a matter submitted to 
his determination. Were the rule otherwise, no one 
would be safe in taking upon himself the burdens 
of an office the duties of which involved the exercise 
of judgment. 

"In Jackson v. Waldron, 11 Johns. 114, it was held 
that officers called to exercise their deliberate judg- 
ment are not answerable for mistakes in law, either 
civilly or criminally, where their motives are pure 
and untainted with fraud or malice. The English 
cases on this subject hold the same doctrine. Han- 



138 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

nan v. Tapinnden^ 1 East. 555, declares no action 
will lie against individuals for acts erroneously done 
by them in their corporate capacity, from which 
detriment may happen to another, without proof 
of malice." McCormicJc v. Burt, 95 111. 263. 

A later decision in Illinois affirms the above. 
Churchill v. Fewkes^ 1883 (see p. 22). To same 
point see Britt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286, citing 
Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 391 ; Spear v. Cum- 
mings, 23 Pick. 224; Stephenson v. Hall, 14 Barb. 
222. See also Steivart v. Southard, 17 Ohio, 402, 
but see 21 Ohio St. R. Q^Q', Weaver v. Devendorf, 
3 Dcnio, 117; Doioner v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94; Mills v. 
Dean, 32 N. Y. 489 ; Hines v. Lockport, 50 N. Y. 
236; 49 Barb. 455; 49 N. II. 199; 37 Conn. 365; 
48 Mo. 253; 1 Denio, 599; 3 How. 87. 

There is a wide difference of authority upon the 
question whether or aot teachers are included in the 
class of officers vested with judicial powers, and not 
liable for errors of judgment. As this question is 
involved in the decisions in relation to corporal pun- 
ishment, the reader is referred to them and the note 
following, on pages 105-130. 

AUTHORITY OF TEACHER IX CHARGE OF SCHOOL, 
WITHOUT HOLDING CERTIFICATE OF APPOINTMENT. 

The power and authority of a teacher who has 
not a certificate of appointment, where such is re- 
quired by statute, has been much disputed. The 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 139 

subject was thus treated by Horace Mann, an emi- 
nent educational authority, lOtli Rep. Mass. Board 
of Education (1847), p. 169, 170: "An important 
question has been agitated, whether a person ille- 
gally admitted, or smuggled into a school without a 
certificate, can legally exercise any of the preroga- 
tives of a teacher ; whether, for instance, if he should 
punish or chastise a refractory or vicious scholar, so 
much only as, under other circumstances, would be 
held justifiable, he could defend himself from fine or 
damages in a prosecution or action for assault and 
battery, instituted against him in a court of law. . . . 

" On the one hand, it is maintained that. a teacher 
without a certificate can no more justify a punish- 
ment inflicted by him on a scholar than a sheriff, 
without a commission, can justify an arrest of per- 
son, or a seizure of chattels ; nor more than a con- 
stable or collector can justify the taking of property 
for non-payment of taxes, when he has received no 
warrant from the collector to collect them ; no more 
than a judge who, without a commission from the 
executive, has usurped the bench, can, with impuni- 
ty, pronounce sentence of imprisonment or of death 
ao-ainst an offender arraio;ned at his bar. . . . 

" The pretended teacher is not a teacher. It would 
be of the worst possible tendency to allow any man 
to derive lawful authority from the commission of 
an unlawful act. Public policy requires that a teach- 
er who has obtruded himself into a school without 



140 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 

the necessary credentials sbould be peremptorily de- 
barred from pleading his own misconduct in justifi- 
cation of an act which, if committed out of school, 
would doubtless be unlawful. . . . 

'' Such is the course of argument usually presented 
against a teacher without a certificate, in regard to 
his right to punish. 

" On the other hand, some incline to the opinion 
that a teacher without a certificate, though not in 
laiv a teacher, yet is so in fact ; and, while the ac- 
tual relation of teacher and pupil subsists, all the 
legal powers of a teacher attach to this relation, and 
may therefore be exercised by them. If a school 
kept by a teacher without a certificate is not a pub- 
lic school, then it must be a private school ; and the 
teacher of a private school has as clear a right to in- 
flict punishment, in exigencies as require it, as any 
other teacher, or as any parent." 

The last view of the matter presented by Mr. 
Mann is sustained by such decisions as have been 
published. 

Yermont, \^bb.— State v. Williams, 27 Yt. 755. 

Peter Bean was a prudential committee, and Miss 
Emily Culver was a teacher in his district. One 
Henry Williams, a boy sixteen or seventeen years 
old, refused to obey the lawful and proper com- 
mands of the teacher, when, and in consequence of 
such misconduct, he was expelled from school and 



SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 141 

forbidden to attend further until lie would make 
suitable and proper acknowledgment of such misbe- 
havior. He again went to the school, and, upon 
being called upon by the teacher, refused to make 
acknowledgment or leave the school, whereupon the 
teacher sent for Peter Bean, the committee, who 
went to the school-house and requested the said 
Henry to make acknowledgment to the teacher or 
leave the school, which he refused to do. Bean 
then attempted to remove him, when the defendant, 
Spencer Williams, interfered and resisted. 

The defendant was found guilty, and the question 
was raised that the existence of the school district 
and the office of Bean had not been shown. It was 
decided not necessary. 

From opinion: "But if we were to assume that 
there was no such school district, and that no evidence 
was introduced showing that Mr. Bean was one of the 
prudential committee, we do not see that it would 
necessarily affect this prosecution. The fact that 
there was a school, that Miss Culver was its teacher, 
that one of the pupils was requested to leave for in- 
subordination and misconduct, and that he refused 
to do so, are not disputed. Regarding the school, 
therefore, as a private school, and subject to the 
discipline and government of Miss' Culver as its 
teacher, she had a right, for those reasons, to request 
Mr. Bean to assist her in enforcing her discipline 
and government; and in so doing Mr. Bean would 



142 POWER AND AUTHORITY O^F SCHOOL OFFICERS. 

be justified as her agent and servant. Under sucli 
circumstances the respondent cannot be justified in 
the assault and battery of which the jury have found 
liim guilty." 

For a case directly in point see Kidder v. Chellis^ 
ante, p. 52. 



APPENDIX A. 



STATE LAWS. IN RELATION TO POWERS OF SCHOOL 
OFFICERS. 

In Alabama: Superintendent of state education 
" shall exercise a general supervision over all educa- 
tional interests of the state. . . . He shall prepare and 
have printed. . . all laws, rules, and regulations pertain- 
ing to the public-school system of the state, and cause 
the same to be distributed to the county superintend- 
ents of education and other officers connected with the 
school system, for the information of those interested 
in the educational interests of the state." County su- 
penntendent " shall have general supervision of the pub- 
lic schools of the county " and " general superintend- 
ence." Township superintendent "shall have immedi- 
ate supervision of the public schools in his township." 

In Arkansas: State superintendent "shall be charged 
with the general superintendence of the business relat- 
ing to the free common schools." School directors 
" shall have charge of the school affairs, and of the 
school educational interests of their districts." 

In California: State board of education "to adopt 
rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the laws 
of this state, for its own government, and for the gov- 



144 APPENDIX* 

crnment of the public schools." Superintendent of 
public instruction '\to superintend the public schools 
in the state," and to have the school laws printed, to- 
gether with the rules and regulations, and supply the 
same to school officers and teachers. Trustees of 
scliool districts and cit}^ boards of education shall " pre- 
scribe and enforce rules not inconsistent with law, or 
those, prescribed by the state board of education, for 
their own government and the government of schools." 

In Colorado : " The state board of education shall 
have power to adopt any rules and regulations not in- 
consistent with law, for its own government and for 
the government of the public schools." State super- 
intendent " shall have general supervision of the pub- 
lic schools of the state." County superintendent "to 
exercise a careful supervision over the schools of his 
county." District directors "shall have power to 
make such by-laws for their own government and for 
the government of the public schools under their 
charge as they may deem expedient, not inconsistent 
with the provisions of law or the instructions of the 
superintendent of public instruction," and to "en- 
force the rules and general regulations of the state 
superintendent." 

In Connecticut: State board of education "shall 
have general supervision and control of the educa- 
tional interests of the state." Boards of education in 
districts " to have the general superintendence of the 
public schools in the district." Each board of school 
visitors "shall prescribe rules for the management 
. . . and discipline of the public schools." 

In Delaware : " The school committee of each dis- 



APPENDIX. 145 

trict . . . may make regulations for the government 
of the school." 

In Florida: Superintendent of public instruction 
" shall have the oversight, charge, and management of 
all matters pertaining to public schools," and " pro- 
vide for teachers such printed instructions, regula- 
tions, and decisions as he may judge necessary for 
their use." Board of jjublic instruction " to perform 
all acts reasonable and necessary for the promotion of 
the educational interests of the county." School trus- 
tees " to take the special charge, inspection, and man- 
agement of all the schools and school interests over 
which they have been appointed." 

In Georgia : " It shall be the duty of school trus- 
tees, herein provided for, to supervise the school oper- 
ations of the sub-districts." 

In Illinois : State superintendent of public instruc- 
tion " shall have the supervision of all the public and 
common schools in the state," and " shall make such 
rules and regulations as may be necessary and expe- 
dient " to carry out the school act. In districts of 
two thousand inhabitants the board of directors " to 
prescribe the method and course of discipline and 
instruction in the several schools, and to see that they 
are maintained and pursued in a proper manner," and 
" to establish all such by-laws, rules, and regulations 
for the government and for the establishment and 
maintenance of a proper and uniform systeta of disci- 
pline in the several schools as may, in their opinion, 
be necessary." Boards of education in cities of one 
hundred thousand inhabitants "shall have charge and 
control of the public schools in such cities," " and 
10 



146 APPENDIX. 

generally to have and possess all the rights, powers, 
and authority required for the proper management of 
schools, with power to enact such ordinances as may 
be necessary or deemed expedient for such purpose," 
and the same power is given to establish by-laws, 
rules, and regulations as directors in last-named dis- 
tricts have. District directors " shall adopt and en- 
force all necessary rules and regulations for the man- 
agement and government of the schools." 

In Indiana : The county superintendent " shall have 
the general superintendence of the schools of his 
county." School trustees "shall take charge of the 
educational affairs of their respective townships, towns, 
and cities." Trustees of graded schools " shall have 
the care and management" of such. School com- 
missioners in cities of thirty thousand inhabitants or 
more " to establish and enforce regulations . . . for 
the government and discipline of such schools." 

In Iowa: Superintendent of public instruction "shall 
be charged with the general supervision of . . . all 
the common schools of the state." Board of direc- 
tors shall " aid the teachers in establishing and en- 
forcing the rules for the government of the schools." 
Principal of county high -school, with the approval 
of trustees, " shall make such rules and regulations 
as he deems proper in regard to the . . . conduct 
and government of the pupils under his charge." 

In Kentucky : Superintendent of public instruction 
and two professional teachers, who shall be members 
of the board of education, " shall constitute a stand- 
ing committee wiio shall prepare rules, by-laws, and - 
regulations for the common schools of the state, which 



APPENDIX. 147 

shall be adopted and enforced under the authority 
and direction of the county school commissioners, 
in all cases where the district school trustees shall 
fail to enforce such." Each school district " shall 
be under the control of one trustee." And such 
district trustee " shall visit the school " and " see 
that the regulations for its government are complied 
with." 

In Kansas : County superintendent to visit schools, 
" correcting any deficiency that may exist in the gov- 
ernment of the school, the classification of the pupils, 
... to make such suggestions, in private, to the 
teachers as he shall deem proper and necessary to the 
welfare of the school." Boards of education in cities 
" have power to make all necessary rules for the gov- 
ernment of the schools of said city under its charge 
and control," and " to exercise the sole control over 
the public schools and school property of the city." 
District directors "shall confer with the teacher in 
regard to condition and management ; and make such 
suggestions as in their view would promote the inter- 
est and efficiency of the school, and the progress and 
good order of the pupils." 

In Louisiana : The free public schools " shall be un- 
der the control of a state board of education ;" which 
has power to " make all needful rules and regulations 
for the government " thereof. Superintendent of pub- 
lic instruction " shall be charged with the general su- 
pervision of all parish boards of education, and of all 
the common, high, and normal schools of the state." 
Parish board of directors " to prescribe rules for the 
government of the free public schools within their 



148 APPENDIX. 

jurisdiction not inconsistent with tliis la^ and the 
rules prescribed by; the state board of education." 

In Maine : State superintendent " to exercise a gen- 
eral supervision of all the public schools of the state." 
School committee to " examine the schools, and in- 
quire into the regulations and discipline tiiereof, and 
the proficiency of the scholars." Supervisors, when 
chosen, to have power of school committee. 

In Maryland : " The state board of education . . . 
shall enact by-laws for the administration of the pub- 
lic-school system, not at variance with this act." 
County school commissioners " shall have the general 
supervision and control of all schools in their respec- 
tive counties." School trustees " shall exercise a gen- 
eral supervision over their respective schools, and visit 
them frequently." 

In Massachusetts: School committees "shall have 
the general charge and superintendence of all the pub- 
lic schools." Where superintendents are appointed by 
vote of city or town they, " under the direction and 
control of said committee, shall have the care and su- 
pervision of the public schools." 

In Michigan : " The superintendent of j)ublic in- 
struction shall have general supervision of public in- 
struction." He shall prepare and send " such instruc- 
tions, relating to the organization and government of 
such schools, . . . as he may deem advisable, to the 
several officers intrusted with their care and manage- 
ment." District board " shall have the general care of 
the school, and shall make and enforce suitable rules 
and regulations for its government and management." 

In Minnesota: Board of trustees "shall have the 



APPENDIX. 149 

general charge of the interests of schools and school- 
houses in their districts." Boards of education in in- 
dependent districts " shall have power to superintend 
and manage, in all respects, the schools of said dis- 
trict, ... adopt, alter, modify, and repeal rules for 
their organization, government, and instruction." 

In Mississippi : Board of education " shall regulate 
all matters arising in the practical administration of 
the free-school system which are not otherwise pro- 
vided for." State superintendent of public instruction 
has "general supervision" of the common schools. 
School trustees " to look specially after the local in- 
terests of their schools " 

In Missouri: Board of directors "shall have the 
power to make all needful rules and regulations for 
the organization, grading, and government of the 
schools in their district. Said rules to take effect 
when a copy of the same, duly signed by a majority 
of the board, is deposited with the district clerk, 
whose duty it shall be to transmit forthwith a copy 
of the same to the teachers employed in the schools; 
said rules may be amended or repealed in like man- 
ner. ... It shall be the duty of the board to visit the 
schools under their care, examine into their condition 
and the progress of the pupils, advise and consult 
with the teachers, and to exercise such supervision as 
will best promote the best interests of the schools." 
Boards in towns and cities shall perform same duties 
as other boards. 

In Nebraska : State superintendent to visit schools 
" and witness and advise with teachers and school offi- 
cers upon the manner in which they are conducted." 



150 APPENDIX. 

County superintendent " to examine carefully into the 
discipline and modes of instruction . . . and to con- 
sult with teachers aiid district boards as to the course 
of study to be pursued, and for the improvement of 
the instruction and discipline of the school." District 
board " shall have the general care of the school," and 
" make such rules and regulations as they may think 
necessary for the government and health of the schol- 
ars." Trustees of high -school districts shall have 
powier "to make such rules and regulations as they 
may think needful for the government of the schools." 
Schools in cities and towns " shall be under the direc- 
tion and control " of their boards of education. 

In Nevada : Superintendent of public instruction 
shall cause " such instructions as he shall deem nec- 
essary and proper for the organization and govern- 
ment of schools to be transmitted to the local school 
officers, who shall be governed in accordance there- 
with." County superintendent " to exercise a general 
supervision over the interests of the public schools in 
his county." 

In New Hampsliii*e : " Any town may adopt a by- 
law providing for the choice of a school committee 
of such number, chosen in such manner, for such 
terms, with such title, and such powers relating to 
schools as tliey may think proper." Town board of 
education " shall have the control and management 
of the schools of the district . . . and generally shall 
have and enjoy all the power and authority, and per- 
form all the duties pertaining to the offices of pru- 
dential and school committees." School committees 
" may prescribe suitable rules and regulations for the 



APPENDIX. 151 

attendance upon, management . . . and discipline of 
the schools, whenever they deem the same necessary ; 
and the same being recorded by the town clerk, and a 
copy thereof given to the teachers, and read in the 
schools, shall be binding upon scholars and teachers." 
High-school committee " shall have the entire charge 
thereof . . . and generally shall have the same pow- 
ers and perform the same duties, in regard to such 
high-schools, as school committees in relation to com- 
mon schools." Towns and cities may provide for su- 
perintendent " who shall be vested with such of the 
powers and charged with such of the duties of the 
school committee and of the prudential committee 
... as may be therein provided." 

In New Jersey : " The general supervision and con- 
trol of public instruction . . . shall be vested in a 
state board of education." Said board "shall have 
power ... to prescribe and cause to be enforced all 
rules and regulations necessary for carrying into effect 
the school laws." The state superintendent '^ shall 
have the supervision of all the schools of the state." 
County superintendent, with other tasks, ■' to dis- 
charge other duties of general supervision and super- 
intendence over the public schools of the county, in 
accordance with the regulations prescribed from time 
to time by the state board of education," School 
trustees shall have power "to make arid enforce rules 
and regulations, not in conflict with general regula- 
tions of the state board of education, for the govern- 
ment of schools, pupils, and teachers," and " to en- 
force the regulations prescribed by the state board of 
education." 



152 APPENDIX. 

In New York : State superintendent of public in- 
struction shall visit the common schools of the state 
" and inquire into ilieir course of instruction, manage- 
ment, and discipline, and advise and encourage the 
pupils, teachers, and officers thereof. . . . And cause 
such information and instructions as he shall deem 
conducive to the proper organization and government 
of the common schools, and the due execution of their 
duties by school officers, to be transmitted to the 
officers and persons intrusted with the execution of 
the same." School commissioners "to recommend to 
trustees and teachers the proper . . . discipline and 
management of the schools." Board of education of 
union schools "shall have power to establish such 
rules and regulations concerning the order and disci- 
pline of the school or schools, in the several depart- 
ments thereof, as they may deem necessary to secure 
the best educational results." And " to have in all re- 
spects the superintendence, management, and control 
of said union free schools." 

In New York City : Board of education to " have 
full control of the public schools and the public- 
school system of the city," " subject only to the gen- 
eral statutes of the state upon education," Ward trus- 
tees, " under such rules and regulations, and subject 
to such limitations as the board of education may 
prescribe, to conduct and manage the said schools." 
City superintendent " to advise and consult with the 
trustees in relation to the proper studies, discipline, 
and conduct of the schools, the course of instruction 
to be used." 

In North Carolina : Superintendent of public in- 



APPENDIX. 153 

struction " shall direct the operation of the system of 
public schools and enforce the laws and regulations in 
relation thereto." County board of education " shall 
be charged with the general management of the pub- 
lic schools in their respective counties . . . and shall 
see that the school law is enforced." County superin- 
tendent "shall advise with teachers as to the best 
methods of instruction and government ; . . .he shall 
have authority to correct abuses." 

In Ohio : District board " shall make such rules and 
regulations as it may deem expedient and necessary 
for its government, and the government of its appoint- 
ees and the pupils," and " shall have the management 
and control of the public schools of the district." 

In Oregon : State board of education shall have 
power " to prescribe a series of rules for the general 
government of the public schools that shall secure 
regularity of attendance, prevent truancy, secure and 
promote the true interests of the schools." Superin- 
tendent of public instruction " to exercise a general 
superintendence of the county and district school offi- 
cers and the public schools of the state." School di- 
rectors " to employ teachers and assist them in the 
government of the school." Board of directors in 
towns of ten thousand inhabitants to "make rules 
and regulations for the government of said district." 

In Pennsylvania : Board of directors of districts, and 
controllers in cities and boroughs, " shall exercise a 
general supervision over the schools of their respective 
districts." 

In Rhode Island : State board of education has 
" general supervision and control of the public schools 



154 APPENDIX. 

of the state." Public schools to be " under the man- 
agement of the school committee subject to the su- 
pervision of commissioner of public schools." School 
committee "shall make, and cause to be put up in 
each school- house, rules and regulations for the at- 
tendance, . . . instruction, government, and discipline 
of the schools." Superintendent of towns, under the 
direction and advice of committee, " to exercise such 
powers as the committee shall assign to him." 

In South Carolina: State superintendent "shall 
have general supervision over all the free public 
schools" and shall cause the school laws of the state, 
"with such rules, regulations, forms, and instructions as 
shall be legally prescribed, to be transmitted to the 
county school commissioners." State board of ex- 
aminers " to adopt rules and regulations, not incon- 
sistent with the laws of the state, for its own govern- 
ment and the government of the free public schools." 
County school commissioner to visit schools, " noting 
any deficiencies that may exist, either in the govern- 
ment of the school or the classification of its pupils, . . . 
and shall make such suggestions, in private, to the 
teachers as to him shall appear necessary to the good 
order of the school and the progress of the pupils." 
School trustees of districts " shall take the manage- 
ment and control of the local interests of the same, 
subject to the supervision of the county board of com- 
missioners." 

In Tennessee: "Tlie public-school system shall be 
administered" by state superintendent, county super- 
intendent, and district-school directors. State superin- 
tendent has a general power of visitation. County su- 



APPENDIX. 155 

perintendent, "to have supervision of the public schools 
in the county." School directors " to explain and en- 
force the school laws and regulations, and themselves 
to observe them, ... to visit the public schools within 
the district from time to time, and see that they are 
conducted according to law and with efficiency." 
Where cities and towns vote to levy and collect 
school-tax the mayor and board of aldermen "shall 
have exclusive control and management over the 
common schools of the city or town." 

In Texas : State superintendent " shall advise and 
consult witli the school boards of counties, cities, and 
towns as to the best methods of conducting the pub- 
lic schools, and shall be empowered to issue instruc- 
tions and regulations binding for observance on all 
officers and teachers in all cases where the provisions 
of the school law may require interpretation in order 
to carry out the designs expressed therein; also in 
cases that may arise in which the law has made no 
provision; and also where necessity requires some 
rule in order that there may be no hardship to indi- 
viduals, and no delay or inconveniences in the man- 
agement of school affairs." If incorporated cities and 
towns so vote they "may have exclusive control of 
the public free schools within their limits." The 
council or board of aldermen of such city or town 
" are invested with exclusive power to maintain, reg- 
ulate, control, and govern " the free schools of said 
town. City council may appoint trustees, who shall have 
control and supervision of the free public schools. Trus- 
tees of school districts and committees shall have "the 
management and control of the free public schools." 



156 APPENDIX. 

In Vermont: State superintendent lias powers of 
visitation. Town superintendents shall also visit, and 
"shall inform themselves of the discipline and progress 
in study in such schools, advise the teachers, and 
adopt the necessary measures for the examination, 
regulation, and improvement in learning of such 
schools." Prudential committee "to adopt requisite 
measures not in conflict with those of the town su- 
perintendent for the inspection, examination, regula- 
tion, and improvement of the school." School di- 
rectors in towns "have the management of the public 
schools, and may make regulations, not inconsistent 
with law, for carrying the powers granted them into 
effect ; and in general shall have the powers and per- 
form the duties of the prudential committee." 

In Virginia: Public-school system shall be "ad- 
ministered by ... a board of education, a superin- 
tendent of public instruction, county superintendents 
of schools, and district school trustees." The Gen- 
eral Assembly shall " prescribe the duties of all scliool 
oflS.cers, and shall make all needful laws and regula- 
tions to carry into effect tlie free public -school sys- 
tem." State board of education " to make by-laws 
and regulations for its own government and for carry- 
ing into effect the school laws," and "regulate all 
matters arising in the practical administration of the 
school system which are not otherwise provided for," 
State superintendent "shall have general supervis- 
ion of the public free-school interests of the state." 
County superintendent to visit all the schools; "to 
inquire into all matters relating to their manage- 
ment . . . and discipline, . . . and in general into what- 



APPENDIX. 157 

ever concerns tlie usefulness and perfection of the 
public free schools, under his supervision," District 
trustees " to explain and enforce the school laws and 
regulations and themselves to observe the same," and 
''to visit the free public schools within the district, 
from time to time, and to take care that they are con- 
ducted according to law and w^ith the utmost efficiency." 
Trustees in towns and cities have same powers and 
duties as district school trustees. " To make regula- 
tions for the attendance of pupils upon the schools," 
and the methods of " government employed." 

In West Virginia : Board of education " shall have 
general control and supervision of the schools and 
school interests of their districts." State superintend- 
ent " shall be charged with the supervision of all 
county superintendents and free schools of tlie state, 
and see that the school system is carried into effect, . . . 
and shall cause such forms, regulations, and instruc- 
tions as he may judge expedient ... to be from time 
to time published." County superintendent charged 
with duties of visitation. Trustee shall visit schools 
and " make such examination and inquiry as he may 
deem useful respecting the studies, discipline, and gen- 
eral condition of the school, and the conduct and 
proficiency of the scholars ; and give such directions 
or make such suggestions to the teachers as in liis 
opinion will promote the interests of the school, and 
the health, morals, and progress of the scholars." 
Trustees of sub -districts "shall have charge of the 
schools therein." 

In Wisconsin : " The supervision of public instruc- 
tion shall be vested in a state superintendent," and 



158 APPENDIX. 

" such other officers as the legislature direct." Dis- 
trict board "shall have power to make all needful 
rules for the government of the schools established in 
the district, such rules to take effect when a copy of 
the same, signed by a majority of the board, shall be 
filed with the clerk." Directors of township schools 
" shall have, in all respects, the supervision and man- 
agement of all the schools, w^ith full power to adopt, 
enforce, modify, and repeal, from time to time, all rules 
and regulations not inconsistent with the laws of this 
state, necessary for their organization, gradation, and 
control, and for the instruction given by them in the 
different branches of education taught therein, and to 
establish and enforce proper penalties for the vio- 
lation of such rules." 



APPENDIX B. 



STATE LAWS IN RELATION TO SUSPENSION AND EX- 
PULSION. 

In Alabama: "Every teacher of a public school is 
required ... to suspend pupils for grossly immor- 
al conduct, or persistent violation of the rules and 
regulations of the school, giving immediate notice to 
parents or guardians." 

In Arkansas : School directors " may, at the instance 
of the teacher, suspend from the school any pupil for 
gross immorality, refractory conduct, or insubordina- 
tion, or for infectious disease. Provided that such 
suspension from the school shall not extend beyond 
the current term." 

In California : Trustees of school districts and city 
boards of education " to suspend or expel pupils for 
misconduct." "Continued wilful disobedience or 
open defiance of the authority of the teacher consti- 
tutes good cause for expulsion from school, and habit- 
ual profanity and vulgarity good cause for suspension 
from school." Teachers to " suspend for good cause 
any pupil in the school, and report such suspension to 
the board of trustees or education for review. If 
such action is not sustained by them the teacher may 



160 APPENDIX. 

appeal to the county superintendciit, whose -decision 
shall be final." 

In Colorado : School board " to suspend or expel pu- 
pils from school who refuse to obey the rules thereof." 

In Connecticut : The committee of every district 
" shall suspend during pleasure, or expel from the 
school for the term, all pupils found guilty, on full 
hearing, of incorrigibly bad conduct." 

In Delaware : The school committee of each district 
may provide regulations "for the expulsion of a 
scholar for obstinate misbehavior." 

In Florida : School trustees " to extend the suspen- 
sion of, or expulsion from school, of any pupil for 
gross misconduct, immorality, a disregard of, or persis- 
tent opposition to, the authority of the teacher. But 
such restriction is not to be continued after a mani- 
fest reformation, and a sincere determination to do 
well in future." Teachers " to suspend pupils from 
school for ten days for gross immorality, misconduct, 
or persistent violation of the regulations, giving im- 
mediate notice to the parent or guardian of the pupil, 
and to the school trustee of the suspension, and the 
cause of it." 

In Illinois : District directors, directors in cities of 
two thousand inhabitants, and boards of education 
in cities of one hundred thousand inhabitants, have 
power to suspend or expel any pupil who may be 
guilty of " gross disobedience or misconduct." 

In Indiana : Township director " may exclude any 
refractory pupil. . * . But the exclusion of any pupil 
from the school for disorderly conduct shall not ex- 
tend beyond the current term, and may be, in the dis- 



APPENDIX. 161 

ci'etion of the director, for a shorter period." " The 
decision of the director in excluding a pupil shall be 
subject to appeal to the township trustee, whose deci- 
sion shall be final." 

In Iowa : The majority of the board of directors in 
independent districts, and sub-directors in sub -dis- 
tricts, " shall have power, with the concurrence of the 
president of the board of directors, to dismiss or sus- 
pend any pupil from the school in their district for 
gross immorality, for a persistent violation of rules of 
the school, and to readmit them if they deem it 
proper so to do." Trustees of county high - schools 
may suspend or expel pupils who do not " conform to 
and obey the rules of the school." 

In Kentucky : School trustees, upon complaint of the 
teacher, " shall have power to expel a pupil." " Every 
teacher shall have the power ... to suspend from 
school any pupil for good cause, provided such sus- 
pension shall be reported, as soon as practicable, to the 
trustee, by the teacher, and if such action is not sus- 
tained by him he may appeal to the commissioner, 
whose decision of the cause shall be final." " Wilful 
disobedience and defiance of the authority of the 
teacher, habitual profanity and vulgarity, or other 
gross violation of propriety or law, shall constitute a 
good cause of suspension or expulsion from school." 

In Kansas : " The district board may suspend, or au- 
thorize the director to suspend, from the privileges of 
a school, any pupil guilty of immorality, or persistent 
violation of the regulations of the school, which sus- 
pension shall not extend beyond the current quarter 
of the school. Provided that the pupil suspended 
11 



162 APPENDIX. 

shall have the right to appeal from the decision of 
said board of directors to the county superintendent, 
■wlio shall, upon a full investigation of tlie charges 
preferred against said pupil, determine as to his guilt 
or innocence of the offence charged, whose decision 
shall be final." 

In Louisiana : Parish board of directors " to dismiss 
any pupil from free public schools for gross immo- 
rality, or for persistent violation of the regulations of 
the school." 

In Maine: School committee may "expel from a 
school any obstinately disobedient and disorderly 
scholar, after a proper investigation of his behavior, if 
found necessary for the peace and usefulness of the 
school, and restore him on satisfactory evidence of his 
repentance and amendment." 

In Maryland: District school trustees "shall have 
l)0wer to suspend and expel pupils for cause. Pro- 
vided that an appeal shall lie to the board of county 
school commissioners, whose decision shall be final." 

In Massachusetts : " Every member of a school com- 
mittee under whose directions a child is excluded 
from a public school, and every teacher of such school 
from which a child is excluded, shall, on ai^plication 
of a parent or guardian of such child, state in writing 
the grounds and reason for the exclusion." 

" A child unlawfully excluded from a public school 
may recover damages therefor in an action of tort, 
to be brought in the name of such child by his guar- 
dian or next friend, against the city or town by which 
such school is supported." 

In Michigan : District board " may authorize or order 



APPENDIX. 163 

the suspension or expulsion from the school, whenever 
in its judgment the interests of the school demand it, 
of any pupil guilty of gross misdemeanor or persis- 
tent disobedience." 

In Minnesota: Boards of trustees and boards of edu- 
cation " may suspend or expel pupils for insubordina- 
tion, immorality, or infectious disease." Boards of 
education in independent districts " shall have pov/er 
... to adopt, alter, modify, and repeal rules ... for 
suspension, expulsion, and transfer " of pupils. " If 
any scholar is suspended or expelled from any such 
school without sufficient cause, or on account of color, 
social position, or nationality, the board by whose di- 
rection the offence was committed shall forfeit and 
pay a fine of fifty dollars for each offence." 

In Missouri : Board of directors have " power to sus- 
pend or expel a pupil whenever, upon due examina- 
tion, they become satisfied that the interests of the 
school demand such expulsion." 

In Nebraska : District board " may authorize or or- 
der the suspension or expulsion from school, whenever 
in their judgment the interests of the school demand 
it, of any pupil guilty of gross misdemeanors or per- 
sistent disobedience, but such expulsion shall not ex- 
tend beyond the close of the term." 

In Nevada : School trustees " shall have power to 
suspend or expel from any public school within their 
district, with the advice of the teacher, any pupil who 
will not submit to the reasonable and ordinary rules 
of order and discipline therein." 

In New Hampshire : " Any scholar may be dismissed 
from school by the school committee for gross mis- 



164 APPENDIX. 

conduct, or for neglect, or refusal to conform to the 
reasonable rules of the school, and shall have no right 
to attend the school until restored by the school com- 
mittee. ... If any scholar, after notice, shall attend 
or visit a school which he has no right to attend, 
or shall interrupt or disturb the same, he shall be 
fined," etc. 

In New Jersey : School trustees " shall have power 
... to suspend or expel pupils from school." Teach- 
ers " shall have power ... to suspend from school 
any puj)il for good cause, provided that such suspen- 
sion shall be reported to the trustees as soon as prac- 
ticable, and if such action is not sustained by them 
the teacher may appeal to the county superintendent, 
whose decision shall be final." Pupils " shall submit 
to the authority of the teacher. Continued and wilful 
disobedience, or open defiance of the authority of the 
teacher, the use of habitual profanity or obscene lan- 
guage, shall constitute good cause for suspension or 
expulsion from school." (Piif)ils liable to suspension 
for injury to school property, see p. 72.) 

In North Carolina : " If any pupil should wilfully 
and persistently violate the rules of school, such pu- 
pil may be dismissed by the teacher for the current 
term." 

In Ohio : " No pupil shall be suspended fi'om school 
by a superintendent or teacher, except for such time 
as may be necessary to convene the board of educa- 
tion of the district, or the directors of the sub -district, 
and no pupil shall be expelled except by a vote of 
two thirds of such board of directors, and not until - 
the parent or guardian of the offending pupil has 



APPENDIX. 165 

been notified of the proposed expulsion, and permit- 
ted to be heard against the same, and no scholar shall 
be suspended or expelled from any school beyond tlie 
current term thereof." 

In Pennsylvania : Boards of directors in districts 
and controllers in cities and boroughs " may suspend 
or expel from school all pupils found guilty, on full 
examination and hearing, of refractory or incorrigibly 
bad conduct." 

In Rhode Island : " The school committee may sus- 
pend during pleasure all pupils found guilty of incor- 
rigibly bad conduct, or of violation of the school reg- 
ulations." 

In South Carolina : School trustees " to suspend or 
dismiss pupils when the prosperity and efficiency of 
the schools make it necessary." 

In Tennessee : School director " to suspend or dis- 
miss pupils when the prosperity or efficiency of the 
school makes it necessary." Any teacher may, "for 
sufficient cause, suspend pupils from attendance on 
the school until the case is decided by the board of 
school directors, which shall be with as little delay as 
possible." 

In Virginia : School trustees " to suspend or dismiss 
pupils when the prosperity and efficiency of the schools 
make it necessary." Teachers may, "for sufficient 
cause, suspend pupils from attendance on the school 
until the case is decided by the board of school trus- 
tees, which shall be with as little delay as possible." 
" Persons suffering from contagious diseases shall be 
excluded." A city superintendent " may suspend or 
dismiss pupils from the public schools provided that 



166 APPENDIX. 

the city school board shall have power to reverse his 
action in the premises." 

In West Virginia • School trustees " may suspend or 
expel any scholar found guilty of disorderly, refrac- 
tory, indecent, or immoral conduct, and may refuse to 
admit such scholar again to the school until satisfied 
that he "will properly conduct himself thereafter. But 
trustees shall take no action or proceeding relating to 
the . . . suspension or expulsion of any scholar from 
school unless at a meeting of which all the trustees 
shall have had notice, and when at least two of their 
number shall be present and concur in such action or 
proceedings And their action in »uch particular shall 
be subject to the revision and carrectio-n of the board 
of education, upon complaint in writing of a majority 
of the patrons of the school." Directors of high- 
schools '^ may expel or suspend scholars when neces- 
sary." 

In "Wisconsin : District board " shall have power to 
suspend any pupil from the privileges of the school, 
for non-compliance with the rules established by them, 
or by the teachers with their consent; to expel from 
school any pupil who shall persistently refuse or neg- 
lect the rules above mentioned, whenever, upon due 
examination^ they shall become satisfied that the in- 
terests of the school shall demand such expulsion." 



APPENDIX C. 



STATE LAWS IN RELATION TO POWERS OF TEACHERS. 

In Alabama : " Every teacher of a public school is 
required ... to maintain good order in the school 
and on the playground," and to " enforce the rules, 
laws, and regulations relating to public schools." 

In California : Teachers " to enforce . . . the rules 
and regulations prescribed for the schools. ... To hold 
pupils to strict account for disorderly conduct on the 
way to and from school, on the playgrounds, or dur- 
ing recess." 

In Florida : Teachers "• to require the pupils to ob- 
serve personal cleanliness, neatness, order, prompt- 
ness, and gentility of manners, to avoid vulgarity and 
profanity. ... To enforce needful restrictions upon the 
conduct of the pupils in or near the school house and 
grounds, avoiding, at all times, unnecessary severity 
and measures that are degrading in their tendency." 

In Kentucky : " Teachers shall faithfully enforce in 
school . . . the regulations prescribed in pursuance of 
law." Every teacher shall have power and authority 
to hold every pupil to a strict accountability in school 
for any disorderly conduct on the way to and from 
school, or on the playground of the school, or during 
intermission or recess." 



168 appendix: 

111 New Jersey : " Every teacher sliall have j^ower 
to hold every pupil accountable iu school for any dis- 
orderly conduct on the way to or from school, or on 
playgrounds of the school, or during recess." 

In North Carolina : " It shall be the duty of all 
teachers of free j)ublic schools to maintain good order 
and discipline in their respective schools, to encour- 
age morality, industry, and neatness in all their pu- 
pils." (For teacher's power of supervision see p. 105.) 

In Oregon : " A teacher's duty while in charge of a 
school shall be ... to maintain order in school, and 
conduct himself in such a manner, before his school, 
as to command respect from his pupils." 

In Virginia : Teachers " shall require of the pupils 
cleanliness of person and good behavior during their 
attendance at the school and on the way thither and 
back to their homes." 



APPENDIX D. 



STATE LAWS IN RELATION TO INSULTS TO TEACHERS. 

In Alabama : " If any parent, guardian, or other per- 
son, from any cause, fancied or real, visit any school 
and insult any teacher in the presence of his pupils, 
the person offending by such conduct -shall be liable 
to a fine of twenty-five dollars, and costs, to be paid 
into the school revenues of the district." 

In California : " Any parent, guardian, or other per- 
son who shall insult or abuse any teacher in the pres- 
ence of the school shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, 
and be liable to a fine of not less than ten nor- exceed- 
ing one hundred dollars." 

In Florida: "Any person who shall, within the 
school-house or grounds, upbraid or insult any teacher 
in the presence of the pupils shall, upon conviction, 
be liable to a fine of twenty-five dollars." 

In Indiana: " If any parent, guardian, or other per- 
son, from any cause, fancied or real, visits a school 
with the avowed intention of upbraiding or insulting 
the teacher in the presence of the school, and shall so 
upbraid or insult the teacher, such person, for such 
conduct, shall be liable to a fine of not more than 
twenty-five dollars, which, when collected, shall go 
into the general tuition revenue." 



INDEX 

Absence— 

rule as to Page 3 

expulsion for. 10, 22 

rule requiring written excuse for. 22 

suspension for 20 

to attend religious services by comnoand of parents 

and priest 10 

BlBL£ — 

reading of, rule concerning. 24, 134 

rule requiring reading of Protestant version ........ 24 

Cases Repoktei> and Cited : 

A nderson v. State (3 Head. K. 455) » 119 

» " cited 130 

Bendich v. Babcoch (31 Iowa, 562) 3, 101 

Chandler v. Babcock (31 Iowa, 562) 3 

Churchill v. FewJces, (13 Brad. R. 520) 22 

« " cited 138 

Com. V. Randall (4 Gray, 36) 116 

« « cited. 124,129 

Com. V. Seed (5 Penn. L. J. R. 78) 126 

« " cited 129 

Cooper V. McJunhin (4 Ind. 291) 113 

« " cited 125,130 

Dannenhoffer v. State (69 Ind. 295) 124 

" « cited 130 

Dannenhoffer v. State (79 Ind. 75) 125 



172 INDEX.- 

Cases Reported and Cited — Continued: 

Davis V. Boston (133 Mass. 103) Page 83 

Donahoe v. Richards (38 Me. 379) 24 

" « cited 8,67,138 

Dritt V. Snodgrass (66 Mo. 286) , 102 

" " cited 138 

Ferriier v. Ti/Ier (48 Vt. 444) 10 

" " cited 67 

Gardner v. State (4 Ind. 633) 115 

" " cited 130 

Guernsey \.PitUn{^2Yt.2'2Q) 33 

" " cited 8 

Hathaway v. Rice (19 Vt. 102) 109 

" « cited 121 

Hodghins v. Rochport (105 Mass. 475) 76 

« cited 130 

Hughes v. Goodell (3 Pitts. Eep. 264) 86 

Kidder V. Chellis (59 N. H. 473) 52 

" cited 68,132,142 

King v. Jefferson City Sch. Board (71 Mo. 628) 20 

Lander y'. Seaver (32 Vt. 114) 94, 121 

" cited 8,101,130 

McCormicTc v. Burt (95 III. 263) 138 

" " cited 23 

Morrow v. Wood(2,b Wis. 59) 34 

« « cited 50,55-58 

Parher v. School Dist. (5 Lea, 525) 80 

Pech V. Sinith (41 Conn. 442) 88 

Perkins v. Directors (56 Iowa, 479) 72 

Rulison y. Post {79 111. 567) 41 

" " cited 50 

Russell y. Lynnjield (116 Mass. 366) 9 

« " cited 130 

Scott y. School Dist. (46 Vt. 452) 77 

Sewell V. Board of Ed. (29 O. St. R. 89) 44 

Sherman v. Charlestown (8 Cush. 160) 91 

•' " cited 8,09,76,101 



INDEX. 173 

Cases Reported and Cited — Continued: 

Spiller V. Wohurn (12 All. 1 27) Page 68 

*' " cited 8,76 

State V. Burton (45 Wis. 150) 78 

« " cited 131 

State V. Mizner (50 Iowa,162) 122 

" " cited 63,130,134 

State V. Pendergrass (2 Dev. & Batt. 365) 105 

" " cited 123,129 

State V. Williams (27 Vt. 755) 140 

Stevens v. Fassett (27 Me. 266) 110, 133 

Thompson v. Beaver (63 111. 356) 8 

Trustees v. The People (87 111. 303) 46 

" " cited 62 

Connecticut case, Pech v. Smith (41 Conn. 442) 88 

Corporal, Punishment— 

decisions relating to 105 

not allowable, for refusing to take studies forbidden 

by parent 34, 50 

right of teacher 105 

for disobedience 124 

for truancy 126 

must be moderate 122 

must not be excessive and cruel 109, 119, 121 

for refusal to study certain branches 128 

teacher must not abuse the privilege 115 

right of teacher when resisted 110 

instrument of. 116, 127 

marks of violence 105, 127 

unreasonable and excessive force cannot be used 118 

may be inflicted on pupils over twenty-one years. 122, 133 

right and measure of. / 133 

liability of teacher for error of judgment 138 

note to decisions 129 

Law of New Jersey concerning 128 

« "New York « 128 

Certificate, teacher without, has authority. 62, IDS 



174 INDEX. * 

Disobedience, expulsion for ."Page 77 

Excuses for absence. . ., . . .■ 22 

Expulsion— 

decisions relating to 74 

committee to decide what requires 27, 76, 82, 85 

by teacher, will not support action against town or 

city 83 

for absence 10, 22 

. for acts of misconduct 76 

for disobedience 77 

for attending social parties 102 

for immorality out of school 91 

for refusal to bow head during prayer 68 

for truancy 94 

for not reading in Bible, . , 24 

not allowable, for not taking studies not required by 

law 41 

not allowable, for refusal to pay for property in- 
jured. 72 

terms of, cannot inflict perpetual disability SQ 

teacher has no power of, 83 

state laws, in relation to, see State Laws. 

General Poavers of school officers. 2 

Illinois cases — 

Churchill v. FewTces (13 Brad. R, 520) 22 

McCormich v. Burt (95 111. 263) 138 

Rulison V, Post (79 III. 667). . . , 41 

Thompson v. Beaver (63 111. 356) 8 

Trustees v. The People (87 111. 303) 46 

Indiana cases — 

Cooper V. McJunUn (4 Ind. 291) 113 

Dannenhojfer v. State (69 Ind. 295) 124 

Dannenhojfer v. State (79 Ind. 75) 125 

Gardner v. State (4 Ind. 633) 115 

Insulting teacher, out of school 96 

state law, in relation to, see State Laws. 



INDEX. 175 

Iowa cases— 

Beiidick v. Bahcoch (31 Iowa, 562) Page 3, 101 

Chandler v. Bahcoch (31 Iowa, 562) 8 

Murphy v. Directors (30 Iowa, 429) 99 

Perhins v. Directors (56 Iowa, 479) 72 

State V. Mizner (50 loAva, 152) 50, 122 

Maine cases — 

Donakoe v, Richards (3.8 Me. 379) 24 

Stevens v. Fassett (27 Me. 266) 110 

Mann, Horace, opinion on power of officers in schoolroom. . 90 
" " " of teacher without certif- 
icate 139 

Massachusetts cases — 

Com. V. Randall (4 Gray, 36) .... 116 

Davis V. Boston (133 Mass. 103) 83 

Ilodghim v. Rochport (105 Mass. 475) 76 

Russell V. Lyyinfield (116 Mass. 366) 9 

Sherman v. Charlestoicn (8 Cush. 160) 91 

Spiller V. Wohurn (12 All. 127) 68 

Misconduct, expulsion for. 76 

Missouri cases — 

Dritt V. Snodgrass {^ Mo. 286) 102 

King v. Jefferson City Sch. Board (71 Mo. 628) 20 

New Hampshire case — 

Kidder V. Chellis (50 N. H. 473) 52 

North Carolina case — 

State V. Pendergrass (2 Dev. & Batt, 365). 105 

Officers, School — 

general powers of .' 2 

acting in good faith, not liable to parents or pupil. . . 134 

power to act in schoolroom. ..,,,.... 90, 141 

opinion of Horace Mann 90 

power over pupils for acts out of school 91 

to decide what requires expulsion 27, 76, 82, 85 

state law in relation to powers of, see State Laws. 



176 INDEX*. 

Ohio case— 

Seioell V. Board of Ed, (29 0. St. R. 89) Page 44 

Out of School — ' 

power over pupils for acts 9i 

immorality, expulsion for 91 

insulting teacher 9G 

acts, punishable 97 

publication, ridiculing school directors 99 

acts, within authority of teacher and school board. . . 101 

directors cannot forbid attending social parties 102 

Pennsylvania cases — 

Com. V. Seed (5 Penn. L. J. R. 78) 12G 

Hughes v. Goodell (3 Pitts. Rep. 264) 86 

Prayer, expulsion for refusal to bow head during 68 

Reasonable rule, what is. 2 

Rules — 

as to absence 3 

as to tardiness 3 

cannot be made to cover all cases 131 

made by one member of committee , 131 

need not be recorded 130 

pupils over twenty-one, subject to 133 

requiring written excuse for absence 22 

requiring English composition, is reasonable 33 

what is a reasonable rule 2 

rules in other cases 68 

(^See State Laws.) 

Social parties, expulsion for attending, not allowable. . . . 102 

State Laws, in relation to pupils and rules — 

California 132 

Kentucky 132 

Missouri 132 

New Jersey 132- 

New Hampshire 133 



INDEX. 1*77 

State Laws, in relation to pupils and rules — Continued: 

Ehode Island Page 133 

Wisconsin , , . 133 

State Laws, in relation to poAvers of school officers — 

Appendix A 143 

Alabama 143 

Arkansas. 143 

California 143 

Colorado 144 

Connecticut 144 

Delaware 144 

Florida 145 

Georgia 145 

Illinois 145 

Indiana 146 

Iowa 14G 

• Kentucky 146 

Kansas 147 

Louisiana 147 

Maine 148 

Maryland. 148 

Massachusetts. » , . . 148 

Michigan 148 

Minnesota 148 

Mississippi , 149 

Missouri, . . , 149 

Nebraska 149 

Nevada 150 

New Hampshire 150 

New Jersey 151 

New York - 152 

New York City , 152 

North Carolina 152 

Ohio .153 

Oregon 153 

Pennsylvania 153 

Pihode Island 153 

12 



178 INDEX, 

State Laws, in relation to powers of school of&cers—jyoniinued: 

South Carolina Page 154 

Tennessee ....>. 154 

Texas 155 

Vermont 156 

Virginia 156 

West Virginia 157 

Wisconsin 157 

State Laws, in relation to expulsion and suspension-r 

Appendix B 159 

Alabama 159 

Arkansas 159 

California 159 

Colorado 159 

Connecticut 160 

Delaware. 160 

Florida 160 

Illinois 160 

Indiana 160 

Iowa 161 

Kansas 161 

Kentucky , • • • • 161 

Louisiana 162 

Maine. 162 

Maryland 162 

Massachusetts 162 

Michigan 162 

Minnesota 163 

Missouri 163 

Nebraska 163 

Nevada 163 

New Hampshire 163 

New Jersey 164 

North Carolina 164 

Ohio 164 

Pennsylvania 165 

Pihode Island 165 



INDEX. 179 

State Laws, in relation to expulsion and suspension — Continued: 

South Carolina Page 165 

Tennessee 165 

Virginia 165 

West Virginia 166 

Wisconsin 166 

State Laws, in relation to powers of teachers — 

Appendix C 167 

Alabama 167 

California 167 

Florida 167 

Kentucky , 167 

New Jersey 168 

North Carolina 168 

Oregon 168 

Virginia 168 

State Laws, in relation to insults to teachers — 

Appendix D, 169 

Alabama 169 

California 169 

Florida. 169 

Indiana 169 

Studies — 

corporal punishment for refusing to pursue certain.. . 128 
not to be enforced against reasonable wish of par- 
ent , 34, 50 

rules concerning 24 

not required by law, pupils not compelled to take ... 41 

parent has right to determine 46, 50 

suspension for not declaiming 52 

suspension for not studying rhetoric. - 44 

note to decisions on 66 

Suspension — 

decisions relating to.. 74 

for tardiness 3, 9 

for absence 20 

for not writing English composition 33 



180 INDEX. , 

Suspension — Continued: 

for not studying rhetoric Page 44 

for not declaiming 52 

for pviblishing article ridiculing directors 99 

for refusing to remain quiet during reading of Bible. 134 
where teacher enforced rule against wish of directors 80 

power of teacher 79, 80 

state laws in relation to, see State Laws. 

Tardiness — 

rule as to 3 

suspension for 3, 9 

directors cannot bar door against tardy pupils 9 

rule that pupils should be sent to committee for 9 

Teacher— 

authority of, without certificate. 52, 138 

opinion of Horace Mann 139 

power to suspend 78, 80 

has no power to expel 85 

may call assistance 110, 141 

cannot enforce role against wish of directors 80 

liability of, for error of Judgment 138 

not liable for excessive punishment, unless clearly 

so..,.. 122 

insults to, out of school 96 

state laws in relation to, see State Laws. 

state laws in relation to powers of, see State Laws. 

See Corporal Panishnaent. 

Tennessee cases — 

A nderson v. State (3 Head. E. 455) 119 

Parler v. School District (5 Lea, 525) 80 

Truant— 

expulsion of. 94 

corporal punishment for 126 

truancy 20 

Twenty-one years, pupils over, subject to rules 133 

subject to corporal punishment 133 



INDEX. 181 

Vermont cases — 

Ferriter v. Tyler (48 Vt. 444) Page 10 

Haihaxoay v. Rice (19 Vt. 102) 109 

Lander v. Seaver (32 Vt. 114) 96, 121 

Scott \. School Dist.iA&^t.^hV) 77 

State V. Williams (27 Vt. 755) 140 

Wisconsin cases — 

Morrow v. Wood (35 Wis. 59) 34 

State \. Burton (45 Wis. 150) 78 



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